

**ROLE OF ELECTORAL PROCESS ON POLITICAL  
STABILITY IN EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY STATES**

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**Role of Electoral Process on Political Stability in East African  
Community States**

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## DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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## **DEDICATION**

This thesis is dedicated to my loved wife Drocella and Children Dr. Jean Pierre, Dr. Jean Claude, Dr. Jean Paul, Dr. Jean Christophe, my daughter in law Dr. Gloria, my grandsons Jacen, Jacob and Jaden for their valuable inspiration, commitment, constant prayers and true love. Special dedication goes to my daughters Clementine and Aline for their love, closeness, patient and constant stimulating effort. To crown it all, to the almighty God who provided me with all I needed in this journey of seeking knowledge.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

<b>EAC:</b>	East African Community
<b>EALA:</b>	East African Legislative Assembly
<b>EC:</b>	Electoral College
<b>ECG:</b>	Electoral Commission of Ghana
<b>EMB:</b>	Election Management Body
<b>EVMs:</b>	Electronic Voting Machines
<b>FPTP:</b>	First-Past-the-Post
<b>IEB:</b>	Independent Electoral Body
<b>IEBC:</b>	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
<b>IEC:</b>	Independent Electoral Commission
<b>MLA:</b>	Members of Legislative Assembly
<b>MMP:</b>	Mixed Member Proportional System
<b>MP:</b>	Member of Parliament
<b>NEC:</b>	National Electoral Commission
<b>PR:</b>	Proportional Representation
<b>PRS:</b>	Proportional Representation System
<b>SMM:</b>	Single Member Majority
<b>SMP:</b>	Single Member Plurality

**SPSS:** Statistical Package for Social Science

**TTGP:** Two Third Gender Principle

**UEC:** Uganda Electoral Commission

**USA:** United States of America

## OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

- Electoral process:** Refers to the method by which a person is elected to Public office. An electoral process is the method and law for holding an election and explains laws and custom that must be followed by all partakers and must produce free and fair elections (Robert, *et al.*, 2011).
- Election process:** An election is the process of voting to choose someone to be their political leader or representative in government (Shivam, 2016).
- Political leadership:** is a concept central to understanding political processes and outcomes, yet its elusive. Many disciplines have contributed to the study of leadership, including political theory, history, psychology and management studies (Staniland, 2014).
- Political stability:** It can for instance be understood on a relatively micro level, as the expectation of certain continuity in diplomatic and bureaucratic practices or the guarantee against unlawful forms of expropriation for a country's own companies acting abroad (Jandhyala *et al.*, 2011).
- Post-electoral phase:** is the period between the closing of polling stations and the announcement of the final results. It includes, for example, the sealing and safe transport of ballot boxes, the counting of ballot papers, independent oversight over the counting process, the collation of results, the declaration of provisional results, the resolution of electoral disputes and challenges of results, and the declaration of the final results. In some circumstances this phase may continue through to the appropriate implementation of the election results (Reno, 2011).

**Pre-election phase process:** In the pre-election period, legislatures and state institutions develop or refine the legal and procedural framework in which the elections are conducted. The electoral bodies conduct a range of activities in preparation for Election Day and determining the electoral outcome. The pre-electoral phase starts with the actual preparations for holding elections and lasts until the end of the electoral campaign. Activities during this phase are in preparation of the elections and may include amending laws, training election officials, educating voters, registering voters, printing ballot papers, compiling voter registers, registering candidates and electoral campaigning (EALA, 2017).

## ABSTRACT

The general objective of the study was to examine the role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community States. In order to achieve the general objective this study was guided by the following specific objectives: to determine the role of pre-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States, to assess the role of election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States, to evaluate the role of post-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States and to find out the moderating role of political leadership on the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States. The research design adopted in the study was a cross sectional survey design. The target population consisted of 123 individuals working within the electoral commissions of different EAC countries and the EAC Legislative Assembly and a sample of 94 was drawn. The study adopted a positivism philosophy. A stratified sampling technique was used to gather for proper representation. Data collection instrument used was a questionnaire. Quantitative data was analyzed statistically yielding frequencies, percentages, means and standard deviations, while inferential statistical tools such as correlation and regression were used to determine and explain variable relations by use of SPSS Version 21 program. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test for significant differences and data were presented in the form of tables, figures and charts. The study conducted various tests including multi collinearity, autocorrelation tests, normality test and heteroscedasticity tests. The study found out that there was a positive and significant relationship between Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes and political stability. The constant term is 0.102 dependent variable when all the independent variables are equal to zero. The constant term has a p-value of 0.915 which is greater than 0.05. This implies that the constant term is insignificant. The multiple regression on the role of electoral process on political stability is thus an equation through the origin. If all the independent variables take on the values of zero, there would be zero political stability in East Africa states. The t statistics helps in determining the relative importance of each variable in the model. As a guide regarding useful predictors, we look for t values well below -0.5 or above +0.5. In this case the significant variable level of the variables was as follows; election phase (0.000 less than P-value 0.05) then it was followed by pre-election phase (p=0.021) and lastly the post-election phase (p=0.185), respectively. The entire null hypotheses were rejected. The study concludes that Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes and Post-election phase processes have a positive and significant effect on political stability. The study recommends East African Community States leaders should consider the many factors involved in a complex and dynamic situation before making decisions on electoral processes that will influence the effectiveness, efficiency and ultimately the political stability of individual partner states. Further the study recommends a future studies introducing other moderating or an intervening variable in their models.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background of the Study**

Globally elections play a significant role in peace processes since they are widely considered to be the main method of achieving a peaceful resolution to political controversies (Levitsky & Way, 2010). An election process is a means of pursuing or retaining political power in which social differences are highlighted by candidates and parties' campaigning for popular support (Frantz & Geddes, 2013). This process can contribute to peace, but it can also provide entry points for violence and conflicts because of the competitive patterns embedded in the "winner-loser" dichotomy (Norman, 2013). Such instability can derail the peace process and hamper both short-term recovery efforts and long-term development (Kilonzo, 2009).

The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the highest development of democracy in the olden times of the world (Mudde, 2013). If we define democracy in the minimal sense, as a system of government in which the principal positions of political power are filled through even, able, and just elections, then about three of every five sovereign states in the world are democracies today (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013).

Furthermore, most countries in the world regard periodic and regular elections as a core attribute of democracy. In 2016, a total of 132 elections were held worldwide in presidential, legislative or local contests (International IDEA, 2017). Electoral processes held under conditions that meet global and regional standards for being credible give meaning to democracy's core values of political equality and the accountability of those who govern. At a basic and practical level, elections are a critical element of an effective anti-corruption strategy, even if the fear of losing an election is not always enough to prevent elected representatives from being dishonest.

### **1.1.1 Global Perspective on electoral process**

Developed countries like United States of America are considered a democratic state which holds elections after every four years. Candidates for each political party declare interest but the final candidate for a given party is chosen at party meetings called conventions. The parties hold conventions at the local, state and national levels. There are two main ways the states send people to the national convention: the caucus and the primary. Both methods result in a set of delegates who attended the national conventions. The delegates pledge that when they attend the convention, they voted for the candidate the state political party supports. In terms of campaign funding, millions of dollars are spent in the months leading up to the national conventions, but that is just the beginning. Once the field is narrowed to the two main party candidates, fundraising becomes even more important. This normally happens at a time where only a few months before the general election, and each candidate needs to get his or her message out to the American public. Political parties in each state normally help the candidates with paying the bills and organizing support (Thad, 2012).

The UK is a constitutional monarchy comprising England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. A bicameral parliament exercises legislative authority which is supported by both the House of Lords and the House of Commons. During the session six hundred and fifty members of the House of Commons are elected under a first- past-the-post system in single-member constituencies for a fixed 5-year period. Candidates who receive the highest numbers of valid votes in each constituency are elected (Blau & Adrian, 2008).

According to the Australian Education Office (2009), Australia is a representative democracy, founded in the liberal democratic tradition. This means that the people vote for candidates from among multiple political parties to represent their interests in congress enhancing the decision - making power of elected representatives is subject to the rule of law. The structure, together with decree and mutual rule, defends the privileges and autonomies of individuals and minority groups such that diverse political interests are acknowledged; and all Australians are entitled to

procedural fairness in the resolution of disputes. The Constitution sets out the protagonists and supremacies of the nationwide assembly, the administration and the judges. It guarantees the protection of certain rights and freedoms defines the responsibilities of the Commonwealth government (such as foreign relations, trade, defense, immigration and taxation) and places constraints on government authority.

In India is the Election Commission of India is an autonomous, constitutionally established federal authority responsible for administering all the electoral procedures. Underneath the command of the instruction, permitted and impartial elections have been held in India at regular intervals as per the principles enshrined in the Constitution (Gill, 2008). Art 325 of the constitution provides for creation of a single election roll for entire country. There is an Election Commission of India at National level and State Election Commissions at State level to administer the electoral process in India. India recognizes democracy as being extremely important and strives to conduct free and fair elections to establish the legitimacy of political leaders. India is by far the largest democracy in the world with more than 800 million electorates where conducting able, just and efficient elections is a very challenging and a daunting task. Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) were introduced as an effort to improve and strengthen the method of electoral process. In particular, its objective was to minimize incidences of human error, reduce instances of rigging and manipulation, and prevent abuse of government power in polls. In addition, the use EVMs were also justified in terms of “commendable” reduction in price and period involved while conducting elections and increase the likelihood of being able to cast votes by the vulnerable sections (Shri, 2011).

### **1.1.2 Regional Perspective on electoral process**

In South African the participants in the political field admits the fact that elections and electoral structures are vibrant indicators of the level and extent of democratic association. According to Teorell and Lindstedt, (2010) South African Constitution assurances general adult suffrage, a national common voter’s roll and regular elections. It provides for a national assembly consisting of no fewer than 350 and no more than 400 men and women elected as members under an electoral system based



on a national common voter's roll and results. It also provides for a minimum voting age of 18 years (Kadima & Leonard, 2009). The Constitution provides for provincial legislatures consisting of representatives elected as members in the same fashion as those elected to the national legislature save that such election is based on the province's segment of the national common voter's roll.

Albertyn, Hassim and Meintjes (2012) elucidate that South Africa uses a proportionate illustration electoral system, based on fixed party lists. Half of the 400 national assembly members are chosen from nine provincial lists and the other half from a single national list prepared by each party. Provincial parliaments are chosen from the party lists for each provincial legislature. They assert that this ensures an almost complete proportionality with no votes 'wasted'. The Droop quota is used to apportion seats: this quota results in seats being awarded through the largest remainder method. If a seat is left unfilled after all allocations have been made, the political party with the highest remainder of unallocated votes were given that seat. No mandatory threshold for parliamentary representation exists, thus ensuring inclusiveness by enabling even very small parties' representation in parliament.

Ghana's political system is a mixture of Westminster and a presidential system, where the president endowed with far-reaching powers and the executive playing the legislative (Lindberg, 2010). Under the Constitution, Ghana's judicial system is relatively well developed, although even the judiciary is not wholly free of political influence and bribery. Currently, the president and the parliamentary elections follow the first-past-the-post electoral system whereby the people elect the President and their deputies directly. Although parliamentary elections are by a simple majority, the leader on the other hand needs an absolute majority to win such that if no candidate emerges victorious from the first ballot, a run-off is held between the two frontrunners to determine the winner (Smith, 2011).

### **1.1.3 Local Perspective on electoral process**

Kenya's electoral process is hinged on the constitution which directly addresses most of the sequences. However, parliament also has a lee way to address some of the processes through different Acts (Pepela, 2015). The elections are conducted after

every five years unless in the instances that a by-election is announced for a certain parliamentary or county seat. Kenya Constitution of 2010 has a strong link to party-political stability as determined by the electoral system and administration of elections. Constitution of Kenya of 2010 rigidities the general ethics pinged on the electoral system that must be observed before, during and after elections. The qualified voters are then given votes cards which are kept safely for use on the particular day of voting. This is normally followed by checking of voters register whereby the registered voters are given an opportunity to go back to the areas where they registered so as to confirm whether their names appear on the voters' register. They also find out whether their names are spelt correctly this in some cases is also done electronically. Educating voters is compulsory according to the election Act 2012. Voters are educated on how to vote through advertisement, workshops, media awareness and other congregations throughout the country. The people are also informed on the importance of voting. Conducting elections is held transparently by ensuring that candidates have their agents at the polling stations that make sure the ballot boxes and vote counting are effectively managed. The voters then elect members of their choice. Counting votes and announcement of results is done at the balloting posts and the presiding officer delivers results to the presiding officer at the constituency level. The returning officer after compiling all the results from presiding officers declares the elections results. The results are then submitted to the IEBC headquarters for official announcement (Kathurima, 2011).

In Uganda the electoral system is commonly set in the Constitution and the relevant laws. The Constitution establishes an Electoral Commission as an independent commission; a body corporate, consisting of a chairperson, a deputy chairperson and five other members, appointed by the President with approval of Parliament. Members of the Commission must be persons of high moral character, proven integrity, with considerable experience and demonstrated competence in the conduct of public affairs and must hold office for seven years. Their appointment may be renewed for one more term only (IPU, 2015).

Role of crime preventers: Claims had been made that there was ongoing recruitment and training of militia by the NRM, to harass and intimidate citizens in

constituencies, as well as the establishment of ‘vote protecting brigades’ by opposition parties. Concerns were expressed about the potential threats associated with the recruitment of such forces in the absence of a legal framework to embed accountability. The police had acknowledged that crime preventers were being recruited to boost the capacity of police at polling stations on Election Day, by performing the role of ‘electoral constables, Commonwealth (2016).

Tanzania is a Union of formerly sovereign states which are Tanganyika (now Mainland Tanzania) and Zanzibar (now Tanzania Zanzibar). Tanzania is a democratic country with a Multi-party-political system since July 1992. Tanzania and Zanzibar’s electoral context is based on a First-Past-The Post (FPTP) system in the sense that; the Presidential, Parliamentary and Councilor Candidate who secures the majority of votes is declared to be the winner. However, according to the National Electoral Commission of Tanzania (2010), special seats such as the Women Special Seats Members of Parliament are obtained by way of Proportional Representation basing on the total sum of polls each Party got country-wide in the Parliamentary Election.

Elections Expenses Act of 2010 governs the election expenses; it became operational immediately after being approved in early 2010. This Act makes provisions for the funding of nomination process, election campaigns and elections with a view of controlling the use of funds and prohibited practices in the nomination process. This Act makes provisions for allocation, management and accountability of funds by political parties during elections.

In Rwanda, Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (2003 amendment), defines Rwanda as “an independent, sovereign, democratic, social and secular Republic”. The President is elected on the basis of a single national constituency, requiring a simple majority. An elected term is seven-years, and according to the Constitution amendment, the term limit of two terms has been removed. In terms of national legislation, the key legal instruments for the conduct of the election are: The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (2003, as amended); The Presidential Election Law (No. 27/2010); Law on Political Parties; Law

No18/2008 of 23/07/2008 relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology; Law Relating to the Organization and Functioning of the National Electoral Commission (No. 31/2005); Law on Media (No.22/2009) and Regulation Providing for Access to Public Media during Presidential Election Campaigns.

The National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) established by Constitution as an independent body is responsible for the organization of national level, communes and local elections including voter registration and management of the voting processes done by secret ballot. Registration undertaken by the NIEC provision is made for the implementation of continuous registration. Party registration is undertaken by Ministry of the Interior and funding by the state is restricted to subsidizing electoral expenses; foreign funding is prohibited; parties must submit annual accounts to the Ministries of Interior and of Finance. The National Council of the Communications must ensure equitable access of all candidates during the campaign period to state owned media.

#### **1.1.4 East Africa community states**

East Africa community states comprises of 6 member partner states which includes; Kenya Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, South Sudan and Burundi with its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. (EALA, 2011). The partner states have undergone tremendous changes in the last decade (2007 -2017). Different countries have been admitted in the treaty It has expanded and at the same time encountered many challenges. As one of the fastest growing regional economic blocs in the world, the EAC is widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in various key spheres for their mutual benefit which are not limited to political, economic and social spheres (USAID, 2017). None of the East African Countries has a fool-proof voters register partly because of manipulations in Kenya and Zanzibar- or uncertainty about the integrity of the underlying civil register from which the voters' register is constructed – as in Burundi and Uganda. All the countries have also chronically under-registered the youth. Both of these are dangers to electoral democracy in the region (Barkan, 2013).

History has a role to play in the reasons as to why stakes are high in an election win for many Kenyans. Political leadership in Kenya is a space for the elite ethnic groups favored by or who collaborated with the colonial administration. This system is not inclusive with successive Governments leaving certain ethnic groups out of politics. Marginalized ethnic groups lack the numbers to win an election in a country where voting is primarily along ethnic lines. This has led some to question whether the First Past The Post (FPTP) electoral system is suitable for Kenya and whether a proportional representation system would foster better representation and inclusivity (Julie, 2017)

According to Okolo (2012) the electoral system of any given country plays a fundamental role in sustaining and molding the political behavior of its citizens. The dignity, way and manner in which elections are conducted in a country go a long way to determine the level of political culture, political participation and good governance in the country. These assertions give a clue to the importance of good and healthy electoral system in a country. Although East African Community States history has it that it is difficult to hold elections that are completely free and fair the multiparty elections have not produced anything but minimalist democracies.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Globally, electoral process plays a significant part in determining the political steadiness in any given country.

By violating the specified code of comportment of the electoral procedure is dangerous to both the economy and the political stability of a country. This is potential in situations where polls are subject to manipulation or conducted by a biased source hence distortion of poll results. It is well recognized under international law that any limitation pinged on the autonomy of elections must endure within strictly-defined parameters.

Election malpractices have their roots in autonomous executive; an all-powerful arm which is solely responsible for appointing the leading electoral commission staff, including the leadership. Political expediency has been a pain in the neck that has

always made sure that Africa stagnates right where she is. Trust is vital to democracy. Increasing unrest and volatility within the electorate result in greater political unpredictability. It is important to monitor the development of forms of political participation, involvement and influence. The mass media and the civil society also play an important part as catalysts of change in interactions between voters, parties and public authorities.

For example, this is evidenced by the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya that left more than 1,500 Kenyans killed, 1,133 casualties, over 350,000 internally displaced persons, approximately 2,000 refugees, destruction of 117,216 private properties and 491 government owned property, around 42,000 houses and many businesses looted and destroyed, gang rapes, and destruction of the railway line (Kioko, 2010). The lessons learnt however did not live long to help Kenya in 2017 to organize credible elections.

In Burundi situations has progressively deteriorated since 25 April 2015 after the general elections. According to the report by UNHCR (2016) Burundi political conflict reported fatality count of 1,155 between 26 April 2015 and 25 April 2016. At least 690 of the reported dead (or approximately 60%) are civilians. More than 260,000 people have reportedly fled outside Burundi and thousands have disappeared without trace: approximately 137,000 Burundian refugees have crossed into Tanzania, 77,000 into Rwanda, 23,000 into Uganda, and 22,000 migrated to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

According to the Commonwealth Observer Group report on Uganda Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in 2011 and 2016 respectively a number of irregularities in the electoral processes have consistently been noted and they included; abuse of incumbency, lack of a level playing field, the lack of campaign finance regulations, the lack of a Political Parties Code of Conduct and the issues with regard to the lack of independence of the Electoral Commission.

Quantitative cross-national research on the principal manifestations of political instability coups and civil wars has consistently shown that economic conditions are the best predictors in Africa and other developing regions, (Fearon & Laitin, 2013),

(Miguel *et al.*,2014) and (McGowan, 2014). Although these empirical analyses acknowledge that the weakness of political institutions contribute to the region's volatility, they do not explicitly bring out the factors related to electioneering and leadership positions as possible contributors and the chief strategy used by most African leaders to buy off rivals and reward their followers.

Birch, (2010) observes that in order to enhance democratic participation efforts are sought to incorporate extensive consultation and participation by the widest possible range of consultations that involve politicians, the private sector and civil society. Diamond (2005) stressed that up until his publication the Elections management bodies did little regarding planning and only focused on delivering a specific election. Ronald (2008) also raised the same concerns. Likewise, Pastor and Fischer (2005) in a joint publication by the International Foundations for Electoral Systems (IFES) and UNDP did not deal with alternatives to outright procurement of technologies for EMBs. Again, Bean (2007) comprehensively addressed the application of technology to election administration but did not consider alternatives to the outright procurement of technologies. Contrary to this Wall (2011) considered a form of outsourcing when he suggested that EMBs could partner with other government institutions to allow strategic alliances. He also mentions outsourcing "their technology management aspects to a systems integration firm" and suggests that there are successful models. This research sought to bridge the gaps identified above upon reviewing previous scholarly contributions. The study covered objectives that range from determination of the relationship between the pre-election phase processes and political stability in the East Africa Community States; The assessment of the relationship between election phase processes and political stability in the East Africa Community States; the evaluation of the relationship between post-election phase processes and political stability in the East Africa Community States and assessment of the moderating role of political leadership in electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

#### **1.3.1 General Objective**

The general objective of the study was to examine the role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community States.

#### **1.3.2 Specific Objectives**

This study specifically sought to:

1. To determine the role of pre-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States.
2. To assess the role of election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States.
3. To evaluate the role of post-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States.
4. To test the moderating role of political leadership on the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East African Community States.

