

**INFLUENCE OF DEVOLUTION FRAMEWORK ON
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE PROCESS IN KENYA**

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university

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DEDICATION

This study is a special dedication to my wife Damaris, my daughter Kalondu and Son Brian for their continued support and sacrifice during my studies.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CDF	Constituency Development Fund
CDTF	Community Development Trust Fund
DFRS	District Focus for Rural Development Strategy
CPST	Centre for Parliamentary Studies
ERS	Economic Recovery Strategy
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IPAR	Institute of Policy Analysis and Research
KEPSA	Kenya Private Sector Alliance
KHRC	Kenya Human Rights Commission
KIPPRA	Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis
KLIF	Kenya Leadership Integrity Forum
KSG	Kenya School of Government
LA's	Local Authorities
LATF	Local Authority Transfer Fund
MTP	Medium Term Plan
NCBF	National Capacity Building Framework
NESC	National Economic and Social Council

OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
PELF	Poverty Eradication Loan Fund
RoK	Republic of Kenya
RMLF	Roads Maintenance Fuel Levy
SID	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPAN	Social & Public Accountability Network
SRDP	Special Rural Development Programme
TA	Transitional Authority
TISA	The Institute for Social Accountability
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

DEFINITION OF TERMS

- Decentralization** Refers to redistribution of power within the state between the central government and public authorities (Schneider, 2003).
- Democratic governance** Refers to the system of requiring citizens to elect their public authorities freely, have input into setting the public agenda, and hold their authorities accountable for their decisions (Blair, 2000).
- Deconcentration** Refers to a system of government where selected functions are assigned to sub-national units within sector-specific national agencies (Schneider, 2003).
- Delegation** Refers to a system of government where responsibilities for implementing or maintaining sector investments are assigned to parastatal and other semi-autonomous government agencies (Schneider, 2003).
- Devolution** Refers to a system of government where responsibilities and functions are assigned to local governments, sometimes with the necessary resources to carry out these functions (Kimenyi & Meagher, 2004).

- Institutional Decentralization** Refers to the set of policies that transfer the administration and delivery of social services such as education, health, social welfare, or housing to sub national governments (Stohr, 2001).
- Fiscal Decentralization** Refers to the set of policies designed to increase the revenues or fiscal autonomy of sub national governments (Smoke, 2001).
- Political Decentralization** Is the set of constitutional amendments and electoral reforms designed to open new or activate existing but dormant or ineffective spaces for the representation of sub national polities (Litvack et al., 2000).
- Variable** Refers to an empirical property that can take two or more values and can change in quantity or quality (Kumar, 2005).
- Democratic Governance** Refers to the legitimate, transparent, responsible, accountable and efficient exercise of power to manage a country's affairs to the ends of development (Osaghae & Osaghae, 2013).

Devolution Framework: The structures of rules, procedures and institutions that assign public functions to the lowest level of government that is competent to oversee their implementation (Kimenyi & Meagher, 2014).

Public Participation: Is the process where individuals, governmental and non-governmental groups influence decision making in policy, legislation, service delivery, oversight and developmental matters (Jones & Wells, 2007).

Capacity Building: Enhancing the ability to evaluate and address crucial concerns of policy choices, and modes of implementation among development options, based on an understanding and of needs perceived by the people (Kapucu & Demiroz, 2013).

Devolved Units: Subsidiaries of the national government which is assigned public functions at the lowest level of government and created as such by law and applicable legislation and with competence to oversee the implementation of the public functions (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2014).

Social Equity: The ultimate level of distribution and appropriation of public goods, ideals and opportunities evenly across a society (Valdivia, 2011).

Legal Framework: A set of rules, procedural steps, established through precedent in the common law to determine a paradigm of legal doctrine. (Squires, 2012).