### **1.4 Research Hypotheses**

This study was guided by the following null hypotheses:

**Ho1:** Pre-election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.

**Ho2:** Election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.

**Ho3:** Post-election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.



**Ho4:** Political leadership does not significantly moderate the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East African Community States.

### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

This study results would enable the researcher to disseminate factual and relevant information thus contributing to the world of knowledge. This would go a long way in solving the problem of too much dependence on insignificant and unreliable information in understanding the role of political leadership in improving electoral processes in different states. This would also be resourceful to a number of states that wish to conduct free and fair elections and hence embrace political stability.

#### **1.5.1 East African Community member states.**

The best way to look at the political stability in East African Community member states is through investigating the role of electoral process in different member states. The study was to examine the role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community member states. By illustrating the different phases of electoral process effects policy makers are to find the findings of this study to be of importance in formulating policies that were to help the different member states improve in electoral process.

#### **1.5.2 Researchers and Scholars**

The study will be of great importance to other study teams who will gain both theoretical and practical experience on the role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community member states.

#### **1.5.3 International election observers**

International election observers would be able to harmonize elections in different countries basing on the research findings of this study which is a sure way to attain political stability in the East African Community member states.

## **1.6 Scope of the Study**

This study focused on examining the role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community States. Only information regarding the role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community States was done carried out. The study covered all the six countries in East African Community. Information regarding the role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community States was carried at the headquarters of electoral systems of all the East African Community States in Arusha Tanzania. The research covered the period of the last ten (10) years when the EAC has been actively undertaking various integration initiatives.

## **1.7 Limitations of the Study**

One of the limitations that were encountered while conducting the research was getting the respondents to be interviewed during working hours as many of them were out for field work or in closed door meetings. To overcome this, the researcher administered questionnaires through a drop and pick method. The study also acknowledges that not all information sought for this research was in the public domain and to overcome this challenge permission was sought to access the organizations documentation which captured the required information. Finally, the reluctance of the management to disclose crucial information in the name of privacy was an obstacle to the study. The limitations were countered by creating a convenient time schedule with the respondents and guaranteed them that the information was confidential and would be used for academic purposes only.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter reviewed the existing literature regarding the role of electoral processes on political stability. It consists of reviewed theoretical and empirical literature structured under different sub-headings. The review is guided by the study objectives thus, helping to concretize the study variables. A critique of existing literature and summary review of key constructs is also provided together with the existing research gaps that need to be addressed.

#### **2.2 Theoretical Review**

The theoretical review helps to extract, comprehend and ground key concepts and variables of the study. It explores past studies that relate to the objectives and constructs conceptualized in the study. According to Munday (2009) theoretical framework introduces and describes the theory which explains why the research problem under study exists. A theoretical framework consists of concepts, together with their definitions, and existing theory/theories that are used for the particular study (Cyert & March, 2013).

##### **2.2.1 Evolutionary Theory of Political Leadership**

The theory put forward by Smith and Conrey (2010). It states that central to social systems are the attitudes of the rank and file toward those who make political decisions (leaders), and attitudes toward leaders are known to be characterized by two fundamental features; the modal attitude and people's variance. The modal attitude is acceptance of the necessity of leaders coupled with acute aversion to leaders who are believed to be motivated by ambition and avarice; second, people are highly variable with some being markedly more sensitive than others to the traits of leaders.

The theory explains that one of the enduring features of modern representative democracy is people's dissatisfaction with political decision makers but with substantial cross-sectional variance within populations. The fact that people always have the desire to be controlled and the similar time their tendency to be dissatisfied with those who are leaders can be explained using evolutionary biology that given the competitive and uncertain environment in which groups typically exist, leadership is essential mainly because groups without leaders will ultimately lose out to groups with influential, similarly bad leaders can be just as pathological to a group as no leaders at all.

It relates to the fact that in many circumstances when a limited number of individuals possesses special authority to make decisions for others, those individuals are also in a position to direct resources to themselves at the expense of other group members, resulting in a dysfunctional group. To avoid this, members of a successful group need to stand ready not only to elevate and obey leaders but also to keep an unblinking eye on those leaders and to be prepared to cut them down to size if they act in a self-serving fashion or seem to believe they deserve special treatment. This is what builds the essence of democracy and hence political stability.

A study by Yu, Leithwood and Jantzi (2012) concluded that transformational leaders impacted on the followers towards change in the organization and conditions in the organization. This leadership approach is thus superior and necessary for all organizations which plan to make progressive change (Tucker & Russell, 2014). People make quick judgments of the competence of leaders based on facial cues, and perceived competence predicts electoral success (Olivola, Eubanks, & Lovelace, 2014).

Evolutionary Theory of Political Leadership was adopted by the study to guide and direct how powerful the type of leadership can be through the actions of the leader in determining aspects of the organization such as setting the strategic direction, managing resources and culture. This theory supports the variable pre-election phase process by positing that in showing that people are indeed generally sensitive to

leadership traits threatening to the larger group even as certain, expected individuals are a good deal more sensitive than others.

### **2.2.2 The Spiral of Silence Theory**

The spiral theory is a most prominent theoretical models of opinion formation and consensus building in modern societies. It describes the dynamics of public opinion in situations where the climate of opinion is shifting. It must be understood only in the light of these two tenets: pressure to conform and fear of isolation.

According to McQuail (2015) Noelle-Neumann's theory proposes that in order to avoid isolation on important public issues (like candidate or political party support), many people are guided by what they think to be dominant or declining opinions in their environment. People tend to conceal their opinions if the impression is that they are in minority and are keener to prompt them if they think they are dominant. The result is that those views that are perceived to be dominant gain even more ground and alternatives retreat still further.

The main point here is that the mass media are the most readily accessible source for assessing the prevailing climate. They can significantly influence this theory. For instance, if a certain view predominates in the media, it tended to be magnified in the subsequent stages of personal opinion formation and expression. Thus, if the media gives a misleading information on the prevailing public opinion then there is the likelihood of a biased public opinion to be formed. Lee (2013), shares that Spiral of Silence Theory is applied to establish the need to raise other voices for a specific agenda. The Sponsored communication messages are put in place to counter dominant voices and influence implementation of TTGP among political parties Jubilee party of Kenya.

On the other hand, due to the social nature of man, that is, the pressure to conform and fear of isolation; people are constantly aware of the opinions of people around them and adjust their behaviors (and potentially their opinions) to majority trends under the fear of being on the trailing crosswise of a free deliberation.

The relevance of this theory to this study is that it explains how people form their voting preferences when bombarded with electoral opinion messages. Electorates are swayed by the bandwagon effects rather than fearing social isolation. In this study, The Spiral of Silence Theory is of great value in explaining why the pre-election messages are used as alternatives to the dominant voice that is condemning election process. The theory supports the variable election phase processes by hypothesizing that Election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.

### **2.2.3 Transformative Political Leadership Theory**

The theory put forward by Rotberg (2012) argues that individual leaders and the choices they make exert significant influence over the development of political cultures and institutions, particularly in young or postcolonial states: This theory is derived almost entirely from the literature on leadership from the fields of business management and organizational studies, and does not seem to be applied specifically to political leadership, except in that the case studies used to coin the theory were focused on political leaders.

The idea of transformational leadership was developed further by Bass (2008), who disputed Burns' conception of transactional and transformational leadership as opposites on a continuum. He suggested instead that the two, are separate concepts and that good leaders demonstrate characteristics of both (Judge & Piccolo, 2014). Bass expanded upon Burns original ideas and developed what is today referred to as Bass' Transformational Leadership Theory. According to him, transformational leadership can be defined based on the impact such leaders had on followers.

He emphasizes that leadership actions greatly determine the kinds of political cultures that arise in newly emergent or post conflict nation-states. Additionally, leaders bring about moral governance, and the exercise of good supremacy fosters and enables healthy institutions and strengthens the decree through early and careful leadership attention to core values. He argues further that the value added of responsible and enlightened leadership is especially great in regions where political institutions are still embryonic, by comparison with more developed and settled

politics. The theory confirms further that transformative leadership mainly as the embodiment of a range of leadership qualities, or, as he calls them, “critical competencies”. These include emotional intelligence (which includes a capacity for empathy), vision, and the ability to mobilize followers, integrity, prudence, courage, self-mastery and intellectual honesty. These competencies combine to give transformative leaders the ability to lead appropriately and with legitimacy. This theory supports the variable post election phase processes by asserting that leadership and individual characteristics appear to play an important role in the post hoc evaluation of presidential greatness and leadership potential; likewise, perceptions of candidate personality may play an important role in determining voter preferences.

#### **2.2.4 The Rational Choice Theories**

The Rational Choice Theories provide the standard explanation of modifications to electoral rules (Shriberg & Shriberg, 2011). This perspective depicts policy change as an elite-level game among competing bigoted comforts, where the outcome depends upon the control of gains for office-holders (Benoit, 2014). This theory depicts a situation where the public sometimes demands for institutional reforms in such a way of putting their agenda through wishes of the masses. According to the theory political elites sometimes necessarily respond to these pressures to counteract their own interests.

Rational choice theory approaches to electoral institutions have been developed in a series of recent studies. According to Boix (2009), the choice of electoral systems derives from the decisions ruling parties make to maximize their representation. As long as the electoral arena does not change, and the current rules benefit the ruling parties, the electoral system is not altered. As the electoral arena changes due to the entry of new voters or a change in voters' preferences, the ruling parties modify the electoral system, depending on the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old parties.

Similarly, Benoit (2014) posits that electoral laws change when two conditions are fulfilled: (i) when a party coalition forms with the power to alter electoral rules; and (ii) where each party in the coalition expects to benefit by gaining more seats under

alternative electoral institutions. Echoing these views, Colomer (2014) argues that existing parties in assemblies and governments tend to prefer the electoral formulas that reinforce their power, with party fragmentation in many countries gradually encouraging the adoption of more inclusive formulas.

The propositions are testable against the empirical evidence if data is available on (i) the partisan composition of national legislatures and (ii) the enactment of legal statutes governing electoral institutions. The approach provides few insights, however, which could be used to generate plausible explanations concerning underlying processes and contexts which constrain or facilitate elite-level actions, including the prior step of agenda-setting in the public sphere. The process follows a general policy cycle model identifying multiple actors and sequential steps in the complex process of maintaining and modifying electoral rules. After comparing the series of major electoral reforms occurring in established democracies since 1950, Katz (2015) concludes that ‘public outrage’ featured as a common factor in all cases. Gallagher (2015) argued that widespread public disaffection has the potential, like ‘woodworm’, to weaken the nitty-gritties of the electoral system, until it suddenly caves in. Therefore, although often assumed in descriptive accounts, cultural explanations of institutional reform have not been clearly and rigorously demonstrated in the research literature using systematic cross-national evidence, especially across a wide variety of contexts (Dalton, 2014; Booth, 2011).

The rational choice approach is attractive because it provides a simple way to compare diverse countries and types of reforms, generating some clear propositions about which types of reforms were adopted. This theory supports the variable political leadership by postulating that individuals have a variety of leaders to choose during elections

### **2.2.5 Resource based view Theory**

The theories propose various factors that affect effective participation in the electoral processes. The resource theories predict that factors such as age, education and economic status ought to be positively associated with turnout; older, better educated members of the electorate and the more affluent in a country have been found to vote



with greatest frequency (Blais, 2010; Clarke et al., 2014). Early studies suggested that men were more frequent voters than women while some more recent analyses show that in many democracies women are now more likely than men to vote (Blais, 2010). In general resource abundance affects the political equilibrium.

Mobilization models have demonstrated that an individual's degree of integration into and mobilization by civil society organizations such as unions, religious groups and political parties increases the likelihood that they will exercise their franchise. Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, (2016) explicitly model politicians and show how the costs and benefits of buying votes through inefficient redistribution, for instance by bribing voters with well-paid but fruitless jobs within the public-sector, that increases with public sector resource income. Acemoglu and Robinson (2016) model underdevelopment as the result of political elites blocking technological and institutional development because such development may erode the elites' incumbency advantage. Such blocking is more likely to arise when the rents from maintaining power is high. In addition, Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier's (2014) personal rule model, greater resource rents make it easier for dictators to buy off political challengers.


Damania and Bulte (2013) show that when politicians maximize the surplus from a lobbying, resource abundance may increase the income from lobbying, but divert the economy from its optimal path. Ades and Di Tella (2009) discuss how natural resource rents may stimulate corruption, and that increased resource rents may make it politically efficient to win votes by building 'white elephants', rather than efficient investment projects, even when voters are fully rational. The theory supports the variable political stability by postulating that when voters are provided with adequate resources with free and fair elections countries will be stable before and after elections.

### **2.3 Conceptual framework**

According to Marshall and Rossman (2010), a conceptual framework is tool researchers use to guide their inquiry; it is a set of ideas used to structure the research. Burns and Burns (2012) define a conceptual framework as an

interconnected set of ideas (theories) about how a particular phenomenon functions or is related to its parts. It is a diagrammatic, flow chart or figurative illustration explaining the relationships between factors and variables identified, relevant to the study (Oso & Onen, 2011; Burns et al., 2012). They stated that the major function of a structural framework is that it enables the study to find links between the existing literature and own research goals. The thesis focused on combined approaches as each individual has different roles which they have to perform. The role of electoral processes (pre-election, election and post-election process) stand out as the independent variable while the dependent variable is the political stability of the East African Community States.

The study considered the following dependent variables: pre-election phase processes, election process and the post-election processes. Political stability is thus, dependent on the design and prudent implementation of the harmonized electoral process that applied to all the EAC States. This study was guided by the relationship between the variables as shown in the conceptual framework (Figure 2.1).



**Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework**

Figure 2.1 shows the conceptualized relationship between the dependent variables and the independent variables as those variables relate to electoral process and political stability. Subsections 2.3.1 to 2.3.5 provides detailed discussions on how to operationalize each of the variables in the model.

### **2.3.1 Pre- Election Phase processes**

Pre-election processes mainly involve the preparations that need to be put in place before the Election Day and is therefore an important determinant of the election outcomes. Some of the important preparation milestones are discussed in this section.

## **Political Environment**

The political environment is an important factor in determining the pre-and post-election stability of a country. The assessment of the elections by international election observers gets based solely on the low incidence of violence throughout the election period. The long-term psychological impact of the type of violence that affects recognition or meaningful reconciliation cannot be quantified easily especially if it takes place over a long period of time and in many subsequent electoral cycles (EISA, 2012). Thus, the lack of evaluation as to the effectiveness of the mechanisms established to address fear, intimidation and violence is a silent problem in politics of Africa.

## **Voter Registration**

Process of registering electors is more concerned on modernization in both developing and recognized democracies. According to Muhula, (2009) voter registration governs the capability of suitable electorates to partake in an election, which is the key component in the impartiality of an election. Registration of voters is usually done earlier before the election day to allow the direct inspection of witnesses the core integrity of voter registration systems needs to be very high. Reforms aims at increasing the efficiency as well as the integrity of voter registration processes in Africa but more still needs to be completed.

Majority of the countries in the East African Community use a continuous voter registration system as required by the laws. However, is a common practice for the electoral bodies to fail to regularly update the voters' register and that the register remains unreliable (Khamisi, 2011). Failure to clean the register regularly and to register new voters, particularly the youth owing to its unreliable registration technology is a common practice in Africa. Many electoral frames have employed systems to expand the comprehensiveness, impartiality, special registration provisions for transient voters, precision and transparency of voter registration, for example, by providing for continuously updated voter registration, and safeguards

against wrongful rejection of registration or removal from the electoral register (Mwangola, 2013).

### **Voter Education and Participation**

Provision of voter education remains a challenge in many countries of Africa especially because it has in numerous cases endured the accountability of the electoral bodies that in many cases nonexistence the capacity to adequately deliver this important task (Olopade, 2014). In an effort to remedy this deficiency, some of the electoral bodies outsource the task to non-governmental organizations allowing the latter to provide voter education for voters. This has been hailed as a positive step by all stakeholders despite some occasioned delays in the process delayed due to logistical reasons. The electoral bodies have also trained youth members of registered political parties in proper voting procedures. These members are in turn, expected to help train their own party members (Wagner & Dreef, 2013).

### **Funding of Campaigns**

As organizations, political parties need financial resources to manage their affairs. Ghufran (2006), points out that ‘access to resources is a decisive factor in electoral contests and party existence the amount of funding available determines the eminence of activism as well as the level of communication that the party has with voters. Public funding of political parties serves to enhance the institutional capacity of parties and enables them to compete on a more or less equal footing. However, there is a debate on the value of party funding in that there are those who argue that bolstering the institutional capacity of parties could lead to undesirable consequences such as enriching party-political leaders, the burgeoning of dogmatic revelries, thus undermining of the efforts of individual parties to raise funds for themselves, and unaccountable disbursement of funds by corrupt politicians.

In most instances, party funding is provided on condition that parties must have participated in elections and is based on the number of seats secured by each party (Bekoe, 2010). The parties must also have gained votes of not less than a certain

threshold required for their registration with the electoral bodies. The funding may also be provided for political parties that did not participate in the last elections, and this is also based on a threshold given in the electoral laws of the country or state. Even those parties which have formed alliances can still be entitled to public funding, but this is allocated to each party individually. The danger, however, is that, if the parties are wholly reliant on this funding, and do not make an effort to raise funds or are unable to raise further funding, they will remain unable to compete effectively with bigger parties (Lamin, 2011). From these studies on pre-election phase and political stability, the study would make the following hypothesis:

*H01: Pre-election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.*

### **2.3.2 Election Phase processes**

All most all African Countries have multiparty democracy and have been conducting general elections often since independence (Odhiambo, 2009). However, the procedure of holding elections is not easy, with the losers contesting the outcome despite the fact that the elections have been conducted within the legal framework and in line with international, African and regional treaties and standards. This section focuses on some pertinent issues linked to the determination procedure that are probable to be applied to make the voting procedure more reliable:

#### **Election Administration**

Elections are generally managed by the Independent Electoral Bodies (IEB) established in the constitution or under the Acts of Parliament. The Commissions are headed by commissioners, with one serving as chairperson. The Commissioners are appointed through an inclusive process that involves all political parties registered with the Commission (Bratton, 2008). In many cases, the impartiality and effectiveness of the IEBs has always raised concern that they tend to give preferential handling to the governing party resulting to major lapses in their effectiveness. The ineffectiveness of the IEC can also be attributed to lack of capacity and poor competence of IEB personnel due to lack of training for the job. Emphasis of IEB

independent in terms of law in most cases is not mirrored in their practice as they serve mainly to ‘endorse’ the benefits of the governing party (Obi, 2008).

The Ministry in charge of the treasury should always strive to provide even contingency budgets for the Electoral Bodies whenever the need arises so that the bodies do not depend on non-governmental organizations for their budget. Challenges concerning mechanisms for ensuring freeness and fairness in political campaigns also need to be addressed in advance and guarantee that there is an obligatory conduct that all partaking candidates are subjected to.

This Code of Conduct gives the IEB powers to discipline and even to take to court, individuals and political parties that are deemed to be in breach of it. The objective of the Encryption is to encourage circumstances favorable to steering conducive elections within a tolerant and democratic environment in which political parties can carry out their activities without fear, coercion, intimidation, and reprisals. The code is expected to give IEB legal powers that would ensure that campaigns are free and fair. Access to state resources which gives the ruling party advantage over its competitors has also remained a thorny issue. This is because members of the opposition hardly have the resources to fund their political campaigns and the private sector that could help to unravel the delinquent is also curtailed in many cases.

### **Use of State Resources in Campaigns**

The law in some countries allows incumbent Ministers unrestricted use of state vehicles and IECs has no control over this imbalance, as it is allegedly the norm all over the world. Another example relates to allegations of food aid being strategically distributed to constituencies a few days before the elections. Unfair utilization of communal resources by ordinary ruling-party members for their campaigns is also common (Ukase, 2015). There is an emerging trend where some of the principal secretaries, though not legally allowed to do so like incumbent Ministers, are openly using public resources to campaign for the ruling party’s candidacy in their respective constituencies as well as unlimited access to the state media throughout the year, while their parties are only allowed a few brief slots paid for by the IEC on national radio and television, barely about a month before elections.

It is common for the ruling party, on occasion, covertly and overtly abuses the law to hinder legitimate activities of the hostility parties. In most scenarios, the governing party uses excessive force through the police, buried the walks of the opposes party from the public eye by imposing awkward and isolated routes for such marches. The following hypothesis is therefore made:

*Ho2: Election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.*

### **2.3.3 Post-Election Phases processes**

Post-election processes can easily turn chaotic especially in cases where some interest groups have a feeling of having been short changed in the election and pre-election processes. The losers tend to contest the outcome despite the fact that the elections have been conducted within the legal framework and in line with international, African and regional treaties and standards. This section focuses on some pertinent issues related to the post-election process that are expected to be applied to make the election closure to be acceptable to all the stakeholders (Baets, 2011).

#### **Election observation**

It is now common for parliamentary elections to be experiential by universal and local witnesses, which are not limited to the SADC, the Commonwealth and local observers from civil society organizations. The process of election observation is provided for in the National Assembly Electoral Acts or the constitutions. Both local and international observers are allowed to observe various stages of elections.