ABSTRACT

Devolution framework in Kenya is anchored in article 174 of the Constitution which espouses the relationships where political, administrative and fiscal power is distributed to semi-autonomous territorial and sub-national units which seek to promote accountability, transparency, responsiveness and legitimacy in a state. For this to be achieved, the devolution framework borrows heavily on the objects of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010. To operationalize devolution framework, the study identifies some of the constitutional key indicators of devolution, namely, devolved units, public participation, capacity building, social equity and legal framework to measure the relationship between the devolution framework and democratic governance indicators. The devolution framework in Kenya promised a structural architecture of power relations that engenders democratic governance tenets of transparency, accountability and open governance. The objectives of the study were; to establish the influence of decentralized units on enhancing democratic governance, to establish the influence of public participation on enhancing democratic governance, to determine the influence of capacity building on democratic governance, to establish the influence of social equity on enhancing democratic governance and to establish the influence of legal framework in enhancing democratic governance. The study adopted descriptive and correlation research design. All the forty-seven (47) counties in Kenya were targeted, with five officers per counties forming the sample frame. Regression models were used to examine the influence of the devolution framework on democratic governance in Kenya. The study found that there was a positive relationship between decentralized units and democratic governance, a positive relationship between public participation and democratic governance, a positive relationship between capacity building and democratic governance, a positive relationship between social equity and democratic governance, a positive relationship between legal framework and democratic governance and since the coefficient of intersection was significant, it implied that the political interest had a moderating effect on the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance. This study addresses the existing knowledge gap by determining the effect of devolution framework on democratic governance process in Kenya is not

direct but rather is through devolved units, capacity building, public participation, social equity and legal framework, and further political interest have moderating effect on the relationship between devolution framework on democratic governance process in Kenya. The findings of this study therefore have implications for theory, practice and policy.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The study sought to explore the role of Kenya's devolution framework on democratic governance. This chapter provides the background information of the study, which introduces the devolution framework in Kenya as conceptualized and contextualized by the 2010 Constitution. The chapter also outlines the statement of the problem, study objectives and research hypotheses. The chapter further outlines the significance of the study, scope and the limitations of the study.

1.1 Background Information

Devolution is one of the various forms of decentralization which is an attribute of all governments globally. Kauzya (2007) observes that various decentralization forms offer vertical and horizontal decentralization, where vertical offers a vote while horizontal offers a voice to the citizens. Devolution embraces both where the citizens are heard and their vote counts in assembling the governance structure. Globally therefore, it is not if governments decentralize but rather how and why they do choose their preferred mode of decentralization.

Ndegwa (2002) offers in a study of decentralization that 'it is significant to note that in no country was the claim to centralization as preferred organizational mode made or implied, nor was decentralization considered undesirable, only difficult to effect and sustain'(pg.67). Decentralization is therefore an emerging governance model globally and its effects have been shared among several governments.

Based on the principle of subsidiary, it assigns specific functions hitherto performed by the national government (centre) to the lowest sub national organs. Such distribution of responsibilities and powers could involve some shared functions, with the logic being to enlarge sub-national participation in decision making over interventions, and hence engendering local relevance and citizen participation (Kauzya, 2007).

Omolo (2010) identifies three dimensions of decentralization namely administrative, political and fiscal. Administrative decentralization attends to the transfer of responsibilities and functions from the centre to one or more of its lower structures. Political decentralization distributes powers and responsibilities horizontally or vertical. As such, decentralization is between or among agencies of comparable status, such as the executive, legislature and judiciary. Fiscal decentralization involves changing the locus of revenue generation and expenditure autonomy. Globalization has been accompanied by an equally global tendency towards devolution of authority and resources from nation-states to regions and localities that take on various forms, depending upon which actors are driving decentralization efforts (Montero, 2001). Devolution has therefore become a global phenomenon in a several countries, among them Brazil, China, India, Mexico, the US, and countries of the European Union (Montero, 2001).