#### **Handling Post-Election Disputes**

Adjudication of electoral disputes is still a dilemma in almost all unindustrialized countries where the East African Community States are part. According to Ayanda and Odunayo (2015), the use of the courts as a mechanism for resolving electoral disputes is not ideal. The researchers stated further that cases of this nature decided



by the High Court are never on its substantive merits, but on technicalities that are hardly understood by a common person.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation of the Electoral Processes**

International advisers and monitors can play a useful role in countries emerging from a past of authoritarian rule. Their duties and responsibilities ought to be clearly defined. Their reports should not be inspired by the political agenda of their country of origin (Mbaku, 2010). A clear distinction between peace monitors and election observers is crucial in order to avoid an unhealthy confusion between the interests of political stability and the requirements of democracy. In any case, the role of international observers is limited to the transition phase and to a limited sphere of activities, such as elections.

The broader democratic process requires 'monitors of democracy', but this role is best left to local actors, notably independent media. This is therefore not a plea for either/or monitors or media: both have a role to play. But while much attention has recently been given to various forms of international involvement where intervention of the media in Africa is much neglected. The donor community is narrowly focused on multi-party elections as the litmus test of democratization. A political conditionality which singles out multi-party elections as the crucial element without taking account of the wider environment, risks being counter-productive to the citizens may not be very relevant in maintenance of peace (Omilusi & Adu, 2016). Indispensable for sustainable democratization are independent media. Governments not only in Africa have a tendency to dismiss media as 'irresponsible' and therefore not very relevant to the democratic process. Tension between governments and media is however a normal condition in democracies (Stokes, 2013). The following hypothesis is therefore made:

*Ho3: Post-election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.*

### **2.3.4 Political Leadership**

A "political leader" refers to persons who occupy important positions in the formal polity such as Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers, Governors, Legislators, Party Officials, Local Government Chairmen, Council Members and of course, the local Chiefs. Research by Kura (2014) showed that the quality of leadership affects the pace of development in any country. Obazee (2014), opined that leadership skills are still required for effective public governance in Africa.

Ngowi (2009) studied the effect of political leadership on economic development in Tanzania and concluded that leadership is the defining factor that shaped the nature and path of economic development in that country. Poor leadership, and the endemic bureaucratic corruption that has characterized public sector governance since independence in 1960, have been blamed for the slow pace of development in key sectors of Africa's economy, especially in the infrastructure sector (Ogbeide, 2012).

According to USAID and UKAID (2015). there are some basic principles indicators that can be used to determine political leadership and its effect on democracy in general and electoral systems in particular which are essential: Among them include the following:

All citizens should be given a chance by the leadership have an equal and effective opportunity to make their views known to other citizens; the leadership should give citizens exclusive opportunity to decide what is placed on the agenda. Policies have to be open to change. These are fulfilled as long as various freedoms is guaranteed; Every citizen must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote and all votes must be counted as equal (one person one vote); Each member must have equal and effective opportunities for learning about the relevant alternative policies or the policies candidates stand for and their likely consequence; All adult permanent residents should have the full rights of citizens which are defined in the first four criteria. This works in two ways. Governments and presidents should be constantly accountable to the parliament and at election times to the electorate. This means that an electoral system should make sure that bad performing politicians and parties can get voted out and replaced by other parties and politicians.

Leadership is at the heart of public sector governance and political stability and is vital to the overall development of a nation as well as the welfare of the citizens.

Government exists to serve the needs of the public, and good governance exists to ensure that those needs are served efficiently, effectively, and fairly, (Deloitte Global Series, 2012). This means that governance has a lot to do with how authority is exercised in institutions and the traditions of government, which includes the process of bringing government into being and holding it accountable for socio-economic outcomes (Davis, 2011). Good leaders ensure effective public governance which helps to strengthen democracy, promote economic prosperity and social cohesion, and reduce poverty (United Nations, 2009). Good governance must be perceived to solve social problems.

*Ho4: Political leadership does not significantly moderate relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East African Community States.*

### **2.3.5 Political Stability**

Political stability as determined by specific indicators refers to a qualitative assessment of the political ability in a country to support the needs of its people (Bratton, 2010). Political stability is derived from five sub-indicators, measuring the likelihood of social unrest, the strength of constitutional mechanisms, accountability, international disputes and the likelihood of an antagonistic opposition. It is perceived to be among the twenty-two (22) indicators of peace measured by the Global Peace Index. It is an “internal” indicator of peace, meaning it measures peace within a country. Political instability in the governments creates uncertainty for business and investors which may in turn reduce investment and the speed of economic development, poor economic performance and eventual government collapse and political unrest.

Political stability is connected to the voting procedure as it determines the issues of public accountability and transparency in government procedures, rule of law, and public-sector management are emphasized (Kapur, 2009). Political instability can be caused by many factors, including conflict between rival political parties, insufficient

internal resources and the proximity to other nations in conflict. Political instability may occur when there is a sudden change that leaves citizens in doubt about their nation's situation and may even lead to general revolt or sporadic mass demonstrations. This means that a country's leadership can be responsible for political instability when they hold onto power for too long amidst opposition or enact controversial legislation. Political instability can also be caused by conflict between two or more ethnic groups within a nation or Community. Some of the documented indicators for political stability as defined by Olorunmola (2016) include the following: The practice of and respect for rule of law and the privileges and liberties of the citizens, low levels of corruption and efficient management of public fund, free and fair elections in the country, low unemployment and a generalized low poverty levels, suppression of other hostile parties by the presiding government. As a result, members of the opposition parties are deliberately targeted and prosecuted for no apparent reason, Transparency, respect and tolerance for the views and opinions of others; ethnic prejudices have over the years and clear electoral processes that are adhered to and respected by all consistently.

#### **2.4 Empirical review**

According to Aubyn and Abdallah (2013), the government has the foremost responsibility to provide the enabling environment and the resources for efficient management of elections. Many countries have definite organs of National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration. Their main mandate is to establish a mechanism for national healing, cohesion and unity and laying the foundation for a society characterized by mutual respect, tolerance, and development through the relevant constitutional setups. The end product is to develop an effective mechanism for addressing the culture of impunity. In addition, the focus on physical violence during election needs to take into account intimidation and harassment that is non- physical (Resnick & Casale, 2011).

Fox and Van Weelden (2012), argues that state funding of opposition does not make a lot of difference if the party does not use the funds appropriately. He surmises that future state funding of political parties is likely to benefit the larger parties, as the

amount of money given to parties is based on their share of the total vote in previous elections. This system could therefore have an effect of continuously marginalizing smaller parties. Several African Countries have addressed the issue of funding political parties in their National Assembly Electoral Acts since 2010 whereby political parties, receive ‘party funds’ from the public purse for their daily operations. In some cases, the political parties are entitled to both party funding and campaign funding from the public purse. The main difference between these two types of funding, as their names suggest, is that party funding finances the day-to-day running of each party, while campaign funding is exclusively for the financing of activities related to campaigning during elections.

According to Human Rights Watch (2013), pre-election violence in Coast, Eastern, and North Eastern provinces resulted in the death of more than 477 people and displaced an additional 118,000. In a late development with significant implications for potential election violence, Kenyatta and fellow ICC indictee William Ruto joined forces in December 2012 to form the Jubilee Coalition. This ticket brought together Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, the two ethnic groups between which the 2007-08 violence had been the most devastating.

## **2.5 Critique of existing literature**

Voters are too poorly informed to fulfill their electoral function (Campbell et al., 2010; Kinder & Sears, 2015; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 2016). If voters lack basic information about the policy choices made by political leaders, then, the argument goes, elections are neither “a useful mechanism for selecting public leaders” nor “a credible check on the behavior of those leaders” (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).

This critique has inspired a large literature. That literature’s strongest defense of voter competence argues that voters do not need detailed information about candidates or policies to act as if they were informed (Downs, 1957). An early salvo of this defense argued that voters could make good decisions based solely on retrospective evaluations of their welfare (Fiorina, 2011). Subsequent work argued that voters can use a variety of cues party labels, statements by opinion leaders, personal economic fortunes, etc to fulfill their democratic function, without needing

detailed information or political sophistication (Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1993; Lupia, 1994). Critics of this defense argue that these informational shortcuts do not fully offset the lack of information (Bartels, 1996), may be systematically misused (Huber, Hill and Lenz, 2012), and can even lead to worse decision making (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). Kuklinski and Hurley (1994, p. 731) exemplify this strand of the literature when they interpret their experimental results as showing that although rational, and probably inevitable given the nature of large political systems, this mechanism may not be as effective as has been

Fombad (2009) study on election management bodies in Africa: Cameroon's National Elections Observatory in perspective' has made an important and illuminating contribution in this area. However, the work is based on the EMB of Cameroon and, therefore, it does not offer a comprehensive assessment of the electoral processes in other African countries. This research attempts to address this shortcoming by bringing to the forefront the idea of effective planning and investigating the potential and degree of elections planning that may be possible and acceptable.

Odoziobodo (2015) in a similar study, *An Appraisal of the 2007 General Elections in Nigeria,* used structural functionalism or the structural functionalist theory traced to Talcott Parsons (1971) and Gabriel Almond (1960) as the framework for analysis and the theory as reflected in that study is hereby adapted for the analysis of this study. According to Varma (1975), structural functional analysis revolves around certain concepts more important of which are: functions and structures. In using structural functional analysis, three basic questions are usually asked, namely: (a) What basic functions are fulfilled in any given system, (b) By what structures and (c) Under what conditions? In the words of Merton (1949), "functions are those observed consequences which make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system; and dysfunction, those observed consequences which lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system". A system on its own part has been variously defined as "a set of elements standing in interaction" (Bertalanffy, 1956); "a set of objects together with relationships between the objects and between their attributes" (Hall & Fagen, 1956); and "a whole which is compounded of many parts- an ensemble of

attributes’’ Cherry (1961). Whereas democratic elections have become common place in Africa over the past 40 years, several recent examples have shown that they can also crystallize tensions and cause violence as happened in a number of African countries and can fail to legitimize power. In Africa, the stakes are high, with access to resources through electoral victory a major aspect of elections. This explains why elections are often the object of fraught competition.

## **2.6 Research Gap**

Birch, (2010) observes that in order to enhance democratic participation efforts are sought to incorporate extensive consultation and participation by the widest possible range of consultations that involve politicians, the private sector and civil society. The literature reviews present conflicting findings in electoral processes research and political leadership research. Although policy makers, journalists, and scholars readily employ the concept of patronage in explaining leadership and political outcomes in Africa, relatively little is known about the extent to which the distribution of political power systematically affects political stability. Rather than assert that African leaders are merely venal or myopic in their deployment of resources, the empirical regularities surrounding the use of patronage as an instrument for managing political relations need to be explained from the electoral process’s perspective. Quantitative cross-national research on the principal manifestations of political instability coups and civil wars has consistently shown that economic conditions are the best predictors in Africa and other developing regions, (Fearon & Laitin, 2013), (Miguel et al., 2014) and (McGowan, 2014). Although these empirical analyses acknowledge that the weakness of political institutions contribute to the region’s volatility, they do not explicitly bring out the factors related to electioneering and leadership positions as possible contributors and the chief strategy used by most African leaders to buy off rivals and reward their followers.

This is attributable to difficulties in operationalization and measurement of indicators of the electoral processes and leadership. From the review it is also worth noting that a few studies have determined the electoral processes. Ironies such as those were

identified by Mukandala and Killian (2014) who jagged out that citizens' participation may result in the "consolidation of nation states" as well as an upsurge in regional separatist demagogy about the need for "non-interference in each other's internal affairs; respect for each and sovereignty issues may be working against all the efforts made towards the integration process. This is because they may work towards 'consolidating' the status quo; thus, promoting a situation that may be the opposite of the ultimate goal of EAC regional political and economic cooperation, which are political federation and political union. Lwaitama (2012) concludes on the extent to which a lot is still required to encourage full participation of all the stakeholders in the EAC integration. One important observation in the harmonization process is the fact that the national constitutions of the different EAC countries do not make much reference to the EAC integration. Similarly, the election manifestoes of political parties hardly addressed the EAC integration in any great detail, if at all. This and other related areas of elections and electoral processes need to be relooked into if the harmonization process is to succeed.

A large amount has been written, researched and discussed about the need for elections management, yet very little is written about effective elections planning. Studies on the need for electoral process are vast and often acknowledge the enormous financial outlay especially on concerns regarding the high cost of implementing state-of-the-art technology which may not be sustainable leading to ultimate failure (Evrensel, 2010).

Diamond (2005) stressed that up until his publication the Elections management bodies did little regarding planning and only focused on delivering a specific election. Ronald (2008) also raised the same concerns. Likewise, Pastor and Fischer (2005) in a joint publication by the International Foundations for Electoral Systems (IFES) and UNDP did not deal with alternatives to outright procurement of technologies for EMBs. Again, Bean (2007) comprehensively addressed the application of technology to election administration but did not consider alternatives to the outright procurement of technologies.



Bean (2007) discuss the many options of ICT implementation but do not consider outsourcing. Contrary to this Wall (2011) considered a form of outsourcing when he suggested that EMBs could partner with other government institutions to allow strategic alliances. He also mentions outsourcing “their technology management aspects to a systems integration firm” and suggests that there are successful models. However, his paper does not provide examples. Like Neufeld (2007), effective election process on political stability is often touched upon but is never actively pursued with the view of formally introducing it.

This research sought to bridge the gaps identified above upon reviewing previous scholarly contributions. The study covered objectives that range from determination of the relationship between the pre-election phase processes and political stability in the East Africa Community States; The assessment of the relationship between election phase processes and political stability in the East Africa Community States; the evaluation of the relationship between post-election phase processes and political stability in the East Africa Community States and assessment of the moderating role of political leadership in electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States.

## **2.7 Summary of literature**

This chapter began with introduction of the subject matter relating to the role of electoral process on political stability in East Africa Community States. The study pinged on Relevant theories that involves Evolutionary Theory of Political Leadership, The Spiral of Silence Theory, Transformative Political Leadership Theory, The Rational Choice Theories and Resource based view Theory. These theories were then reviewed so as to obtain the hypothesized relationship between the variables of interest as captured in the objectives. The conceptual framework that shows how the researcher conceptualizes the interrelationships between the study variables is then represented diagrammatically and the variables described. A critical empirical literature review was then done with the aim of identifying the gaps that this study aspired to fill.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter describes the methodology that was used in the study. It contains the research design, research approach, target population, sample size, sample size determination and sampling procedure, data collection instruments and procedure. The study also looks at validity and reliability plus the analysis of the research tools as well as the data analysis methods, data presentation techniques and ethical issues involved in this noble research.

#### **3.2 Research Philosophy**

Research philosophy refers to the basis of information and the landscape of that knowledge contains important assumptions about the way in which researchers view the world (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). Research methods are influenced by philosophical orientations such as epistemology. Epistemology attempts to answer the basic question: what distinguishes true (adequate) knowledge from false (inadequate) knowledge. Epistemology is concerned with determination of the scenery of info and the degree of human knowledge (Uddin & Hamiduzzan, 2009). There are various philosophical paradigms such as ontology, realism, positivist and phenomenological paradigms, but the two main paradigms that guide research in social sciences are the positivist and phenomenological paradigms (Bryman, 2011).

Cooper and Schindler (2011) asserted that positivist research paradigm takes the quantitative approach and is based on real facts, objectivity, neutrality, measurement and validity of results. The roots of positivism lie particularly with empiricism, that is, all factual knowledge is based on positive information gained from observable experiences, and only analytic statements are allowed to know as true through reason alone. Positivism maintains that knowledge should be based on facts and not abstractions; thus, knowledge is predicated on observations and experiments based on existing theory (Orodho, 2013). The researcher focuses on facts, looks for

causality and fundamental laws, reduces phenomena to simplest elements, formulates hypotheses and tests them. This paradigm involves operationalizing concepts so that they can be measured, and taking large samples (Brooks, 2011).

Phenomenological paradigm focuses on the immediate experience and description of things as they are, not what the researcher thinks they are. The phenomenological approach does not begin from an established theory and then proceed to collect data to either vindicate or reject the theory (Kombo & Tromp, 2009). This paradigm believes that rich insights into this complex world are lost if such complexity is reduced to a series of law-like generalizations. There is need to realize the specifics of the situation to understand the reality. It is essential to discover the idiosyncratic meanings inspiring people's arrangements in directive to be gifted to comprehend these (Cooper & Schindler, 2008). This approach assumes that reality is multiple, subjective, and mentally constructed by individuals. The use of flexible and multiple methods is desirable as a way of studying a small sample in depth over time that can establish warranted assert ability as opposed to absolute truth (Oso & Onen, 2011). This study adhered to the foregoing beliefs and practices, it would be appropriate to assert that a predominantly positivist framework was followed.

### **3.3 Research design**

A research design is the arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy (Kombo & Tromp, 2011). According to Kothari (2011), a research design is a series of advance decisions that when pieced together form a specific master plan or prototypical for the behavior of the examination. The purpose of a research design therefore is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables the researcher to effectively address the research problem logically and as unambiguously as possible. Sekaran, (2009) sees a research design as the logical sequence that links the empirical data to a study's initial research questions and as such, the study design discourages the situation in which the evidence is disconnected from the initial questions for the research.

Quantitative approach of both descriptive and correlation designs was adopted by the study. The designs suit this study since they enabled the researcher to examine the role of the electoral processes on political stability in East Africa Community States. In addition, the designs provided an insight of electoral processes in the EAC region without affecting the research context and also ensure that the data collection procedures are fairly explicit in terms of adequately addressing the study objectives. Quantitative data was captured through the use of a questionnaire. The variables measured with numbers and analyzed with statistical procedures in order to determine whether the prognostic overviews hold true (Baker, Veit, & Powell, 2011).

### **3.4 Population**

Zikmund, Babin, Carr, and Griffin. (2010) defined a target population as the total collection of elements about which inferences are made and it refers to all possible cases which are of attention for the study. In addition, it is the collection of individuals to whom the study consequences apply. Kombo and Tromp, (2011); Kothari (2011), refers to the population as a collection of all the individuals who have certain characteristics and are of interest to a researcher. These authors see a population as a ‘universe’ that consists of a group of individuals, objects or items from which samples are taken for measurement. Oso and Onen (2011) observed that a population is the total collection of elements about which one wants to make inferences on. A study population is the people or individuals that meet the researcher’s scope of the study population. The study population was drawn from the East African Legislative Assembly and the electoral bodies of the EAC partner states: Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. The target population consisted of 123 individuals working within the electoral commissions of the different EAC Countries and the EAC Legislative Assembly. Target population refers to the entire group of individuals or objects to which researchers are interested in generalizing the conclusions. The target population usually has varying characteristics and it is also known as the theoretical population (Kothari, 2011).

**Table 3.1: Population Distribution**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Total Population</b>
EAC Legislative Assembly	54
Clerks	18
Public relations	12
Accountants	6
Researchers	10
IT managers	15
Hansards	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>123</b>

Source: Human Resource EALA (2017)

### **3.5 Sample size and sampling technique**

This section examines the method of attaining the sample size and the sampling technique used in the study. In the Sample size, a discussion is followed by an illustration on the process used.

#### **3.5.1 Sampling Frame**

Cooper and Schindler (2011) defines sample frame as the list of all elements or other units containing the elements in a population. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2012) sample frame is a list, directory, or index of cases from which a sample can be selected. Burns & Burns, (2012) stated that a sampling frame facilitates formation of a sampling unit that refers to one member of a set of entities being studied which is the material source of the random variable or a published list in which or a set of directions for identifying a population. The choice of a sample size is mainly cash on the need for accuracy required by the researcher and the degree of variation (Saunders *et al.*, 2009). A sample size of 94 respondents was determined using Slovins formula (1967).

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N (\epsilon)^2}$$

Where;

**n** is the sample size,

**N** is the population size (123)

**e** is the desired level of precision (0.05)

$$n = \frac{123}{1 + 123 (0.05)^2} = 94$$

$$n_s = \frac{n_r}{N} \times n$$

Where;

$n_s$  is the desired sample size

$n$  is the sample size

$n_r$  is the population of each strata

**Table 3.2: Sample Distribution**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Total Population</b>	<b>Sample size</b>
EAC Legislative Assembly	54	41
Clerks	18	14
Public relations	12	9
Accountants	6	5
Researchers	10	8
IT managers	15	11
Hansards	8	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>94</b>

Source: Human Resource EALA (2017)

### **3.5.2 Sampling Techniques**

The study used stratified sampling technique. Stratified Sampling was used to group the respondents and formations into strata. Stratification was used because the population was structured into various non-homogenous units, hence the need for sample diversity. Once the departments and formations were grouped into seven strata, simple random sampling was applied to pick the senior officers stationed at the Administrative Regions and formations. When a sample is picked randomly, each member has a chance of being picked (Zikmund, Babin, Carr, & Griffin, 2010) and as such the sample becomes unbiased (Kothari, 2011). The main advantage with stratified sampling is that it captures key population characteristics in the sample. Just as it is in a weighted average, this method of sampling produces characteristics in the sample that are proportional to the overall population. This study required this technique because, it was intended to give either similarities or differences with consideration to the various aspects raised in governance of security for generalization.

### **3.6 Data Collection Instruments**

Oso and Onen (2011) define data as anything given or admitted as a fact on which a research inference was based. Cooper and Schindler (2011); Mugenda and Mugenda (2012) defined data collection instruments as the tools and procedures used in the measurement of variables in the study. The current research was to examine the role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community States. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2012), in social science research, the most commonly used instruments are questionnaires, interview schedules, observational forms and standardized tests. The study relied on both primary data and secondary data. Primary data was collected using well structure questionnaires were used since the study was concerned with variables that cannot be directly observed such as views, opinions, perceptions and feelings of the respondents which are best collected by this technique (Touliatos & Compton, 2013). Questionnaires provide a high degree of data standardization and adoption of generalized information amongst any population (Schutt, 2015). He further explains that questionnaires are useful in a

descriptive survey study where there is need to get information from people quickly and easily in a non-threatening way.

Structured questionnaires were used as the tool to collect data in order to examine the role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community States. These enabled the study to balance between the amount and excellence of data collected and on the other hand provided more information on political leadership. The questionnaires were designed in the form of a five-point Likert scale rating. A set of items in the questionnaire addressed each specific objective. A Likert Scale (Likert, 1932) is a rating scale that requires the subject to indicate the degree of agreement or disagreement to a statement.

Secondary data was collected by way of reading, analyzing, collecting, and recording data contained in readily prepared materials such as private and public statistical records, documents, books, newsletters, magazines and journals on electoral processes and political leadership. The respondents were required to score appropriate values corresponding to each statement in the questionnaire. Provision was made for remarks by the respondent against each statement where necessary. Literature derived from books, internet, journals, and periodicals relevant to the study formed part of the secondary data and was used to support as well as explain the results obtained from the study. These sources added clarity and reliability to the findings obtained through questionnaires (Dailon, 2011). Statistical reports, program descriptions and previous election reports results were obtained from secondary sources; hence, the position on using relevant documents to help in interpreting study results.

### **3.7 Data Collection Procedure**

Kombo and Tromp (2011), states that data collection is important in research because it allows for dissemination of accurate information and development of meaningful programs. This study used both primary and secondary data. The primary data was collected using a questionnaire, which were developed and prepared by the researcher. The questionnaire was hand delivered to all the respondents after seeking introductory letter from Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology.



The procedure adopted was drop and pick. The follow up was done through telephone calls and personal visits in order to facilitate the response rate.

Secondary data was collected by way of reading, analyzing, collecting, and recording data contained in readily prepared materials such as private and public statistical records, documents, books, newsletters, magazines and journals on electoral processes and political leadership. A two-week notice was given before administration of questionnaire to the respondents.

### **3.8 Pilot test**

Pilot test is a method that is used to test the design, methods and instrument before carrying out the research (Cooper & Schindler, 2011). It involves conducting an initial test, the pre-test sample of 1% -10 % depending on the sample size (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2009). The rule of thumb is that 10% of the sample should constitute the pilot test (Cooper & Schilder, 2011). The proposed pilot test was within the recommendation. The pre-test questionnaires were distributed randomly to 10 selected officials from the electoral bodies who did not form part of the study sample during the main study.

#### **3.8.1 Validity of the Research Instruments**

Validity is the scope to which the study results are precisely understood and widespread to other populations. According to Oso and Onen (2011), validity refers to the level to which research instruments quantify what they are intended to measure. This study adopted both construct validity and content validity in order to achieve the study objectives. To establish construct validity, the questionnaire was divided into several sections to ensure that each section assessed information for a specific objective and ensured that the same closely ties to the conceptual framework for this study.

To establish validity, the instruments was given to two experts to evaluate the relevance of each item in the instrument to the objectives and rate each item on a scale. They were asked to evaluate the statements in the questionnaire for relevance

and whether they were meaningful, clear, and polite. Based on the evaluation, the instrument was adjusted appropriately before subjecting it to the final data collection exercise. Their review comments were used to ensure that content validity is enhanced.

### 3.8.2 Reliability of the Research Instruments

Mugenda and Mugenda, (2012) defines reliability as a measure of the degree to which a research instrument yields consistent results after repeated trials. This means that if people answered the same question the same way on repeated occasions, then the instrument can be said to be reliable. Reliability analysis was cast-off to test the core consistency of the study instruments. Cronbach's alpha a coefficient of reliability that gives unbiased estimate of data generalizability was used to test reliability of the answered questionnaires. According to Orodho (2009), Cronbach's alpha coefficient of reliability that gives an unbiased estimate of data generalizability. An alpha coefficient higher than 0.70 indicated that the gathered data had a relatively high internal consistency and could be generalized to reflect opinions of all respondents in the sample.

Table 3.3 shows the range of Cronbach Alpha and their respective strength of association.

**Table 3.3: Cronbach alpha decision matrix**

<b>Cronbach alpha coefficient</b>	<b>Strength of association</b>
< 0.6	Poor
0.6>0.7	Moderate
0.7>0.8	Good
0.8>0.9	Very Good
0.9>	Excellent

Source: Zikmund, Babin, Carr, and Griffin (2010)

### **3.9 Data Processing and analysis.**

Zikmund et al. (2010), refers to data processing and analysis as the submission of the cognitive to comprehend the data that has been gathered with the aim of determining consistent patterns and summarizing the relevant details revealed in the study. Cooper and Schindler (2011); Kombo and Tromp 2011; Kothari (2011); Mugenda and Mugenda (2012); Oso and Onen (2011) argue data analysis refers to examining the data that has been collected and making deductions and inferences which involves uncovering underlying structures, extracting important variables, detecting any anomalies and testing any underlying assumptions. It involves scrutinizing the acquired information and making inferences.

The study was expected to produce both quantitative and qualitative data. Once the questionnaires were received, they were coded and edited for completeness and consistency. The data obtained was cleared and coded then SPSS was used for data analysis using quantitative data analysis as well as qualitative data analysis. The study collected and analyze primary data, which was keyed into an excel table, before subjected to meaningful analysis through SPSS Version 21. The process involved the identification and correcting of errors in the data (data cleaning), coding the data and storing it in excel form. Data was coded and analyzed simultaneously using content analysis method. A list of key categories and themes for each variable were generated and this helped to guide the nature of integration needed for the qualitative data processed.

According to Cooper and Schindler (2011) the process involves reading through the questionnaires, developing codes, coding the data, and drawing connections between discrete pieces of data. Information was sorted, coded and input using SPSS tool. Descriptive statistics were describing the mean frequency counts and standard deviation. Pearson correlation coefficient exploratory examined the relations between the variables under the study. Multiple regression scrutinized the result of the inter correlation of the variables and described the amount of variance.

To make inferences from an analysis, an assumption of a normally distributed dependent variable is important. One of the methods used to check for normality is

the Q-Q test. A Q-Q test is a plot of percentiles of a standard distribution against the corresponding percentiles of the observed data (Keraro, 2014; Royston, 2012). When conducting a Q-Q test, the resulting plot should show an approximately straight line with a positive slope as a sign of normality. This method was employed to determine the normality of the dependent variable in the study.

According to Mwaniki, (2015) identification of multicollinearity in a model is important and is tested by examining both the tolerance and the variance inflation factor (VIF) diagnostic factors. The variance inflation factor (VIF) measures the impact of multicollinearity among the variables in a regression model. Keraro (2014) concluded that even though there is no formal criterion for determining the bottom line of the tolerance value or VIF, tolerance values that are less than 0.1 and VIF greater than 10 roughly indicates significant multicollinearity; a conclusion supported by Tavakol and Dennick (2011) and Gujarat (2011). A multicollinearity test was performed among the study variables.

Autocorrelation is the correlation between members of a series of observations ordered in time or space (Gujarat, 2011; Cameron, 2015). A Durbin-Watson test was used to detect the presence of autocorrelation between the variables and this produced a value of 1.630. The Durbin-Watson statistic ranges in value between 0 and 4 (Gujarat, 2011). A value near 2 indicates non-autocorrelation; a value closer to 0 indicates positive correlation while a value closer to 4 indicates negative correlation. An autocorrelation test was performed on the study variables and the results obtained are discussed in chapter four of this research.

### **3.10 Hypothesis Testing**

The hypothesis testing was done at 5% level of significance and SPSS was used for this purpose. The data was then presented using frequency distribution tables, bar charts, and pie charts for easier understanding. Regression model was tested on how well it fitted the data. The significance of each independent variable was also tested. Fischer distribution test called F-test was applied; which refers to the ratio between the model mean square divided by the error mean square. F-test was used to test the

significance of the overall model at a 95 percent confidence level. The study tested the individual linear regression models for each hypothesis of the form,

$$Y = \alpha + \beta X_i + \mu$$

Multiple regression models attempt to determine whether a group of variables together predict a given dependent variable (Oso & Onen, 2011). A multiple regression model separates each individual variable from the rest allowing each to have its own coefficient describing its relationship to the dependent variable. This model was therefore adopted because the study had more than one variable. A multiple linear regression model was used to test the significance between the independent variables on the dependent variable. The multiple linear regression model was as laid below:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \mu \dots \dots \dots (1)$$

Where:

Y = Political stability (dependent variable)

$\alpha$  = Constant  $\beta_1 \dots \beta_3$  = Coefficients of independent variables

$X_1 \dots X_3$  Values of the various independent (covariates) variables

$X_1$  = Pre-election phase

$X_2$  = Election phase

$X_3$  = Post-election phase

$\mu$  = Error term which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance.

Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was also done to establish whether the whole model was a significant fit of the data and therefore formed the tests of significance.

ANOVA is a data analysis procedure that is used to determine whether there are significant differences between two or more groups of samples at a selected probability level (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2012). The data was presented using distribution tables for easier understanding. The p-value for the F-statistic were applied in determining the robustness of the model. The conclusion was based on p-value where if the null hypothesis of the beta was rejected then the overall model was significant and if null hypothesis was accepted the overall model was insignificant. In other words, if the p-value was less than 0.05 then it was concluded that the model was significant and had good predictors of the dependent variable and that the results were not based on chance. If the p-value was greater than 0.05 then the model was not significant and was not used to explain the variations in the dependent variable.

Test for Moderation a)  $Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 X * Z + \epsilon_0$ ..... (2)

Where 2 above is the OLS for the relationship between the moderator variable, dependent variable and the independent variables. Where:

Y= Political stability  $\alpha$  = Constant  $\beta_1...3$  = Associated Regression Coefficients X= Represents Composite for independent variables (Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes) Z= is the moderator variable – Political stability

The decision rule is summarized in Table 3.4 below and 3.5 shows the summary of the analytical models that were employed to test the set hypotheses in this study

**Table 3.4: Hypotheses Tests (Direct Effects Model)**

<b>Hypotheses statement</b>	<b>Hypothesis test</b>	<b>Decision rule</b>
Ho1: Pre-election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.	Karl-Pearson's coefficient of correlation -F-test (ANOVA) -T-test  H <sub>01</sub> : $\beta_1 = 0$	Reject H <sub>01</sub>  If P- value $\leq 0.05$ otherwise fail to reject H <sub>01</sub> if P is $> 0.05$
Ho2: Election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.	Karl-Pearson's coefficient of correlation -F-test (ANOVA) -T-test  H <sub>02</sub> : $\beta_2 = 0$	Reject H <sub>02</sub>  If P- value $\leq 0.05$ otherwise fail to reject H <sub>02</sub> if P is $> 0.05$
Ho3: Post-election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.	Karl-Pearson's coefficient of correlation -F-test (ANOVA) -T-test  H <sub>03</sub> : $\beta_3 = 0$	Reject H <sub>03</sub>  If P- value $\leq 0.05$ otherwise fail to reject H <sub>03</sub> if P is $> 0.05$

**Table 3.5: Hypotheses Tests (Moderation Model)**

<b>Hypotheses statement</b>	<b>Model 2</b>
Ho4: Political leadership does not significantly moderate the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East African Community States.	<p>OLS model <math>Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \varepsilon</math></p> <p>MMR model: <math>Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 X * Z + \varepsilon</math></p> <p><math>Y =</math> Political stability</p> <p><math>\beta_0 =</math> y-intercept/constant</p> <p><math>\beta_1 =</math> Least squares estimate of the population regression coefficient for X</p> <p>X= Degree of the individual independent variable (Electoral process)</p> <p>Z= A hypothesized binary grouping moderator (Political leadership)</p> <p><math>\beta_2 =</math> Least squares estimate of the population regression coefficient for Z</p> <p>X*Z= The product between the predictors (Independent variable*Moderator)</p> <p><math>\beta_3 =</math> The sample base least squares estimates of the population regression coefficient for the product term</p> <p><math>\varepsilon =</math>error term-random variation due to other unmeasured factors</p>

### 3.11 Measure of Variables

In this study the dependent variable was tested using 3 predictive variables: Correlation analysis was used to establish whether there is correlation relationship between the elements and composite of electoral process on political stability in East Africa Community States. Regression analysis was used to investigate the relationship between a set of predictor variables (Electoral process). For the purpose



of conducting the analysis of this study three independent variables were taken into account namely: (Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes). Each of the variables and their sub-variables were used.

**Table 3.6: Measurement of the Variables**

<b>Variable Type</b>	<b>Variable name</b>	<b>Sub-variables Indicators / Measure /</b>	<b>/Measurement tool</b>	<b>Questionnaire Item</b>
Independent Variable	Pre- election Processes	Voter registration and Voter education participation Political parties' campaigns	5 point Likert scale, sub variable and a composite of 12 items	3Section B
	Election processes	Election Administration Electioneering process Use of state resources	5 point Likert scale, sub variable and a composite of 9 items	3Section C
	Post-election processes	Election resolution Foreign policy on elections	dispute 5 point Likert scale, sub variable and a composite of 12 items	3Section D
Moderating variables	Political leadership	Ethnic prejudices Government policy	5 point Likert scale, sub variable and a composite of 7 items	3Section E
Dependent Variable	Political Stability	Good governance Safety and security Practice of and respect for rule of law; Adherence to and respect for electoral processes, Democracy	5 point Likert scale, sub variable and a composite of 11 items	3Section F

## CHAPTER FOUR

### RESEARCH FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the data collected from the field analyzed and interpreted in relation to the research objectives on the role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community States. In this chapter the findings of the study are presented. Response rate, reliability and validity of the study constructs of the study is evaluated. The general background information of respondents is presented. This is followed by descriptive analysis of the study variables, which is followed by inferential analysis. The discussion of the findings as well as the implications arising from the findings is presented in this chapter.

#### 4.2 Response Rate

The number of questionnaires that were administered was 94. A total of 83 questionnaires were properly filled and returned. This represented an overall successful response rate of 88.3% as shown on Table 4.1. This agrees with Babbie (2004) who asserted that return rates of 50% are acceptable to analyze and publish, 60% is good and 70% is very good. Based on this assertion 88.3% response rate is adequate for the study.

**Table 4.1: Response Rate**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Returned	83	88.3
Unreturned	11	11.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** Primary data, 2018

### **4.3 Pilot Study Results**

Key indicators of the quality of a measuring instrument used in this study were the reliability and validity of the measures. Generally, the process of developing and validating an instrument is in large part focused on reducing error in the measurement process. According to Kimberlin and Winterstein, (2012) reliability estimates evaluate the stability of measures, internal consistency of measurement instruments, and interrater reliability of instrument scores. In addition, the authors depict that validity is the extent to which the interpretations of the results of a test are warranted, which depends on the particular use the test is intended to serve.

#### **4.3.1 Reliability results**

The study tested reliability of the questionnaire using a Cronbach Alpha. According to Sekaran and Bougie (2010) Cronbach Alpha coefficient indicates how well items in a questionnaire are positively correlated. Internal consistency is the most commonly used psychometric measure in assessing survey instruments and scales (Zhang, Waszink & Wijngaard, 2002). Cronbach alpha formula was applied to determine reliability based on internal consistency since this measure is viewed as an extension of the Kuder–Richardson Formula 20 (KR-20) used to measure dichotomous items (Kim & Cha, 2002). Cronbach Alpha values range between 0 and 1.0. A Cronbach Alpha value of 0.7 is most set as the threshold value for reliability. However, according to Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, (1998) a Cronbach Alpha of 0.6 is acceptable when the number of items is less. The study consisted of three independent variables, one moderating variable and a dependent variable. The independent variables were Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes and Post-election phase processes, moderating variable of political leadership while dependent variable was political stability. Constructs used in this study were tested for reliability using Cronbach alpha test and the results are depicted in Table 4.2

**Table 4.2: Reliability Statistics**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Alpha (<math>\alpha</math>)</b>	<b>No of items</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Pre-election phase processes	0.752	12	Reliable
Election phase processes	0.898	9	Reliable
Post-election phase processes	0.890	12	Reliable
Political leadership	0.860	7	Reliable
Political stability	0.881	11	Reliable

From the results in Table 4.2 all variables tested have the value of Cronbach's Alpha is above value of 0.7 thus the study was reliable (Castillio, 2009). This represented high level of reliability and on this basis, it was supposed that scales used in this study is reliable to capture the variables. The values of 0.752, 0.898, 0.890, 0.860 and 0.881 were sufficient confirmation that the data for the variables. Therefore, none of the items in the questionnaire was deleted after the pilot study. The questionnaire was adequate to be used in the final survey.

#### **4.3.2 Validity of Research Instruments**

The study used Factor Analysis and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to validate data collected. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2012), PCA is a variable reduction procedure that aims at decomposing many correlated measurements into a small set of uncorrelated (orthogonal) artificial variables called Principal Components. Factor analysis, on the other hand, is a statistical data exploration technique which is used in reducing a set of correlated variables to a smaller number of unobserved, uncorrelated factors (Cooper & Schindler, 2011; Mugenda & Mugenda, 2012; White, 2010). Before proceeding for the field, the data collected from the pilot study was subjected to factor analysis; appropriateness of factor analysis needed to be assessed.

While it is generally agreed that loadings from factor analysis of 0.7 and above are preferable for analysis, Leech et al. (2011) explained that studies use 0.4 as a realistic measure if they are consistent with the theoretical labels given that 0.7 can be high for real life data to meet this threshold. However, as indicated in the Principle Component matrices, all the components show a value of above 0.7 and therefore none was dropped. The two tests were performed to ensure that the data is suitable for analyses.

KMO and Bartlett's Test were conducted to test sample adequacy for political leadership before factor analysis was carried out. Hair et al. (2010) highlighted that Factor Analysis was necessary in research to test for construct validity and highlight variability among observed variables and to also check for any correlated variables in order to reduce redundancy in data. The findings in Table 4.3 showed that the KMO statistic for human trafficking measures was 0.785 which was significantly high; that is greater than the critical level of significance of the test which was set at 0.5 (Field, 2000). In addition to the KMO test, the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was also highly significant (Chi-square = 236.513 with 45 degrees of freedom, at  $p < 0.05$ ). KMO and Bartlett's Test results provided an excellent justification for factor analysis to be conducted.

**Table 4.3: Factor analysis - KMO and Bart**

<b>KMO and Bartlett's Test</b>	
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.	0.785
Approx. Chi-Square	236.513
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	
Df	45
Sig.	.000

#### 4.4 Demographic Characteristics

This section analyzes the demographic characteristics of the study participants. The study sought to establish the demographic information in order to determine whether it had influence on the role of political leadership in electoral process and political stability in the East African Community States. This description of the study respondents included; gender, age, religion, and the level of education.

##### 4.4.1 Gender of Respondents

The researcher sought to find out the gender of the respondents to determine if it had influence on electoral process and political stability. It was important for the study to establish the level of representation by gender. The responses were tabulated and presented on Table 4.4.

**Table 4.4: Distribution of the respondents by gender.**

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Male	47	56.6
Female	36	43.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** Primary data, 2016

As shown in Table 4.4, out of the 83 respondents who participated in the study, 47 (56.6%) were Male while 36 (43.4%) were female. This is a good distribution which represents a fair gender balancing, an indication of successful efforts of various gender mainstreaming campaigns by various stakeholders. These findings implied that County East African Community States had adhered to two third gender rule as stipulated in the United Nations representation rule. Since majority of the responses for this study relies on the perceptual measures of the respondents, this gender distribution is expected to accommodate the opinions and views from both sides of the gender divide. This study was dominated by the male which was in line with (Dolan, 2012) who asserted that the most electoral processes in developing world is

predominantly male-controlled in which female participation in development activities is traditionally looked down upon.

#### **4.4.2 Age of the respondent**

The study sought to determine the distribution of age among the study respondents. When this perception of age is widely accepted and incorporated into the general narratives and stories about aging in any electoral process, it perpetuates negative beliefs about becoming and being old. This leads people to reduce physical activity as they age, and it supports the notion that communities should not be concerned about electioneering process. The results on the age of the respondents are presented using Table 4.5.

**Table 4.5: Age of respondents**

<b>Age</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
20 -29	4	4.8
30-39	21	25.3
40-49	28	33.7
>50	30	36.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** Primary data, 2018

The study requested the respondent to indicate their age category, from the findings, it was found that 4.8% of the respondents were aged between 20-29 years, 25.3% of the of the respondent were aged between 30 to 39 years, 33.7% were aged between 40 to 49 years and finally 36.1% of the respondents indicated that they were aged over 50 years. This is an indication that respondents were well distributed in terms of their age.