Muia (2008) defines devolution as a political arrangement where political, administrative and fiscal power is distributed to semi-autonomous territorial and sub-national units. As such therefore, devolution brings its definitive feature above all other forms of decentralization by embracing a broader essence of deconcentration of power.

It strongly redefines its attribute from the hither to decentralization forms by inscribing the authority for the semi-autonomous territorial units to make their decisions in law.

Devolution therefore occurs when and where the established sub-national units have political, administrative and fiscal powers. Kimenyi and Meagher (2004) observe that devolution impacts governance by distributing authority over public goods and revenues and making it difficult for individuals or groups to collude and engage in corrupt practices. It also fosters effective cooperation within the devolved units and consequently energizes local communities to mobilize social pressure against rent seeking and corruption. It is no wonder that several developing states have increasingly embraced further decentralized administrative, fiscal and political functions of central government to sub-national governments.

Globally, devolution has been associated with efficiency, the expectation that the devolved functions to the lowest feasible levels of decision making will optimize information flows and reduce transactional costs. A decision to devolve therefore is often based on the failure of central government to deliver, such as in revenue collection or in service delivery (Commonwealth Secretariat and Commonwealth Local Government Forum, 2001). Mwenda (2010) argues that devolution also seeks to resolve 'over-centralized mis-governance' or to diffuse secessionist tendencies by facilitating outcomes that result to greater consensus in decisions.

The global arena has successful experiments of devolution, with federalism being the most successful experience at the United States of America and India devolution experience. The India story is a worth experience due to its resilience despite its curious

basis on language, as has the Ethiopian Constitution of 1994 which provided for secession that had been tried by its former Province of Eritrea (Society for International Development, 2011).

Africa has since independence of her states in the 1960's and 1970's lived in the glory of one party democracies, as an extension of the consensus of a traditional set up to guard nationalism. One-partyism and centralized state fed each other, providing the political space for political actors to monopolize the distribution of resources and delivery of services. This state of affairs, Kauzya (2007) and Ndegwa (2002) concur threatened the equitable delivery of services as those holding the purse strings of the states in Africa could on most cases use the budget to exercise client – patronage political philosophy, where it rewarded supporters and punished the critics or opposition (perceived or real).

Despite the collapse of single parties in Africa, competitive politics did not deliver to the citizens the much awaited better services. The thirst for absolute control by the incumbents highly compromised the efforts of decentralization in the continent. Few countries however stood out to excel, among them Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Nigeria. This is well reflected in the study undertaken by Ndegwa (2002) on Eastern Africa countries on their modes of decentralization. Ivanyna and Shah (2014) undertook a study to map out the relationship between governance and decentralization using an econometric model on a unique database comprising of 182 Countries. The analysis developed a two dimensioned measures of closeness to the people and decentralization. It can therefore be concluded that decentralization efforts in the region have bore fruit and that Kenya is on track among her peers in the region to pursue decentralization.

1.1.1 Kenya's Devolution Framework

Kenya's rebirth as a first republic in 1963 has been characterized by episodes of political events which have critically affected the socio-economic and political performance of the country. The happenings climaxed to the much published 2007/8 election violence which was largely seen as anti-climax of cumulative governance failures. Kimenyi and Meagher (2004) posit that these failures are attributable to the quality of governance, which depend largely on institutions. The institutions comprise of among others the constitution, political systems, democratic principles and sub-national entities bylaws. The two scholars infer that different governance frameworks yield varying political, economic and social outcomes and that the differences emanate from the differences in the rules, organizing capabilities, social and political principles captured in the governance concept (Kimenyi & Meagher, 2004).

Devolution in Kenya has been advocated as a political prescription to the ills plaguing fragile and plural societies which thrive in the miasma of internal conflicts, inequalities, rent seeking, economic stagnation, corruption and inefficient use of public resources as envisaged by Mwenda in IEA Research Paper on Devolution (2010). Scholars such as Dent (2004); Kimenyi and Meagher (2004) observe that for devolution to work, it must fulfill certain fundamental principles such as the criteria of subsidiary which entails the assignment of public functions to the lowest levels of government that is competent to oversee their implementation and consensus, which comprise of a situation where policy actions of government units reflect the consent of the people that they represent.