These results were in agreement with other scholars who found that the predictable wisdom of the supremacy of education in stimulating electoral participation had been challenged in a number of methodologically advanced studies (Berinsky & Lenz,

2011; Kam & Palmer, 2008; Persson, 2014). In essence, these studies argued that earlier studies showing an impact of education on political participation had failed to take into account that people who attain higher levels of education systematically differ from those who do not in various overlooked ways. The evidence regarding the causal impact of education on political participation is still inconclusive, but the debate over the relationship has reiterated the main concern.

#### 4.4.3 Education level

The study further sought to determine the distribution of education qualifications among the respondents. According to Spring, (2014) education has increasingly developed as an issue intertwined with party politics and polarized partisanship. Both political party have developed dissimilar and congruent stances on education policy ranging from implementing free market reforms to extending governmental intervention in education. The results on the education level of the respondents are presented using Table 4.6.

**Table 4.6: Education level of respondents**

<b>Education level</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Diploma	5	6.0
Bachelor's degree	31	37.3
Master's degree	38	45.8
Doctoral degree	9	10.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** Primary data, 2018

From Table 4.6 above the study results revealed that 6% of the respondents had diploma, 37.3% of the respondents had bachelor's degree education, 45.8% had acquired a master's degree and 10.8% of the respondents indicated that the highest level of education they had attained was a doctoral degree. These results imply that majority of the respondents had at least a degree education hence understood the



information sought by this study. This proposition is supported by Ditonto, Hamilton & Redraws, (2013), who posited that professionalism in any occupation relates not only to the levels of education and qualifications of the workforce but also to the professional approach in the conduct of business activities. An individual's level of education is attributed to the level of competence ability to meet professional demands of top management positions.

#### 4.4.3 Religion distribution

The study further sought to determine the distribution of religion among the respondents. Religion and politics are concepts that designate two different and interdependent subsystems of society. Although the concepts are separated analytically, the relationship between religion and politics is characterized by interdependence. The results on the education level of the respondents are presented using Table 4.7.

**Table 4.7: Religion of respondents**

<b>Religion</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Christian	36	43.4
Muslim	18	21.7
Traditional	7	8.4
Others	22	26.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** Primary data, 2018

From Table 4.7 above the study results revealed that 8.4% of the respondents indicated that in general they were traditional worshippers, 43.4% of the respondents indicated that they were Christians, 21.7% of the respondents indicated that they were Muslims and 26.5% of the respondents indicated that they didn't believe in any religion. This is in agreement with Patterson, et al. (2011) who found out that politics

of practicing Muslims in developed world looked at the possibility of a causal relationship between attendance of religious services and political participation.

#### **4.5 Descriptive Analysis**

The purpose of this study was to examine the moderating role of political leadership in electoral process and political stability in the East African Community States. The researcher analyzed descriptive statistics for the following observed variables: Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes. The following sub-sections present descriptive

##### **4.5.1 Pre-election phase processes**

The first objective was to determine the role of pre-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States. Respondents' opinion on pre-election phase processes and political stability was captured using 1-Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 – Indifferent; 4 – Agree; 5 –Strongly agree. The findings presented in the Table 4.8 shows the respondents view on the statement used to measure pre-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States. The study used percentages, mean and standard deviation in the analysis.

**Table 4.8: Descriptive Results for pre-election phase processes**

Statements	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	Std dev
Political violence and intimidation is not common in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability.	31.3%	31.3%	19.3%	12.0%	6.0%	2.30	1.21
The EAC laws and regulations on political violence are adequate and do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.	28.9%	25.3%	20.5%	19.3%	6.0%	2.48	1.26
There is no need to match the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on political violence in all the EAC States to ensure political stability.	2.4%	24.1%	20.5%	22.9%	30.1%	3.54	1.23
Voter registration is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability.	6.0%	2.4%	13.3%	32.5%	45.8%	4.10	.11
The EAC laws and regulations on voter registration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.	9.6%	30.1%	20.5%	18.1%	21.7%	3.12	1.32
There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on voter registration in the EAC States to ensure political stability.	16.9%	8.4%	21.7%	28.9%	24.1%	3.35	1.38
Voter registration is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability.	6.0%	3.6%	8.4%	42.2%	39.8%	4.06	1.09
The EAC laws and regulations on voter registration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.	7.2%	9.6%	28.9%	22.9%	31.3%	3.61	1.23
There is no need to match the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on voter registration in the EAC State to ensure political stability.	14.5%	15.7%	19.3%	22.9%	27.7%	3.34	1.41
Funding of political campaigns by the States is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability.	19.3%	24.1%	18.1%	19.3%	19.3%	2.95	1.41
The EAC laws and regulations on campaign funding are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.	25.3%	18.1%	28.9%	14.5%	13.3%	2.72	1.35
There is no need to match the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on funding of political campaigns in the EAC States to ensure political stability.	20.5%	14.5%	25.3%	24.1%	15.7%	3.00	1.36

The results in Table 4.8 shows that, 31.3% had strongly disagreed that political violence and intimidation is not common in the EAC and financial management system, 31.3% had disagreed that political violence and intimidation is not common in the EAC and financial management system, 19.3% had somehow agreed that Political violence and intimidation is not common in the EAC and financial management system, 12.0% had agreed that political violence and intimidation is not common in the EAC and financial management system .and 6.0% had strongly agreed that political violence and intimidation is not common in the EAC and financial management system. Often times, this feature of the FPTP is not understood by politicians leading to serious problems, especially during the primary elections, emanating from conflict between constituencies and party leadership on choice of candidates. This usually results in intra-party squabbles, faction fighting and at times even a rupture of parties into fragmented splinter groups (witness this problem in Lesotho (1998) and Zimbabwe (2000).

Table 4.8 shows that, 28.9% had strongly disagreed with the statement that the EAC law and regulation on political violence are adequate and do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 25.3% disagreed, 20.5% had somehow agreed that 19.3% had agreed that and the standard deviation at 1.02 to show the heterogeneity of responses. This information can function as a focal point for action and facilitate coordination among citizens and opposition parties (Tucker, 2007).

Table 4.8 shows that, 2.4% had strongly disagreed with the statement that there is no need to match the implementation of an existing law, 24.1% had disagreed there is no need to match the implementation of an existing law, 20.5% had somehow agreed that There is no need to match the implementation of an existing law, 22.9% had agreed that there is no need to match the implementation of an existing law 30.1% had strongly agreed that there is no need to match the implementation of an existing law. Voter registration determines the ability of eligible voters to participate in an election, and thus is a key ingredient in the fairness of an election (Muhula, 2009).

Table 4.8 shows that, 6.0% had strongly disagreed voter registration is effectively exceeded in the EAC state during election, 2.4% had disagreed voter registration is

effectively exceeded in the EAC state during election, 13.3% had somehow agreed that Voter registration is effectively exceeded in the EAC state during election, 32.5% had agreed that the voter registration is effectively exceeded in the EAC state during election 45.8% had strongly agreed that voter registration is effectively exceeded in the EAC state during election. This concurs with Khamisi, (2011) who indicated that voter registration is a common practice for the electoral bodies to fail to regularly update the voters' register and that the register remains unreliable.

Table 4.8 shows that 9.6% had strongly disagreed the EAC law and regulation on voter's registration are inadequate, 30.1% had disagreed the EAC law and regulation on voters' registration are inadequate, 20.5% had somehow agreed that the EAC law and regulation on voters' registration are inadequate, 18.1% had agreed that the EAC law and regulation on voters' registration are inadequate 21.7% had strongly agreed that the EAC law and regulation on voters' registration are inadequate. A voter in Ethiopia's 2000 legislative election, for example, is quoted in Tronvoll (2009: 449) as expressing his discontent over government manipulation by stating 'they cannot only let us smell democracy, now they have to allow us to eat it too!' The presence of international monitors adds to this dynamic by publicizing the regime's illegitimate tactics and leaving no doubt about incumbents' willingness to deny citizens their vote

Table 4.8 shows that, 16.9% had strongly disagreed there is no need to match the implementation of the existing law and regulation, 8.4% had disagreed there is no need to match the implementation of the existing law and regulation, 21.7% had somehow agreed there is no need to match the implementation of the existing law and regulation, 28.9% had agreed there is no need to match the implementation of the existing law and regulation 24.1% had strongly agreed that there is no need to match the implementation of the existing law and regulation. Many electoral bodies have implemented systems to improve the inclusiveness, fairness, accuracy and transparency of voter registration, for example, by providing for continuously updated voter registration, special registration provisions for transient voters, and safeguards against wrongful rejection of registration or removal from the electoral register (Mwangola, 2013).

Table 4.8 shows that out of the 83 respondents, 6.0% had strongly disagreed voter registration is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability, 3.6% had disagreed voter registration is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability, 8.4% had somehow agreed Voter registration is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability, 42.2% had agreed voter registration is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability 39.8% had strongly agreed that voter registration is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability. While it is often believed that elections can easily be judged according to whether they were ‘free and fair’, there are a variety of processes that could be considered to arrive at such conclusions (Hartlyn & McCoy, 2006: 44).

Table 4.9 shows that, 7.2% had strongly disagreed that the EAC laws and regulations on voter registration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 9.6% had disagreed the EAC laws and regulations on voter registration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 28.9% had somehow agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on voter registration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 22.9% had agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on voter registration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability 31.3% had strongly agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on voter registration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability. Provision of voter education remains a challenge in many countries of Africa especially because it has in many cases remained the responsibility of the electoral bodies that in many cases lack the lack the capacity to adequately deliver this important task (Olopade, 2014).

Table 4.8 shows that, 14.5% had strongly disagreed there is no need to match the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on voter registration in the EAC State to ensure political stability, 15.7% had disagreed there is no need to match the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on voter registration in the EAC State to ensure political stability, 19.3% had somehow agreed there is no need to match the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on voter registration

in the EAC State to ensure political stability, 22.9% had agreed there is no need to match the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on voter registration in the EAC State to ensure political stability 27.7% had strongly agreed that there is no need to match the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on voter registration in the EAC State to ensure political stability. The electoral bodies have also trained youth members of registered political parties in proper voting procedures. These members are in turn, expected to help train their own party members (Wagner & Dreef, 2013).

Table 4.8 shows that, 19.3% had strongly disagreed Funding of political campaigns by the States is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability, 24.1% had disagreed Funding of political campaigns by the States is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability, 18.1% had somehow agreed Funding of political campaigns by the States is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability, 19.3% had agreed Funding of political campaigns by the States is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability 19.3% had strongly agreed that Funding of political campaigns by the States is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability. Ghufuran (2006), points out that ‘access to resources is a decisive factor in electoral contests and party existence the amount of funding available determines the quality of campaigning as well as the level of communication that the party has with voters’.

Table 4.8 shows that, 25.3% had strongly disagreed The EAC on law and regulation on the electioneering process are adequate, 18.1% had disagreed The EAC on law and regulation on the electioneering process are adequate, 28.9% had somehow agreed The EAC on law and regulation on the electioneering process are adequate, 14.5% had agreed. The EAC on law and regulation on the electioneering process are adequate 13.3% had strongly agreed that The EAC on law and regulation on the electioneering process are adequate. Fox and Van Weelden (2012), argues that state funding of opposition does not make a lot of difference if the party does not use the funds appropriately. He surmises that future state funding of political parties is likely

to benefit the larger parties, as the amount of money given to parties is based on their share of the total vote in previous elections.

Table 4.8 shows that, 20.5% had strongly disagreed there is no need to match the implementation of the existing law and regulation, 14.5% had disagreed that there is no need to match the implementation of the existing law and regulation, 25.3% had somehow agreed that there is no need to match the implementation of the existing law and regulation, 24.1% had agreed there is no need to match the implementation of the existing law and regulation 15.7% had strongly agreed that there is no need to match the implementation of the existing law and regulation. The danger, however, is that, if the parties are wholly reliant on this funding, and do not make an effort to raise funds or are unable to raise further funding, they will remain unable to compete effectively with bigger parties (Lamin, 2011).

Contrary to the above results, another group of researchers argue that democracy is a better promoter of political stability since protection of civil and property rights can be obtained only under democracy. Bratton (2008) argue that only a democratic government can achieve policies in the interest of the whole population. Furthermore, democracy enables the election of politicians since there is the possibility of voting thus politicians are accountable for their actions and policies.

#### **4.5.2 Election phase processes**

The second objective was to assess the role of election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States. Respondents' opinion on election phase processes and political stability was captured using 1-Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 – Indifferent; 4 – Agree; 5 –Strongly agree. Table 4.9 presents the finding on how respondents responded to various statements on the variables on election phase processes.



**Table 4.9: Descriptive Results for election phase processes**

	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	Std Dev.
Election administration has been effective and efficient as exercised in the EAC States to ensure political stability.	6.0%	13.3%	13.3%	24.1%	43.4%	3.86	1.28
The EAC laws and regulations on administration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.	9.6%	14.5%	16.9%	25.3%	33.7%	3.59	1.34
There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election administration in the EAC States to ensure political stability.	2.4%	27.7%	25.3%	26.5%	18.1%	3.30	1.13
Electioneering process has been free and fair as exercised in the EAC States to ensure political stability.	18.1%	18.1%	25.3%	13.3%	25.3%	3.10	1.44
The EAC laws and regulations on the electioneering process are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.	19.3%	20.5%	24.1%	21.7%	14.5%	2.92	1.34
There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on electioneering process in the EAC States to ensure political stability.	6.0%	14.5%	32.5%	14.5%	32.5%	3.53	1.25
Use of state resources for political activities is effectively controlled in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability.	2.4%	21.7%	22.9%	34.9%	18.1%	3.45	1.11
The EAC laws and regulations on the use of state resources are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.	18.1%	18.1%	13.3%	18.1%	32.5%	3.29	1.53
There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on the use of state resources in political activities in the EAC States to ensure political stability.	4.8%	16.9%	27.7%	36.1%	14.5%	3.38	1.08
Election dates are effective for each of the EAC States during elections as they are to ensure political stability.	3.6%	26.5%	20.5%	31.3%	18.1%	3.34	1.16
The EAC laws and regulations on election dates are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.	22.9%	20.5%	21.7%	18.1%	16.9%	2.86	1.41
There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election dates in the EAC States to ensure.	22.9%	21.7%	25.3%	15.7%	14.5%	2.77	1.36

Table 4.9 shows that out of the 83 respondents, 6.0% strongly disagreed that the election administration has been effective and efficient as exercised in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 13.3% disagreed, 13.3% somehow agreed while 24.1% agreed that the Election administration has been effective and efficient as exercised in the EAC States to ensure political stability lastly 43.4% strongly agreed that election administration has been effective and efficient as exercised in the EAC States to ensure political stability. This is in line with a study carried by Maltosa (2000) in South Africa who found out that stability is crucial for elections to serve their intended functions. It is also widely accepted that electoral systems play an important role in either stabilizing or destabilizing political systems in the region. He adds that election and electoral systems on their own are not sufficient conditions or instruments for ensuring and sustaining peace, security and stability in Southern Africa.

In addition, Table 4.9 shows that out of the 83 respondents, 9.6% strongly disagreed that the EAC laws and regulations on administration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 14.5% had disagreed that the EAC laws and regulations on administration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 16.9% had somehow agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on administration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability 37.7% strongly agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on administration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability. Research points to violent intimidation and the use of force as tools for influencing electoral outcomes or deterring individuals from voting (Bratton, 2008).

Furthermore, Table 4.9 shows that 2.4% strongly disagreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election administration in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 27.7% disagreed with the statement, 25.3% somehow agreed, 26.5% agreed and 18.1% strongly agreed with the statement. The electoral process settles the problem of transition from one administration to another, from one governmental epoch to another. Przeworski (1999) opined that, the strategic problem of transitions is to get to democracy without being either killed by those who have arms or starved by those who control

productive resources. He emphasized that, the path to democracy is mined and the final destination depends on the path. Some Scholars, however, maintain that election is not the only obstacle to democratic stability.

Moreover, Table 4.9 shows that 18.1% had strongly disagreed that electioneering process has been free and fair as exercised in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 18.1% had disagreed, 25.3% somehow agreed, 13.3% agreed and 25.3% strongly agreed that electioneering process has been free and fair as exercised in the EAC States to ensure political stability. Free, fair and peaceful elections are possible where mandated institutions are able to ensure integrity of the electoral process. As the political crises in Kenya (2007/2008), Zimbabwe (2008) and Zambia (2016) demonstrate, electoral violence is more likely to occur when the electoral process lacks integrity, when there is a perceived critical departure from the accepted rules that govern the process.

In addition, Table 4.9 shows that 19.3% strongly disagreed that the EAC laws and regulations on the electioneering process are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 20.5% disagreed, 24.1% somehow agreed, 21.7% agreed and 14.5% strongly agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on the electioneering process are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability. This is in line with Snyder (2000) who argues that consolidated democracies are less likely to see violence sparked by elections, as competition is institutionalized, and minority rights are strong. We also suggest that fully authoritarian regimes are unlikely to see instability or violence result from elections, because the elections themselves are unlikely to represent any threat to those in power, and because the regime maintains control of levers of repression which prevent anti-regime forces from organizing and deter anti-regime actions.

Table 4.9 also shows that, 6.0% strongly disagreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on electioneering process in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 14.5% disagreed, 32.5% somehow agreed, 14.5% agreed and only 32.5% strongly agreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on electioneering

process in the EAC States to ensure political stability. This disagrees with Nwoba (2004) who observed that the concept and context of election in Nigerian democratic process have been mechanistic to the extent that the ethics and ethos of democracy are either manipulated or discarded. He also maintained that, each election has brought in its wake political problems usually provoked by the unacceptable outcome of elections.

Furthermore, Table 4.9 shows that 2.4% had strongly disagreed that the use of state resources for political activities is effectively controlled in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability, 21.7% disagreed, 22.9% somehow agreed, 34.9% agreed and 18.1% strongly agreed that use of state resources for political activities is effectively controlled in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability. Drawing on arguments of Przeworski (2011), the study suggests that ethnic minorities and their leaders' value relatively more highly the limited power achievable by minority, opposition, or coalition member status, and thus are more easily deterred from violence. However, national elites in partially democratic regimes will only be deterred from violence by the prospect of gaining full control of the executive which is represented by direct executive elections.

Moreover, Table 4.9 indicated that, 18.1% had strongly disagreed that the EAC laws and regulations on the use of state resources are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 18.1% disagreed, 13.3% somehow agreed, 18.1% agreed and 32.5% strongly agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on the use of state resources are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability. This concurs with Raleigh, Linke and Hegre (2010) who found out that Incumbents who are faced with dissent over electoral manipulation may feel threatened in their positions and see the use of violent repression as their only means to stay in power.

Table 4.9 shows that, 4.8% strongly disagreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on the use of state resources in political activities in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 16.9% disagreed, 27.7% somehow agreed, 36.1% agreed and 14.5% strongly agreed that there is no

need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on the use of state resources in political activities in the EAC States to ensure political stability. This scenario is likely to occur if international election observers, as suggested in research by Hyde (2008) and Kelley (2008), are successful in detecting electoral manipulation. When international monitors declare elections as fraudulent, opposition parties and citizens are expected to protest electoral outcomes.

Table 4.9 shows that, 3.6% strongly disagreed that election dates are effective for each of the EAC States during elections as they are to ensure political stability, 26.5% had somehow agreed election dates are effective for each of the EAC states during elections as they are to ensure political stability, 20.5% agreed that election dates are effective for each of the EAC States during elections as they are to ensure political stability 31.3% strongly agreed that election dates are effective for each of the EAC States during elections as they are to ensure political stability. Their findings suggest that executive and legislative elections of all types reduce the chance of political instability in ethnically fractionalized politics, while only direct executive elections reduce the chance of political instability in partially democratic politics by carefully observing the election dates (Collier, 2009).

Table 4.9 shows that, 22.9% strongly disagreed that the EAC laws and regulations on election dates are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 20.5% disagreed with the statement, 21.7% somehow agreed, 18.1% agreed and only 16.9% strongly agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on election dates are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability. As Tucker (2007: 541) points out, laws and regulations on election dates can provide focal points for action by providing information on the likelihood that people will join in the protest.

Lastly Table 4.9 indicated that, 22.9% strongly disagreed there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election dates in the EAC States to ensure, 21.7% disagreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election dates in the EAC states to ensure, 25.3% had somehow agreed that there is no need to harmonize the

implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election dates in the EAC states to ensure, 15.7% agreed there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election dates in the EAC States to ensure 14.5% that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election dates in the EAC States to ensure. This is in line with Straus, Scott and Charlie Taylor (2009) who were of the view that, democracy means more than election. According to him, genuine democracy implies more, such as respect for individual and minority rights, and tolerance for loyal opposition. It should, however, be noted that election is the bulwark of the democratic process which could engender the necessary atmosphere for the achievement of the aspirations of the citizens in particular and the nation in general.

#### **4.5.3 Post-election phase processes**

The third objective was to evaluate the role of post-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States. Respondents' opinion on post-election phase processes and political stability was captured using 1-Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 – Indifferent; 4 – Agree; 5 –Strongly agree. The statements, respondents' opinions and their percentages are as shown in Table 4.10:

**Table 4.10: Descriptive Results for Post-election phase process**

	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	Std Dev
Resolution of election disputes has been effective and efficient as exercised in the EAC States as a practice to ensure political stability	20.5%	14.5%	25.3%	24.1%	15.7%	3.00	1.36
The EAC laws and regulations on election dispute resolution are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.	7.2%	14.5%	16.9%	18.1%	43.4%	3.76	1.34
There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election dispute resolution in the EAC States to ensure political stability.	3.6%	6.0%	8.4%	42.2%	39.8%	4.08	1.03
Monitoring and evaluation of elections has been effective as exercised in the EAC States as a practice to ensure political stability.	12.0%	25.3%	21.7%	24.1%	16.9%	3.08	1.29
The EAC laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation of elections are adequate and do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.	19.3%	20.5%	24.1%	21.7%	14.5%	2.92	1.34
There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation process in the EAC States to ensure political stability.	4.8%	9.6%	18.1%	27.7%	39.8%	3.88	1.18
Use of international observers and the reports generated is effectively exercised in the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability.	3.6%	9.6%	13.3%	36.1%	37.3%	3.94	1.10
The EAC laws and regulations on the use of international observers are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.	12.0%	25.3%	21.7%	24.1%	16.9%	3.08	1.29
There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on the use of international observers in political activities in the EAC States to ensure political stability.	2.4%	16.9%	22.9%	33.7%	24.1%	3.60	1.10
Foreign policies on elections are effectively implemented in each of the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability.	3.6%	4.8%	10.8%	39.8%	41.0%	4.10	1.02
The EAC laws and regulations on election integrating foreign policies in elections are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.	9.6%	13.3%	8.4%	28.9%	39.8%	3.76	1.36
There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on foreign policies on elections in the EAC States to ensure political stability.	10.8%	8.4%	13.3%	20.5%	40.5%	3.84	1.38

Firstly, Table 4.10 shows that, 20.5% strongly disagreed with the statement that resolution of election disputes has been effective and efficient as exercised in the EAC States as a practice to ensure political stability, 14.5% disagreed, 25.3% somehow agreed with the statement, 24.1% agreed with the statement, 15.7% strongly agreed with the statement that resolution of election disputes has been effective and efficient as exercised in the EAC States as a practice to ensure political stability. According to Ayanda and Odunayo (2015), the use of the courts as a mechanism for resolving electoral disputes is not ideal. The researchers stated further that cases of this nature decided by the High Court are never on its substantive merits, but on technicalities that are hardly understood by a common person.

Table 4.10 shows that, 3.6% strongly disagreed with the statement that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election dispute resolution in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 6.0% disagreed, 8.4% somehow agreed, 42.2% agreed while 39.8% strongly agreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election dispute resolution in the EAC States to ensure political stability. Kuntz and Thompson (2009), for example, argue that stolen elections function as triggers for revolutionary action and present a discussion of recent revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, and the Ukraine as evidence for this expectation.

Table 4.10 shows that out of the 83 respondents, 12.0% had strongly disagreed with the statement that monitoring and evaluation of elections has been effective as exercised in the EAC States as a practice to ensure political stability, 25.3% disagreed that monitoring and evaluation of elections has been effective as exercised in the EAC States as a practice to ensure political stability, 21.7% somehow agreed that monitoring and evaluation of elections has been effective as exercised in the EAC States as a practice to ensure political stability, 24.1% agreed that monitoring and evaluation of elections has been effective as exercised in the EAC States as a practice to ensure political stability whereas 16.9% strongly agreed that that monitoring and evaluation of elections has been effective as exercised in the EAC States as a practice to ensure political stability. Electoral activities are clustered in



various electoral phases (IDEA, 2010). The phases of the electoral cycle include Legal and Institutional Electoral Framework, Planning and Preparation for Implementation of Electoral Activities, Training and education, Registration of voters, Political parties and election observers, Electoral campaigning, voting operations, Election results announcement and Post electoral phase.

Table 4.10 shows that out of the 83 respondents, 19.3% strongly disagreed with the statement that the EAC laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation of elections are adequate and do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 20.5% disagreed that the EAC laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation of elections are adequate and do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 10.5% somehow agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation of elections are adequate and do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 24.1% agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation of elections are adequate and do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability while 21.7% strongly agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation of elections are adequate and do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability. A good understanding of the various components and stages of the electoral cycle is a prerequisite for establishing the start and end times of electoral activities in order not to be caught up with time constraints (European Commission, 2006). A key factor for project success is that roles and responsibilities are clearly assigned and EMB team members are empowered to take action. The team also draws up district, state, and constituency level election plans that address all the project management stages (Kumar, 2007).

Table 4.10 shows that, 4.8% had strongly disagreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation process in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 9.6% disagreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation process in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 18.1% somehow agreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation

process in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 27.7% agreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation process in the EAC States to ensure political stability while 39.8% strongly agreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation process in the EAC States to ensure political stability. Vwamu (2010) emphasizes that electoral activities are projects that have start and completion dates that should be adhered to ensure they are carried out effectively and efficiently to guarantee good performance.

Table 4.10 shows that out of the 83 respondents, 3.6% strongly disagreed that the use of international observers and the reports generated is effectively exercised in the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability, 9.6% disagreed that use of international observers and the reports generated is effectively exercised in the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability, 13.3% somehow agreed use of international observers and the reports generated is effectively exercised in the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability, 36.1% agreed use of international observers and the reports generated is effectively exercised in the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability while 37.3% strongly agreed that use of international observers and the reports generated is effectively exercised in the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability. Similarly, in this research, the respondents suggested that the electoral campaign is one of the basic requirements to compete in elections and for the success of a candidate he or she needs to have a clear timeline on all the electoral activities dates (Pattan, 2006). However, the respondents emphasized that the successful elections are always organized and involves coordination of efforts.

Table 4.10 shows that, 12.0% strongly disagreed with the statement that the EAC laws and regulations on the use of international observers are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 21.7% disagreed that the EAC laws and regulations on the use of international observers are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 25.3% somehow agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on the use of international observers are adequate in do not need

any harmonization to ensure political stability, 24.1% agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on the use of international observers are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability while 16.9% strongly agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on the use of international observers are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability. Staffs who have gained electoral experience move on to other government positions, leaving a skill and experience gap (Ronald, 2008). For those public service staff in governmental EMBs under the Governmental and Mixed Models who remain available for electoral tasks, there is a long period between elections when they do work which can be of a completely different nature. Regular development measures such as refresher courses, and the archiving of electoral materials so that they are easily accessible, can assist in maintaining electoral skill levels (Chikuba, 2012).

Table 4.10 shows that out of the 83 respondents, 2.4% strongly disagreed with the statement that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on the use of international observers in political activities in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 16.9% disagreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on the use of international observers in political activities in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 22.9% somehow agreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on the use of international observers in political activities in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 33.7% agreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on the use of international observers in political activities in the EAC States to ensure political stability 24.1% strongly agreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on the use of international observers in political activities in the EAC States to ensure political stability. Gray (2008) revealed that in Australia, the public service regulations allow the EMB considerable flexibility in its employment practices. Special allowances for electoral work, particularly to compensate for the long hours involved during electoral periods, may also be available.

Table 4.10 shows that out of the 83 respondents, 3.6% strongly disagreed with the statement that foreign policies on elections are effectively implemented in each of the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability, 4.8% disagreed that foreign policies on elections are effectively implemented in each of the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability, 10.8% somehow agreed that foreign policies on elections are effectively implemented in each of the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability, 39.8% agreed that foreign policies on elections are effectively implemented in each of the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability while 41.0% strongly agreed that foreign policies on elections are effectively implemented in each of the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability. For an electoral event to proceed smoothly, it is essential that both permanent and temporary EMB staff receive appropriate operational training so that they fully understand the tasks required of them, especially when they are interacting with voters or other stakeholders, handling ballots or other accountable materials, or dealing with sensitive issues (Holm, 2009).

Table 4.10 shows that, 9.6% strongly disagreed with the statement that the EAC laws and regulations on election integrating foreign policies in elections are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 13.3% disagreed that the EAC laws and regulations on election integrating foreign policies in elections are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 8.4% somehow agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on election integrating foreign policies in elections are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability, 28.9% agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on election integrating foreign policies in elections are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability whereas 39.8% strongly agreed that the EAC laws and regulations on election integrating foreign policies in elections are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability. These findings also concur with those of Kumar (2007) who stated that a key factor for project success is that roles and responsibilities are clearly assigned and EMB team members are empowered to take action.

Lastly, Table 4.10 shows that, 10.8% strongly disagreed with the statement that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on foreign policies on elections in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 8.4% disagreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on foreign policies on elections in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 13.3% somehow agreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on foreign policies on elections in the EAC States to ensure political stability, 20.5% agreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on foreign policies on elections in the EAC States to ensure political stability while 40.5% strongly agreed that there was no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on foreign policies on elections in the EAC States to ensure political stability. UNDP report, (2013) described increased participation of a well-informed citizenry in democratic processes, including elections; as a way of influencing decision-making on matters that affect their lives. To make sensible choices, however, citizens must be aware of an elections purpose, their voting rights and obligations, the dates and procedures, the range of electoral options, and they must know how to vote.

#### **4.5.4 Political leadership**

The fourth objective was to test the moderating role of political leadership on the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States. Respondents' opinion on post-election phase processes and political stability was captured using 1-Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 – Indifferent; 4 – Agree; 5 –Strongly agree. The statements, respondents' opinions and their percentages are as shown by Table 4.11:

**Table 4.11: Descriptive Results for political leadership**

	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	Std Dev
Policies on effective participation of stakeholders and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.	3.6%	9.6%	7.2%	26.5%	53.0%	4.15	1.14
Policies on Stakeholder control of the agenda and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.	4.8%	10.8%	10.8%	27.7%	45.8%	3.99	1.20
Policies on voting equality and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.	4.8%	9.6%	8.4%	32.5%	44.6%	4.02	1.17
Policies on enlightened understanding and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.	2.4%	8.4%	8.4%	43.4%	37.3%	4.05	1.01
Policies on inclusion of all adults and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.	8.4%	1.2%	14.5%	41.0%	34.9%	3.93	1.15
Policies on transparency and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.	6.0%	6.0%	9.6%	32.5%	45.8%	4.06	1.16
Policies on accountability and representation and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.	6.0%	7.2%	15.7%	30.1%	41.0%	3.93	1.19

Table 4.11 shows that, 3.6% strongly disagreed with the statement that policies on effective participation of stakeholders and their implementation have a moderating role, 9.6% disagreed with the statement that policies on effective participation of stakeholders and their implementation have a moderating role, 7.2% somehow agreed with the statement that policies on effective participation of stakeholders and their implementation have a moderating role, 25.5% agreed with the statement that policies on effective participation of stakeholders and their implementation have a moderating role while 53.0% strongly agreed with the statement that policies on effective participation of stakeholders and their implementation have a moderating role. Confirming the views of Exworthy et al. (2002), the findings support the idea that policies which emphasize the importance of capturing context-specific contingencies as driven by stakeholder interests can be more effectively implemented when room for interpretation and discretion is given to implementing bodies. In this way, the overall aims/purposes of policies content can be locally re-shaped by allowing the adoption of flexible strategies within the implementation process (Lipsky, 1980; Pope, et al., 2006).

Table 4.11 also shows that, 4.8% strongly disagreed that policies and stake holders control of the agenda and their implementation, 10.8% disagreed that policies and stake holders control of the agenda and their implementation, 10.8% somehow agreed that policies and stake holders control of the agenda and their implementation, 27.7% agreed that policies and stake holders control of the agenda and their implementation while 45.8% strongly agreed that policies and stake holders control of the agenda and their implementation. In contrast, the failure of centrally driven implementation models has provided further evidence that when the ultimate policy goal is increasing stakeholder voice, the vertical/hierarchical dimension entails a weak device for the transmission of central authorities' values and aims (Powell, 1997) – and hence policy outcomes are bound to be unsatisfactory (Bate and Robert, 2002).

Table 4.11 shows that, 4.8% had strongly disagreed that policies on voting equality and their implementation have a moderating role, 9.6% disagreed that policies on voting equality and their implementation have a moderating role, 8.4% somehow

agreed that policies on voting equality and their implementation have a moderating role, 32.5% agreed that policies on voting equality and their implementation have a moderating role while 44.6% strongly agreed that policies on voting equality and their implementation have a moderating role. Bettio et al. (2012) in their study revolving the impact of the crisis on gender equality in the EU warn that ‘the budget cuts induced by fiscal consolidation measures entail the concrete risk of downgrading the status of equality policies or reducing the budgets allocated to them.

The same table indicated that 2.4% strongly disagreed that policies on enlightened understanding and their implementation have a moderating role on election, 8.4% disagreed, 43.4% somehow agreed, 37.3% agreed while 16.1% strongly agreed that policies on enlightened understanding and their implementation have a moderating role on election. Furthermore, Table 4.12 shows that 8.4% strongly disagreed that policies on transparency and their implementation have moderate role on election process, 1.2% disagreed, 14.5% somehow agreed, 41.0% agreed while 34.9% strongly agreed that that policies on transparency and their implementation have moderate role on election process. Some support for this proposition is given by Adserà, Boix and Payne (2003) who notes the effect of transparency on corruption is dependent on the accompanying prospects for publicity and accountability, studying only average effects may be misleading. We suspect that substantial variations in the effect of transparency depending on publicity and accountability may be hidden behind the average effects.

Additional Table 4.11 indicated that, 6.0% strongly disagreed with the statement that policies on accountability and representation and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral process, 6.0% disagreed, 9.6% somehow agreed, 32.5% agreed while 45.8% strongly agreed that policies on accountability and representation and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral process. In addition, Table 4.11 shows that 6.0% strongly disagreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of existing law and regulation on the use of state resources, 7.2% disagreed, 15.7% somehow agreed, 30.1% agreed while 4.0% strongly agreed that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of existing law and regulation on the use of state resources. As Hyde and Marinov (2008) point out,



absent credible information on election quality, allegations of fraud by opposition parties ‘are easily dismissed as those of sore losers. Yet when neutral parties invited to observe elections by the incumbent draw attention to main loopholes in the voting procedure, it will be more difficult to dismiss such concerns as unfounded or self-interested assertions by losing parties

#### 4.5.5 Political stability

Lastly the study investigated the views of respondents on political stability in East Africa Community States. Respondents’ opinion on political stability was captured using 1-Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 – Indifferent; 4 – Agree; 5 –Strongly agree. The statements, respondents’ opinions and their percentages are as shown in Table 4.12:

**Table 4.12: Descriptive Results for Political stability**

	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	Std Dev
There is practice of and respect for rule of law	9.6%	2.4%	9.6%	36.1%	42.2%	3.99	1.22
The rights and freedoms of the citizens is respected	13.3%	12.0%	16.9%	18.1%	39.8%	3.60	1.45
There are free and fair elections	18.1%	18.1%	25.3%	13.3%	25.3%	3.10	1.44
There is low unemployment	19.3%	20.5%	24.1%	21.7%	14.5%	2.92	1.34
Poverty levels are low	0.0%	14.5%	32.5%	19.3%	33.7%	3.72	1.09
There is no suppression of opposition parties by the ruling government	2.4%	21.7%	22.9%	34.9%	18.1%	3.45	1.10
There is transparency, respect and tolerance	10.8%	20.5%	21.1%	26.5%	18.1%	3.20	1.27
There are no ethnic prejudices	3.6%	7.2%	8.4%	31.3%	49.4%	4.16	1.09
The electoral processes are clear	6.0%	8.4%	13.3%	32.5%	39.8%	3.92	1.19
There is adherence to and respect for electoral processes by all	1.2%	4.8%	10.8%	28.9%	54.2%	4.30	0.93
There is accountability	4.8%	14.5%	16.9%	25.3%	38.6%	3.78	1.24

The findings in Table 4.12 shows that 9.6% strongly disagreed with the statement that there is practice of respect for rule of law, 2.4% disagreed, 9.6% agreed while only 42.2% strongly agreed that there is practice of respect for rule of law. In addition, Table 4.12 indicated that 13.3% had strongly disagreed that the right and freedom of citizen is respected, 12.0% disagreed with the statement, 16.9% somehow agreed with the statement, 18.1% agreed with the statement while 39.8% strongly agreed that there the right and freedom of citizen is respected. Furthermore, Table 4.12 indicates that 18.1% strongly disagreed that there are free and fair election, 18.1% disagreed with the statement, 25.3% somehow agreed with the statement, 13.3% agreed with the statement while 25.3% strongly agreed that there are free and fair election. Determining the quality of elections, however, necessitates the creation of an established standards against which elections are evaluated. While it is often believed that elections can easily be judged according to whether they were ‘free and fair’, there are a variety of processes that could be considered to arrive at such conclusions (Hartlyn & McCoy, 2006)

Table also shows that 19.3% strongly disagreed that there is low employment, 20.5% disagreed that there is low employment, 24.1% somehow agreed that there is low employment, 21.7% agreed that there is low employment 14.5% strongly agreed that there is low employment. Table 4.12 shows that, none of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that poverty levels are low, 14.5% disagreed that poverty levels are low, 32.5% somehow agreed that poverty levels are low, 19.3% agreed that poverty levels are low 33.7% strongly agreed that poverty level are low. Table 4.12 shows that out of the 83 respondents, 2.4% strongly disagreed with the statement that there is no suppression of opposition parties by the ruling government, 21.7% disagreed that there is no suppression of opposition parties by the ruling government, 22.9% somehow agreed that there is no suppression of opposition parties by the ruling government, 34.9% agreed that there is no suppression of opposition parties by the ruling government 18.1% strongly agreed that there is no suppression of opposition parties by the ruling government. A voter in Ethiopia’s 2000 legislative election, for example, is quoted in Tronvoll (2009) as expressing his discontent over government manipulation by stating ‘they cannot only let us smell democracy, now they have to allow us to eat it too!’ The presence of international

monitors adds to this dynamic by publicizing the regime's illegitimate tactics and leaving no doubt about incumbents' willingness to deny citizens their vote.

In addition, Table 4.12 indicated that, 10.8% strongly disagreed that there is transparency, respect and tolerance, 20.5% disagreed that there is transparency, respect and tolerance, 21.1% somehow agreed that there is transparency, respect and tolerance, 26.5% had agreed that there is transparency, respect and tolerance 18.1% strongly agreed that there is transparency, respect and tolerance. Table 4.12 shows that out of the 83 respondents, 3.2% strongly disagreed that the electoral process is clear, 23.7% disagreed that the electoral process is clear, 24.7% somehow agreed that the electoral process is clear, 32.3% agreed that the electoral process is clear 16.1% strongly agreed that the electoral process is clear. Table 4.13 shows that out of the 83 respondents, 3.6% strongly disagreed that there are no ethnic prejudices, 7.2% disagreed that there are no ethnic prejudices, 8.4% somehow agreed that there are no ethnic prejudices, 13.3% agreed that there are no ethnic prejudices 39.8% strongly agreed that there are no ethnic prejudices. Table 4.13 shows that, 6.0% strongly disagreed that the electoral processes are clear, 8.4% had disagreed that the electoral processes are clear, 13.3% somehow agreed that the electoral processes are clear, 32.5% agreed that the electoral processes are clear 39.8% strongly agreed that the electoral processes are clear. This information can function as a focal point for action and facilitate coordination among citizens and opposition parties (Tucker, 2007).

Furthermore, Table 4.12 indicated that, 1.2% strongly disagreed that there is adherence to and respect for electoral processes by all, 4.8% disagreed that there is adherence to and respect for electoral processes by all, 10.5% somehow agreed that there is adherence to and respect for electoral processes by all, 28.9% agreed that there is adherence to and respect for electoral processes by all 54.2% strongly agreed that there is adherence to and respect for electoral processes by all. The elections resulted in about seventy deaths, which according to Suberu (2007), included assassinations. This sort of manipulation is the subject of several theoretical papers, which address abuse of the state security apparatus to repress competition in elections.

Moreover, Table 4.12 indicated that, 4.8% strongly disagreed with the statement that there is accountability, 14.8% disagreed that there is accountability, 16.9% somehow agreed that there is accountability 38.6% strongly agreed that there is accountability. One recent example of such behavior includes the arrest of two opposition candidates before political their political rallies in the Uganda's 2015 elections (WSJ), though this particular abuse of state resources was non-violent it is a good example of how state backed political parties can abuse the system in their favor. Nigeria's 2007 elections represent another, more violent, example of the abuse of states resources during an election campaign. It is easy to see how preventing competition from forming may be one way in which semi-autocratic governments can stay in power via the use of elections

#### **4.6 Diagnostics Tests Results**

The study performed requisite tests on statistical assumptions, that is, test of regression assumption and statistic used. This included test of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, and heteroscedasticity to make sure the data used was adequate to conduct inferential analysis. The tests were conducted to make sure that the statistical analysis conducted adhered to regression assumption hence avoid spurious and biased findings.

##### **4.6.1 Multi-collinearity test**

According to William *et al.* (2013), multi-collinearity refers to the presence of correlations between the predictor variables. In severe cases of perfect correlations between predictor variables, multi-collinearity can imply that a unique least squares solution to a regression analysis cannot be computed (Field, 2009). Multi-collinearity inflates the standard errors and confidence intervals leading to unstable estimates of the coefficients for individual predictors (Belsley *et al.*, 2008). Correlation analysis was used to conduct the multi-collinearity test. The rule of the thumb is that a correlation between independent variables of more than 0.8 is an indicator of serious multi-collinearity

**Table 4.13: Multicollinearity Tests**

Variable	Tolerance	VIF
Pre-election phase processes	.261	3.838
Election phase processes	.626	1.598
Post-election phase processes	.198	1.941
Political stability	.640	1.581

a Dependent Variable: Political stability

This study finding show that the independent variables; Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes and Political stability have a high tolerance. VIF values for study variables range between 1.581 and 3.838, an indication that the beta values of the regression equation of three independent variables and one moderating variable was stable with low standard errors. The results presented in Table 4.13 show that there was no threat of multicollinearity problem among the variables in the study data hence the study used linear regression model.

#### **4.6.2 Autocorrelation Tests**

Autocorrelation is a characteristic of data in which the correlation between the values of the same variables is based on related objects. It violates the assumption of instance independence, which underlies most of the conventional models. Durbin Watson test is used to check serial correlation among variables. When error terms from different (usually adjacent) time periods (or cross-section observation) are correlated, then it was said that the error term is serially correlated. Serial correlation should not affect the biasness or consistency of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator, but it affects their efficiency. To use a linear model, there should be no serial correlation among the observations. An autocorrelation test was conducted on the study using the Durbin-Watson statistic as discussed in chapter 3. Verbeek (2004)

and Gujarat (2009) suggested that as a rough rule of thumb, if the Durbin-Watson value is less than 1.0 or greater than 3.0, there may be cause for concern.

In Table 4.14, the dependent variable must be independent and this was tested using Durbin-Watson (d) test which state that  $d=2$  indicates that there is no autocorrelation. The value of (d) always lies between 0 and 4 where 0 indicates autocorrelation while above 1 indicates the residuals are interdependent, the results from the study presented is 1.540. In the case of this study, the result of the autocorrelation test shows that there was no cause for concern since the Durbin –Watson value is 1.0 and it lies between 1 and 2 hence the residuals are independent from each other.

**Table 4.14: Autocorrelation Tests**

<b>R</b>	<b>R Square</b>	<b>Adjusted R Square</b>	<b>Std. Error of the Estimate</b>	<b>Durbin-Watson</b>
.722a	0.522	0.515	0.37816	1.540 <sup>a</sup>

a. Predictors: Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes

b. Dependent Variable: Political stability

**Source:** Primary data, 2018

#### **4.6.3 Normality Test**

As discussed in chapter 3 section 3.8 of this thesis, it is important for a research of this nature, to assume a normally distributed dependent variable in order to make inferences from the analysis. Test of normality is done by inspecting the output of the histogram and normal Q-Q plot for the dependent variable (Pallant, 2010). One of the methods used to check for normality is the histogram and Q-Q test. Royston (2012) argued that a Q-Q test is a plot of percentiles of a standard distribution against the corresponding percentiles of the observed data. One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (K-S) was conducted to test the normality of all the variables. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (also known as the K-S test or one sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) is a non-parametric procedure that determines whether a sample of data comes from a

specific distribution, such as normal, uniform, Poisson, or exponential distribution. The results are presented in Table 4.15.

**Table 4.15: Normality tests results**

	Kolmogorov-Smirnov <sup>a</sup>			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Pre-election phase processes	.229	8	.200*	.847	8	.088
Election phase processes	.251	6	.200*	.869	6	.223
Post-election phase processes	.200	10	.200*	.832	10	.035
Political leadership	.237	5	.200*	.961	5	.814
Political stability	.253	3	.060	.964	3	.637

According to Ghasemi and Zahediasl, (2012) when testing for normality: Probabilities  $> 0.05$  mean the data are normal and Probabilities  $< 0.05$  mean the data are not normal. From the Table 4.15, the obtained values (P value for Pre-election phase processes is 0.2, P value for Election phase processes is 0.2, P value for Post-election phase processes is 0.2, P Value for Political leadership is 0.2 and p value for Political stability is 0.06) which all are greater than  $\alpha=0.05$ . Then  $H_0$  is accepted. Therefore, the distribution is normally distributed.

In carrying out a Q-Q test, the resulting plot should show an approximately straight line with a positive slope as a sign of normality. Normal test of the items of political stability as a dependent variable was carried out using a normal Q-Q plot and histogram. The histogram and a Q-Q plot are shown in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3. The results of the histogram and Q-Q plot shows an insignificant deviation of observations from the normal line thus a high level of normality. This, therefore, means that inferences on assumption of normality could be made on the dependent variable and a multiple regression model could be fitted since the dependent variable is normally distributed.




Figure 4.1: Histogram for the Dependent Variable




Figure 4.2: Q-Q plot for Dependent Variable



#### 4.6.4 Heteroscedasticity

Heteroscedasticity is a systematic pattern in the errors where the variances of the errors are not constant. The presence of heteroscedasticity causes the Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the SE to be biased, leading to unreliable hypothesis testing. According to Sazali et al. (2009), a large chi-square value greater than 9.21 would signify the presence of heteroscedasticity. The study used the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg method which tests the null hypothesis that the error variances are all equal versus the alternative that the error variances are a multiplicative function of one or more variables. As shown on Table 4.16, a small chi-square of 4.53 indicated absence of heteroscedasticity.

**Table 4.16: Heteroscedasticity Test Results**

<b>Ho</b>	<b>Variables</b>	<b>chi<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Prob&gt; chi<sup>2</sup></b>
Constant	Pre-election phase processes,	4.53	0.0033
Variance	Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes		

**Source: Primary data, 2018**

#### 4.7 Correlation Analysis

Correlation analysis was carried out between the variables of the study using Pearson correlation coefficient. The correlation coefficient was used to test whether there existed interdependency between independent variables and also whether the independent variables (the role of political leadership in electoral process) were related to the dependent variable political stability. Pearson's correlation coefficients were found to be appropriate for the variables.

According to the results in Table 4.17, the maximum coefficient was between political stability and pre-election phase (0.755). The findings indicated a positive correlation on all the variables and the correlation coefficient was significant at the

0.05 level of significant level. These results provided preliminary evidence that all these variables were associated with the political stability.

**Table 4.17: Correlation and the coefficient of determination**

	Political stability	Pre-election phase	Election phase	Post-election phase
<b>Political stability</b>				
(r)	1.000			
(p) Sig. (2 tailed)				
<b>Pre-election phase</b>				
(r)	0.755**	1.000		
(p) (2 tailed)	0.000			
<b>Election phase</b>				
(r)	0.663**	0.316	1.000	
(p) Sig. (2 tailed)	0.001	0.047		
<b>Post-election phase</b>				
(r)	0.535**	0.163	0.163	1.000
(p) Sig. (2 tailed)	0.000	0.019	0.019	

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

From the Pearson’s correlation matrix, the three independent variables had a positive and significant relationship with the dependent variable (see Table 4.17). Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes had a positive relationship with political stability ( $r = 0.755$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ;  $r = 0.663$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ; and  $r=0.535$ ,  $p < 0.001$  respectively at 0.05 level of significance. The analysis showed that pre-election phase had the strongest relationship with the political stability since it had the highest positive coefficient of ( $r=0.755$ ). Post-election phase

recorded the lowest level of relationship with the political stability. These results gave an indication that further statistical analysis such as regression analysis was required.

#### **4.8 Regression Analysis**

Regression analysis is a statistical process for estimating the relationships among variables. It helps one understand how the typical value of the dependent variable (political stability) changes when any one of the independent variables (Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes) is varied, while the other independent variables are held constant. Regression analysis was used to predict the variation in a dependent variable caused by the independent variables and was determined. The greater the coefficient, the greater the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. According to Carver et al (2009), R square ranges between 0.000 up to 1.000, with 1.000 indicating a perfect fit and suggesting that each point is on the straight line. In this study, both the standardized and unstandardized coefficients are given in the multiple regression equations. However, the standardized coefficients are the ones used in the discussions.

##### **4.8.1 Regression Analysis for Pre-election phase processes**

Regression analysis was performed in order to determine whether the independent variable, pre-election phase processes could be reliable for explaining the change in the dependent variable, political stability in East Africa Community States. The coefficients obtained indicate that the correlation coefficient (R) between the independent variable and the political stability was 0.994 which is a positive correlation relationship. Table 4.18 shows a coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) of 0.570, which means that this variable alone can explain up to 57.0% of the variations in the dependent variable, political stability. This implies that there exists a positive significant relationship between pre-election phase processes and political stability.

**Table 4.18: Model summary showing pre-election phase processes**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.755 <sup>a</sup>	.570	.567	.65724

**a. Predictors: (Constant), Pre-election phase processes**

The results of an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test performed on the variable pre-election phase processes are summarized in Table 4.19. The findings further confirm that the regression model of variable pre-election phase processes on political stability is significant and supported by  $F=201.134$ ,  $p<0.01$ ) since p-values was 0.00 which is less than 0.05.

**Table 4.19: ANOVA for pre-election phase processes**

Model		Sum of Squares	of Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	42.431	1	42.431	201.134	.000 <sup>a</sup>
	Residual	33.811	82	.617		
	Total	76.242	83			

b. Dependent Variable: Political stability

c. Predictors: (Constant), Pre-election phase processes

The coefficients of pre-election phase processes are presented in Table 4.20 which indicate that the model has a significant p-value =.000. The study at 95% confidence interval solved the first research question by indicating that the variable pre-election phase processes is statistically significant in the political stability.

**Table 4.20: Coefficients of pre-election phase processes.**

Model		Unstandardized		Standardized	T	Sig.
		Coefficients B	Std. Error	Coefficients Beta		
1	(Constant)	.773	.231		5.973	.000
	Pre-election phase processes (X1)	.539	.062	.444	8.815	.000

a. Dependent variable: Political stability

Using the summary of Coefficients presented in Table 4.20, a linear regression model of the form,  $Y = \alpha + \beta X_i$  can be fitted as follows:

$$Y = 0.773 + 0.539X_1 \dots \dots \dots \text{Equation 1}$$

This implied that a unit change in pre-election phase processes would increase political stability by the rate of 0.539.

#### **4.8.2 Regression Analysis for Election phase processes**

Regression analysis was performed in order to determine whether the independent variable, election phase processes could be reliable for explaining the change in the dependent variable, political stability in East Africa Community States. The coefficients obtained indicate that the correlation coefficient (R) between the independent variable and the political stability was 0.663 which is a positive correlation relationship. Table 4.21 shows a coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) of 0.44, which means that this variable alone can explain up to 44.0% of the variations in the dependent variable, political stability. This implied that there exists a positive significant relationship between Election phase processes and political stability.

**Table 4.21: Model summary showing election phase processes**

Model R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.663 <sup>a</sup>	.440	.436
			.5318171

a. Predictors: (Constant), Election phase processes

The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) results are shown in Table 4.22. The findings further confirm that the regression model of Election phase processes on political stability is significant for the data  $F = 119.214$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) since p-values was 0.00 which is less than 0.05

**Table 4.22: ANOVA for election phase processes**

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	Regression	34.528	1	34.528	119.214	.000 <sup>a</sup>
1	Residual	44.023	82	.290		
	Total	78.551	83			

b. Dependent Variable: Political stability

c. Predictors: (Constant), Election phase processes

The coefficients of election phase processes are presented in Table 4.23 which indicate that the model has a significant p-value =.000. The study at 95% confidence interval solved the second research question by indicating that the variable election phase processes is statistically significant in the political stability.

**Table 4.23: Coefficients of election phase processes.**

Model		Unstandardized		Standardized	T	Sig.
		Coefficients		Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.171	.267		4.837	.000
	Election phase processes (X2)	.766	.070	.663	10.919	.000

b. Dependent variable: Political stability

Using the summary of Coefficients presented in Table 4.23, a linear regression model of the form,  $Y = \alpha + \beta X_i$  can be fitted as follows:

$$Y = 1.171 + 0.766X_2 \dots \dots \dots \text{Equation 2}$$

This implied that a unit change in Election phase processes would increase political stability by the rate of 0.766.

#### 4.8.3 Regression Analysis for Post-election phase processes

Regression analysis was performed in order to determine whether the independent variable, post-election phase processes could be reliable for explaining the change in the dependent variable, political stability in East Africa region. The coefficients obtained indicate that the correlation coefficient (R) between the independent variable and the political stability was 0.811 which is a positive correlation relationship. Table 4.24 shows a coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) of 0.658, which means that this variable alone can explain up to 65.8% of the variations in the dependent variable, political stability.

**Table 4.24: Model summary showing post-election phase processes**

Model R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.811 <sup>a</sup>	.658	.420123

a. Predictors: (Constant), Post-election phase processes

The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) results are shown in Table 4.25. The findings further confirm that the regression model of Post-election phase processes on political stability is significant for the data  $F=156.122$ ,  $p<0.01$ ) since p-values was 0.00 which is less than 0.05.

**Table 4.25: ANOVA for post-election phase processes**

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	Regression	51.431	1	51.431	293.042	.000 <sup>a</sup>
1	Residual	26.811	82	.617		
	Total	78.242	83			

b. Dependent Variable: Political stability

c. Predictors: (Constant), Post-election phase processes

The coefficients of post-election phase processes are presented in Table 4.26 which indicate that the model has a significant p-value =.000. The study at 95% confidence interval solved the third research question by indicating that the variable post-election phase processes is statistically significant in the political stability.



**Table 4.26: Coefficients of post-election phase processes.**

Model		Unstandardized		Standardized	T	Sig.
		Coefficients	Coefficients	Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.580	.205		2.826	.000
	Post-election phase processes (X3)	.793	.046	.811	17.118	.000

c. Dependent variable: Political stability

Using the summary of Coefficients presented in Table 4.26, a linear regression model of the form,  $Y = \alpha + \beta X_i$  can be fitted as follows:

$$Y = 0.580 + 0.793X_3 \dots \dots \dots \text{Equation 3}$$

This implied that a unit change in post-election phase processes would increase political stability by the rate of 0.539.

#### 4.8.4 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis

In interpreting the results of multiple regression analysis, the R squared was used to check how well the model fitted the data. Therefore, it is interesting to know if the independent variables (Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes) relate to the dependent (political stability). Tables 4.27, 4.28 and 4.29 present the integrated models of the study at the three combined independent variables, as the study used a hierarchical regression analysis method to for the integrated model for the study

According to Brooks (2011) and Gujarat (2011), hierarchical regression analysis is a statistical procedure of computing regression results of a study where a researcher determines the order of entry of the variables (both predictor and outcome variables).

In this regression process, F-tests are used to compute the significance of each added variable (or set of variables) to the explanation reflected in  $R^2$ .

This procedure is an alternative to comparing betas for purposes of assessing the importance of the independents. In more complex forms of hierarchical regression, the model may involve a series of intermediate variables which are dependents with respect to some other independents but are themselves independents with respect to the ultimate dependent. Hierarchical multiple regression may involve a series of regressions for each intermediate as well as for the ultimate dependent. According to Gujarat (2011) use of hierarchical regression has two key advantages, namely; it has less capitalization on chance and; a researcher is assured that hierarchical regression results such as  $R^2$  are easily interpretable. The multiple regression analysis was consistent with previous studies like Kribat et al., (2013). The data collected was used to fit the proposed regression model;

$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \epsilon$  in determining the statistical significance of the three independent variables.

### **Model of the study**

Table 4.26 shows the model summary of the political leadership in the East African Community States. The study findings indicated that the value of R was 0.884 and the values for R square were 0.781. The value of R which was 0.884 was an indication of a positive linear relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable political stability in the East African Community States. The adjusted R square was an indication of the explanatory level of the independent variables towards establishing the relationship with the dependent variable which was 78.1%. This means that the three independent variables of the study could explain up to 78.1% of the political stability in the East African Community States. The difference of 21.9% of the political leadership can be said to be contributed to by other factors other than the study variables, Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes.

**Table 4.27: Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.884 <sup>a</sup>	.781	.774	.340598

a. Predictors: (Constant), Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes.

### ANOVA for the Regression model of the study

Table 4.28 presents the results of the ANOVA for the regression model that was used in the study. The ANOVA indicated an F- value of 105.285 with a P-value of 0.000, which was less than 0.05. This was an indication that the coefficients fitted in the multiple regression were not equal to zero therefore the model was a good fit for the variables that were being tested.

**Table 4.28: ANOVA for the Regression model of the study**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	Regression	61.382	3	12.276	105.285	.000 <sup>b</sup>
1	Residual	17.169	52	.116		
	Total	78.551	55			

a. Dependent Variable: Political stability

b. Predictors: (Constant), Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes.

### Coefficients of the study model

The constant term is 0.102 dependent variable when all the independent variables are equal to zero. The constant term has a p-value of 0.915 which is greater than 0.05.

This implies that the constant term is insignificant. The multiple regression political leadership on political stability is thus an equation through the origin. If all the independent variables take on the values of zero, there would be zero political stability in East Africa states.

The t statistics helps in determining the relative importance of each variable in the model. As a guide regarding useful predictors, we look for t values well below -0.5 or above +0.5. In this case the significant variable level of the variables was as follows; election phase (0.000 less than P-value 0.05) followed by pre-election phase (0.021), and post-election phase (0.185), respectively

**Table 4.29: Coefficients of the study model**

Model		Unstandardized		Standardized	t	Sig.
		Coefficients		Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.102	.946		.108	.915
	Pre-election phase processes (X1)	.116	.009	.444	2.112	.021
	Election phase processes (X2)	.182	.050	1.231	3.616	.000
	Post-election phase processes (X3)	.204	.240	.230	5.850	.025

#### 4.8.5 Moderation role of political leadership

The objective was to test the moderating role of political leadership on the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States. All the independent variables were moderated by the variable political leadership to give a composite. Results are presented in Table 4.30.

**Table 4.30: Moderation role of political leadership Results**

Variable	Unstandardized Coefficients				R squared Before Moderation	R squared After Moderation	R Squared Change
	B	Std. Error	t	Sig.			
Pre-election phase processes (X1)	-0.27	0.12	-2.34	0.02	57%	63.6%	6.6%
Election phase processes (X2)	-0.14	0.12	-1.18	0.24	44%	49.6%	5.6%
Post-election phase processes (X3)	-0.28	0.12	-2.43	0.02	65.8%	77.4%	11.6%

The  $R^2$  for Pre-election phase processes before moderation was 57% but after moderation, the  $R^2$  increased significantly to 63.6%. This implies that political leadership moderates' electoral process on political stability in East African Community States. Further Pre-election phase processes was significance with P value  $0.02 < 0.05$ . This implies that political leadership moderates the relationship between the electoral process on political stability in East African Community States.

The  $R^2$  for Election phase processes before moderation was 44% but after moderation, the  $R^2$  increased insignificantly to 49.6%. Further Election phase processes was insignificance with P value  $0.24 > 0.05$ . This implies that political leadership does not moderate the relationship between the electoral process on political stability in East African Community States.

The  $R^2$  for Post-election phase processes before moderation was 65.8% but after moderation, the  $R^2$  increased significantly to 77.4%. This implies that political leadership moderates the relationship between the electoral process on political stability in East African Community States.

Further Post-election phase processes were significance with P value  $0.02 < 0.05$ . This implies that political leadership moderates the relationship between the electoral process on political stability in East African Community States.

#### **4.9 Hypotheses Testing**

Hypotheses were tested using multiple linear regression analysis as represented in Table 4.29.

##### **4.9.1 Hypothesis Testing for pre-election phase processes**

The first Hypothesis to be tested was:

**H<sub>01</sub>: Pre-election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States**

The hypothesis was tested by using multiple linear regression and determined using p-value. The acceptance/rejection criteria were that, if the p value is less than 0.05, was to reject the H<sub>A1</sub> but if it was more than 0.05, the H<sub>A1</sub> is not rejected. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis is that Pre-election phase has a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States. Results in Table 4.29 shows that the p-value was 0.021. This was supported by a calculated t-statistic of 2.112 that is larger than the critical t-statistic of 1.96. The alternative hypothesis was therefore not rejected. The study therefore adopted the alternative hypothesis that Pre-election phase has a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.

#### **4.9.2 Hypothesis Testing for Election phase processes**

The second Hypothesis to be tested was:

**Ho2: Election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.**

The hypothesis was tested by using multiple linear regressions and determined using p-value. The acceptance/rejection criterion was that, if the p value is less than 0.05, we reject the  $H_{A2}$  but if it is more than 0.05, the  $H_{A2}$  is not rejected. Therefore, the alternate hypothesis is that Election phase has a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States. Results in Table 4.29 shows that the p-value was 0.00. This was supported by a calculated t-statistic of 3.616 that is larger than the critical t-statistic of 1.96. The alternative hypothesis was therefore not rejected. The study therefore adopted the alternative hypothesis Election phase has a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.

#### **4.9.3 Hypothesis Testing for Post-election phase processes**

The third Hypothesis to be tested was:

**Ho3: Post-election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.**

The hypothesis was tested by using multiple linear regression and determined using p-value. The acceptance/rejection criteria were that, if the p value is less than 0.05, we reject the  $H_{A3}$  but if it is more than 0.05, the  $H_{A3}$  is not rejected. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis is that Post-election phase has a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States. Results in Table 4.29 shows that the p-value was 0.025. This was supported by a calculated t-statistic of 5.850 that is larger than the critical t-statistic of 1.96. The alternate hypothesis was therefore not rejected. The study therefore adopted the alternative hypothesis that Post-election phase has a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.

#### **4.9.4 Hypothesis Testing for Political leadership**

The fourth Hypothesis to be tested was:

**Ho4: Political leadership does not significantly moderate the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East African Community States.**

The hypothesis was tested by using multiple linear regression and determined using p-value. The acceptance/rejection criteria were that, if the p value is less than 0.05, we reject the  $H_{A4}$  but if it is more than 0.05, the  $H_{A4}$  is not rejected. Political leadership was a positive and significant moderating variable for pre-election phase processes  $0.02 < 0.05$  and post-election phase processes at  $0.02 < 0.05$ . However, Political leadership did not have a significant moderating effect on election process  $0.24 > 0.05$  as shown in Table 4.30.

#### **4.10 Discussion of Key Findings**

##### **4.10.1 Pre-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States.**

The first objective of the study was to determine the role of pre-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States. Regression of coefficient revealed that there was a positive and significant relationship between pre-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States ( $r=0.116$ ,  $p=0.021$ ). This was supported by a calculated t-statistic of 2.112 that is larger than the critical t-statistic of 1.96. This means that a unitary improvement in pre-election leads to an improvement in political stability by 0.116 units holding other factors constant.

This is in agreement with Muhula, (2009) who found that voter registration governs the capability of suitable electorates to partake in an election, which is the key component in the impartiality of an election. Registration of voters is usually done earlier before the election day to allow the direct inspection of witnesses the core integrity of voter registration systems needs to be very high. Reforms aims at



increasing the efficiency as well as the integrity of voter registration processes in Africa but more still needs to be completed.

This is in agreement with a study conducted by Lamin (2011) who carried a study in west Africa and found that pre-election processes possess danger, however, is that, if the parties are wholly reliant on this funding, and do not make an effort to raise funds or are unable to raise further funding, they will remain unable to compete effectively with bigger parties.

#### **4.10.2 Election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States**

The second objective of the study was to assess the role of election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States. Regression of coefficient revealed that there was a positive and significant relationship between election phase processes and political stability in East African Community States ( $r=0.182$ ,  $p=0.00$ ). This was supported by a calculated t-statistic of 3.616 that is larger than the critical t-statistic of 1.96. This means that a unitary improvement in election phase processes leads to an improvement in political stability in East African Community States by 0.18.2 units holding other factors constant.

The Commissions are headed by commissioners, with one serving as chairperson. The Commissioners are appointed through an inclusive process that involves all political parties registered with the Commission (Bratton, 2008).

#### **4.10.3 Post-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States**

The third objective of the study was to evaluate the role of post-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States. Regression of coefficient revealed that there was a positive and significant relationship between post-election phase processes and political stability in East African Community States ( $r=0.240$ ,  $p=0.025$ ). This was supported by a calculated t-statistic of 5.850 that is larger than the critical t-statistic of 1.96. This means that a unitary improvement in

post-election phase processes leads to an improvement in political stability in East African Community States by 0.240 units holding other factors constant.

This is in line with Agence France-Presse (2007) who argued that approximately 20 female political party candidates were assaulted during the run-up to the 2007 general elections in Kenya. Furthermore, women in general were exposed to high levels of violence during the post-election period, lasting in to 2008, which resulted in over 1,300 deaths and approximately 3,000 cases of rape (Roberts, 2009).

#### **4.10.4 Moderating role of political leadership in electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States**

The fourth objective of the study was to test the moderating role of political leadership on the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States. Political leadership was a positive and significant moderating variable for pre-election phase processes  $0.02 < 0.05$  and post-election phase processes at  $0.02 < 0.05$ . However, Political leadership did not have a significant moderating effect on election process  $0.24 > 0.05$ .

This correlated with a research undertaken by Wachira (2010) who found out that the election-related violence that broke out in Kenya in 2007–08 was triggered by the announcement of the presidential election results and aggravated when the president was sworn in later on the same day. In addition Roberts (2009) further found that during a two-month period, 1,500 Kenyans lost their lives, 3,000 women were raped, businesses were ransacked and set on fire, and over 300,000 people were internally displaced. During this time, a group of five influential Kenyans, calling themselves Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), started to plead for dialogue and negotiations among the political leadership. Through this initiative, working committees were formed attracting a wide range of skilled and influential volunteers to reflect, analyze, strategize and act to mitigate violence. This included the launch of the Citizens' Agenda for Peace which influenced the formal mediation efforts, led by Kofi Annan, that helped in reaching a power-sharing agreement between the opposing sides. The CCP also facilitated the international mediation process by initiating the visit of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, briefing eminent persons, and

interacting with the Kofi Annan mediation through a CCP High Level Dialogue Committee and Technical Committee. The CCP also worked with the Internal Security Ministry to set up peacekeeping in the city of Nairobi at a time when riots threatened to engulf the city. This also led to the creation of the Nairobi Peace Forum and the establishment of District Peace Committees (Wachira, 2010).

#### 4.11 Summary of Hypotheses


The summary results of the hypotheses are presented in Table 4.31.

**Table 4.31: Summary of Hypotheses**

Objective No	Objective	Hypothesis	Rule	p-value	Comment
Objective 1	To determine the role of pre-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States	<b>H01:</b> Pre-election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States	Do not reject $H_{A1}$ if p value <0.05	p<0.05	The alternative hypothesis was not rejected; therefore, Pre-election phase has a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States
Objective 2	To assess the role of election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States.	<b>H02:</b> Election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.	Do not reject $H_{A2}$ if p value <0.05	p<0.05	The alternative hypothesis was not rejected; therefore, Election phase has a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States
Objective 3	To evaluate the role of post-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States.	<b>H03:</b> Post-election phase does not have a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.	Do not reject $H_{A3}$ if p value <0.05	p<0.05	The alternative hypothesis was not rejected; therefore, Post-election phase has a significant relationship with political stability in the East African Community States.
Objective 4	To test the moderating role of political leadership on the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States	<b>H04:</b> Political leadership does not significantly moderate the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East African Community States.	Do not reject $H_{A4}$ if p value <0.05	p<0.05	The alternative hypothesis was not rejected; therefore, Political leadership significantly moderate the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East African Community States

#### 4.12 Model Optimization and Revised Conceptual Framework

Based on the results in Table 4.29 and Table 4.31, a model optimization was conducted. The aim of model optimization was to guide in derivation of the final model (revised conceptual framework) where only the significant variables are included for objectivity. Results were arrived at through running multiple regressions. Results of the new conceptual framework are presented in Figure 4.3.



**Figure 4.3: Revised Conceptual Framework**

As shown in Figure 4.3, no variable was dropped since all the variables were significant.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents a summary of major findings of this study, sets out the relevant conclusions and makes recommendations for practice and suggestions for further research based on the study findings.

#### **5.2 Summary of the major findings**

The study sought to role of Electoral Process on Political Stability in East African Community States. The results are summarized in the order of study objectives. Specific objectives of the study were to determine the role of pre-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States, to assess the role of election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States, to evaluate the role of post-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States and to test the moderating role of political leadership on the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States.

The study adopted descriptive survey research design. The target population consisted of 123 individuals working within the electoral commissions of different EAC countries and the EAC Legislative Assembly. A stratified sampling technique was used to gather for proper representation of the entire population. Data collection instrument used was a questionnaire. A total 94 Questionnaires were administered to the respondents and 83 were filled, returned and analyzed by descriptive and inferential statistics. The study established positive relationship between role of Electoral Process on Political Stability in East African Community States as follows:

### **5.2.1 Pre-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States.**

The first objective was to determine the role of pre-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States. From this objective, it was hypothesized that there is no relationship between pre-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States. The results of this study showed a positive statistically significant relationship between pre-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States. The results on the beta coefficient of the resulting model indicated that the constant  $\alpha = 0.773$  is significantly different from 0, since the p-value = 0.000 meaning it was less than 0.05. The coefficient  $\beta = 0.539$  is also significantly different from 0 with a p-value=0.000 which is less than 0.05. This implies that the null hypothesis  $\beta_1=0$  is rejected and the alternative hypothesis  $\beta_1 \neq 0$  is taken to hold implying that the model is significantly fit. Therefore, hypothesis **H01**: there is no significant relationship between pre-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States was rejected and concluded that pre-election phase processes have a significant effect on political stability. It is notable that the relationship at this stage was not as strong as expected. This confirmed that there is a positive linear relationship between pre-election process and political stability in the East African Community States. In other words, 1% change in pre-election process will bring about 53.9% change in political stability in the East African Community States. The researcher attributes this to the fact that before election process it is still young, and the states are at initial stage of implementation of election campaigns and rules.

### **5.2.2 Election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States.**

The second objective was to assess the role of election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States. From this objective, it was hypothesized that there is no relationship between election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States. The results of this study showed a positive statistically significant relationship between election phase processes and political

stability in the East African Community States. The results on the beta coefficient of the resulting model indicated that the constant  $\alpha = 1.171$  is significantly different from 0, since the p-value = 0.000 meaning it was less than 0.05. The coefficient  $\beta = 0.766$  is also significantly different from 0 with a p-value=0.000 which is less than 0.05. This implies that the null hypothesis  $\beta_2=0$  is rejected and the alternative hypothesis  $\beta_2 \neq 0$  is taken to hold implying that the model is significantly fit. Therefore, hypothesis **H02**: there is no significant relationship between election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States was rejected and concluded that election phase processes have a significant effect on political stability. The findings therefore confirmed that election phase processes are a determinant of political stability in the East African Community States. In other words, 1% change in election process will bring about 76.6% change in political stability in the East African Community States.

### **5.2.3 Post-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States.**

The third objective was to evaluate the role of post-election phase processes on political stability in East African Community States. From this objective, it was hypothesized that there is no relationship between post-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States. The results of this study showed a positive statistically significant relationship between post-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States. The results on the beta coefficient of the resulting model indicated that the constant  $\alpha = 0.58$  is significantly different from 0, since the p-value = 0.000 meaning it was less than 0.05. The coefficient  $\beta = 0.793$  is also significantly different from 0 with a p-value=0.000 which is less than 0.05. This implies that the null hypothesis  $\beta_3=0$  is rejected and the alternative hypothesis  $\beta_3 \neq 0$  is taken to hold implying that the model is significantly fit. Therefore, hypothesis **H03**: there is no significant relationship between post-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States was rejected and concluded that post-election phase processes have a significant effect on political stability. The findings therefore confirmed that post-election phase processes are a determinant of political stability in the East

African Community States. In other words, 1% change in post-election process will bring about 79.3% change in political stability in the East African Community States.

#### **5.2.4 Moderating role of political leadership in electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States.**

The fourth objective was to test the moderating role of political leadership on the relationship between electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States. It was hypothesized that there is no significant moderating effect of the political leadership on the political stability in East African Community States. The results confirmed that there is a positive statistically significant joint relationship between the moderating effect of political leadership and the political stability in East African Community States. The EAC law and regulation on elections and political leadership are effective. Respondents outlined various electoral raw in utilization of these phases they included; electoral raw, political environment on violence and intimidation, voter's education, funding camping and electoral administration among others. Findings show that most of the respondents were involved in decision making in election phases processes, majority of 52% of the respondents reported to be involved in election phase processes, more than 50% of the respondent were involved to a moderate use of state resources on election phases processes while 40% agreed being involved election phases processes on election disputes. On the other hand, 20% of the respondents agreed to be involved in monitoring and evaluation of election phases. However, most of the key informants noted that participating beneficiaries were not adequately involved in decision making process as most of the international observer reported that Majority of East Africa community (91%) acknowledged that East Africa community States maintain stability on election date.



### **5.3 Conclusion**

From the findings of this study several conclusions can be drawn.

#### **5.3.1 Pre-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States.**

The first objective was to determine the relationship between the pre-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States. The findings confirm that there is a statistically significant influence of pre-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States. A positive increase in pre-election phase processes leads to an increase in political stability in the East African Community States. It can be concluded from this study that pre-election phase processes were statistically significant in explaining political stability in the East African Community States. The study concludes that EAC law and regulation on elections and political leadership are effective. EAC law and regulation on elections and political leadership are adequately implemented. The constitutional of all the EAC states cover all the aspect of election and political leadership.

#### **5.3.2 Election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States.**

The second objective was to determine the relationship between the election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States. The findings confirm that there is a statistically significant influence of election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States. A positive increase in election phase processes leads to an increase in political stability in the East African Community States. It can be concluded from this study that election phase processes were statistically significant in explaining political stability in the East African Community States. The study concludes that election administration has been effective and efficient as exercised in the EAC. The EAC laws and regulation on administration are adequate. Lastly the study concludes that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulation.

### **5.3.3 Post-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States.**

The third objective was to determine the relationship between the post-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States. The findings confirm that there is a statistically significant influence of post-election phase processes and political stability in the East African Community States. A positive increase in post-election phase processes leads to an increase in political stability in the East African Community States. It can be concluded from this study that election phase processes were statistically significant in explaining political stability in the East African Community States. The study concludes that policies on effective participation of stakeholders and their implementation have a moderating role. In addition, the study concludes that policies and stake holders' control of the agenda and their implementation. Policies on voting equality and their implementation have a moderating role. Lastly the study concludes that there is no need to harmonize the implementation of existing law and regulation on the use of state resources.

### **5.3.4 Moderating effect of political leadership in electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States.**

The fourth objective was to find out the moderating effect of political leadership in electoral processes and political stability in East Africa Community States. These conclusions are; resource identification and utilization form the election phases of are successful program. The utilization of these law must directly affect the immediate Moderating role of Political Leadership and political stability in East Africa Community States. It can therefore be concluded that respondents in the study utilized East Africa Community States in activities that directly and positively impacted on moderating role. Activities like election administration; electioneering engineering, use of state resources, election date election law. It can further be concluded that decision making process of program was not adequately inclusive as observe.

## **5.4 Recommendations**

From the conclusions drawn on this study the study was seen to provide important insights on role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community States. Therefore, the results of this study are of interest to the East African Community States leaders, policy makers, civil society and development partners. The study made the following recommendations.

### **Recommendation for Management and Policy Makers**

East African Community States leaders should consider the many factors involved in a complex and dynamic situation before making decisions on electoral processes that will influence the effectiveness, efficiency and ultimately the political stability of individual partner states. The management of the elections and political leadership to lead the way in the design, measurement and evaluation of election practices that help attract and retain talent with skills and competencies necessary for political stability

The study recommended the policy makers to formulate policies than embrace electoral process that could be implemented by individual partner states to give the region a competitive advantage and for the new countries willing to join the East African Community States a reason to join the partner states.

### **Academic Recommendations**

The current study has contributed knowledge to the role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community States. The study recommended that the academicians, scholars should team up to develop theories on electoral processes that will enhance the knowledge on political stability in the developing world instead of relying more on theories from the western world.

## **5.5 Areas for further Research**

The study examined the role of electoral process on political stability in East African Community States, the dependent variable political stability and the independent variables Pre-election phase processes, Election phase processes, Post-election phase processes and political leadership as a moderating variable. There are other mediating or intervening factors that can affect political stability that could be researched further for example election rigging. Therefore, future studies can introduce other moderating or an intervening variable in their models.

Secondly, this study used cross-sectional research design which means that the constructs were measured from a static perspective. Future studies should use a longitudinal study which would provide more insight. Finally, the present study used data drawn from the same respondents at a multiple countries using the same collection method. Self-rating of each country under East African Community States can provide more insight on how electoral process is unique and its influence in political stability.

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## APPENDICES

### **Appendix I: Letter of Introduction**

Dear Respondent,

#### **RE: INTRODUCTION LETTER**

I am a postgraduate student from the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology in the college of Human Resource Management. Am carrying out a research on **“Role of Electoral Process on Political Stability in the East African Community States”** and you have been selected to participate in the study.

The attached questionnaires have been designed to assist the researcher gather data for the purpose of the research only. You will not be required to write your name. You are kindly requested to respond to all items thoughtfully and honestly. You are hereby assured that the information you will give will be treated with confidentiality it deserves and used strictly and only for academic purposes.

Thank you in advance.

Yours faithfully

Rwigema Pierre Celestin

Researcher



## Appendix II: Research Questionnaire

Please tick

### **SECTION A: Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent. (Please tick one option)**

#### 1. Gender

1. Male       2. Female

#### 2. Age

1. 20-30

2. 30-40

3. 40-50

4. Above50

#### 3. Religion

1. Christian

2. Muslim

3. Traditional

4. Others

#### 4. Education level

1. Bachelor's Degree

2. Master's Degree

3. Doctoral Degree

**SECTION B: Pre-election phase process**

Please tick **ONE** option in the table below

*Key: 1: Strongly disagree 2: Disagree 3: Somehow Agree 4: Agree 5: Strongly Agree*

<b>Pre-election phase harmonization processes</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Political Environment on Violence and Intimidation	Political violence and intimidation is not common in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability.					
	The EAC laws and regulations on political violence are adequate and do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.					
	There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on political violence in all the EAC States to ensure political stability.					
Voter Registration	Voter registration is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability.					
	The EAC laws and regulations on voter registration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.					
	There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on voter registration in the EAC States to ensure political stability.					
Voter	Voter registration is effectively exercised in the					

<b>Pre-election phase harmonization processes</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
education	EAC States during elections to ensure political stability.					
	The EAC laws and regulations on voter registration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.					
	There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on voter registration in the EAC State to ensure political stability.					
Funding Campaigns	Funding of political campaigns by the States is effectively exercised in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability.					
	The EAC laws and regulations on campaign funding are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.					
	There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on funding of political campaigns in the EAC States to ensure political stability.					

**SECTION C: Election phase processes**

Please tick **ONE** option in the table below

*Key: 1: Strongly disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Somehow Agree, 4: Agree 5: Strongly Agree*

<b>Election phase harmonization processes</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Election administration;	Election administration has been effective and efficient as exercised in the EAC States to ensure political stability.					
	The EAC laws and regulations on administration are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.					
	There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election administration in the EAC States to ensure political stability.					
Electioneering process	Electioneering process has been free and fair as exercised in the EAC States to ensure political stability.					
	The EAC laws and regulations on the electioneering process are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.					
	There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on electioneering process in the EAC States to ensure political stability.					
Use of State resources;	Use of state resources for political activities is effectively controlled in the EAC States during elections to ensure political stability.					
	The EAC laws and regulations on the use of state resources are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.					
	There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on the use of state resources in					

<b>Election phase harmonization processes</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
	political activities in the EAC States to ensure political stability.					

**SECTION D: Post-election phase processes**

Please tick ONE option in the table below

*Key: 1: Strongly disagree 2: Disagree 3: Somehow Agree 4: Agree 5: Strongly Agree*

<b>Post – Election phase harmonization processes</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Election disputes	Resolution of election disputes has been effective and efficient as exercised in the EAC States as a practice to ensure political stability.					
	The EAC laws and regulations on election dispute resolution are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.					
	There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on election dispute resolution in the EAC States to ensure political stability.					
Monitoring and evaluation	Monitoring and evaluation of elections has been effective as exercised in the EAC States as a practice to ensure political stability.					
	The EAC laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation of elections are adequate and do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.					

Post – Election phase harmonization processes		1	2	3	4	5
	There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on monitoring and evaluation process in the EAC States to ensure political stability.					
International observer reports	Use of international observers and the reports generated is effectively exercised in the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability.					
	The EAC laws and regulations on the use of international observers are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.					
	There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on the use of international observers in political activities in the EAC States to ensure political stability.					
Foreign policy on elections	Foreign policies on elections are effectively implemented in each of the EAC States as a practice during elections to ensure political stability.					
	The EAC laws and regulations on election integrating foreign policies in elections are adequate in do not need any harmonization to ensure political stability.					
	There is no need to harmonize the implementation of the existing laws and regulations on foreign policies on elections in the					

<b>Post – Election phase harmonization processes</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
	EAC States to ensure political stability.					

SECTION E: Political leadership in electoral processes

Please tick ONE option in the table below

*Key: 1: Strongly disagree 2: Disagree 3: Somehow Agree 4: Agree 5: Strongly Agree*

	1	2	3	4	5
Policies on effective participation of stakeholders and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.					
Policies on Stakeholder control of the agenda and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.					
Policies on Voting equality and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.					
Policies on Enlightened understanding and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.					
Policies on inclusion of all adults and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.					
Policies on transparency and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.					
Policies on accountability and representation and their implementation have a moderating role on electoral processes and political stability.					
<b>Any Other Comment: Please Add</b>					



	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>

**SECTION F: Political Stability**

**Please tick ONE option in the table below**

**Key:** 1: Strongly disagree 2: Disagree 3: Somehow Agree 4: Agree 5: Strongly Agree

The following are some of the indicators used to determine political stability. Please indicate their level of application in the EAC States.

<b>Political Stability</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
There is practice of and respect for rule of law					
The rights and freedoms of the citizens is respected					
There are free and fair elections					
There is low unemployment					
Poverty levels are low					
There is no suppression of opposition parties by the ruling government					
There is transparency, respect and tolerance					
There is no Ethnic prejudices					
The electoral processes are clear					
There is adherence to and respect for electoral processes by all					
There is accountability					
<b>Any Other Indicators (Please Specify)</b>					

Thank You for Your Contribution