The new mode of governance in Kenya was realized after the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution into law on August 2010. The new governance design was a major departure from the highly centralized system that had dominated Kenya's political scene over forty-six years. Two levels of governments were introduced, the national government and forty-seven county governments.

The Kenyan devolution model is expressing unique in that the devolved units, hereafter referred to as counties are separate entities from the national government but coordinating as cooperating entities in delivery of services to their citizens. Endowed with clearly defined and recognized boundaries, counties in Kenya present the strongest form of decentralization yet, that the country has ever experienced.

Kenya's decentralization history is not unique in its conceptualization. Most African independent constitutions did not provide for elected governments by the locals as captured by Ndulo (2006). Local authorities were thus established and closely controlled by local government ministries as the Kenyan scenario of Local Government Act 265 confirms. The Kenyan decentralization story is manifest of deficit decentralization efforts which have undergone major changes and reforms in an effort to arrive at that ideal decentralization option that serves the right for locals to get the best forms of services and enjoy a role in decision making of those affairs that affect their day to day life.

The search for an ideal decentralization form saw Kenya introduce Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) in early 1990's with the objective to restructure the local public sector, improve the local public expenditure, Management and strengthen local level accountability mechanisms as observed by Oyugi & Kibua (2006).

These efforts would later see the birth of the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) in the year 1998 under the LATF ACT (No. 8). Kenya's strategy seems in tandem with other developing countries effort to improve governance and remedy institutional deficiencies that have emerged from the experience of highly centralized political systems.

Such situations have given way to bureaucratic inefficiencies, lack of accountability and transparency, unequal distribution of resources and low levels of community participation in decision making and policy formulation. The decentralization concept that Kenya has pursued cannot however be alienated from the country's colonial governance history. Pre-colonial Africa existed as communities with each having non-centralized governance structures, mostly led by council of elders. Nyanjom (2011) observes that the colonial masters put different communities under one system of governance. At independence, Kenyan constitution made a tremendous bold governance move of reversing to the traditional models through the adoption of Majimbo, which generously sought to return the country to its normative traditional set up of decentralized governance.

Decentralization schemes that the independence constitution sought to midwife were soon choked by the array of constitutional amendments that engendered a highly centralized governance system. The aftermath of the Constitutional amendments was the skewed distribution of resources, mostly favouring the strengthened office of the Presidency, and consequently making presidency the ultimate political prize (Ghai, 2014).

The Constitutional amendments were closely followed by Kenya's founding policy paper, Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African socialism and its application to planning in Kenya, where the state either deliberately or otherwise stamped the informal approval to developmental segregation and provided the prerequisite environment, force and ammunition to societal discrimination that entrenched the onset of the politics of exclusion. The paper proclaimed as thus "to make the economy as a whole grow as fast as possible, development money should be invested where it will yield the largest increase in net output. This approach clearly favours the development of areas having abundant resources, good land and rainfall, transport and power facilities and people receptive to and active in development".

The above philosophy led to obvious zoning of the country into high, and low potential areas and hence opening a new chapter in Kenya's governance models which mostly marginalized some regions and induced them into unchecked suffering and neglect during the better part of Kenya's history (Republic of Kenya, 2011).

First attempt to administrative decentralization was the special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) of 1971, which purposed to engender development in rural areas. The establishment of local authorities (LAs) through the Local Government Act (repealed) attempted delegation of administrative powers to authorities. In 1983, the District Focus for Rural Development Strategy (DFRS) was mooted to engender 'hub of development' at the districts. Three years after the DFRS programme, the famous Sessional Paper No.1 of 1986 was formulated, to trigger private sector driven development.

Consistent failure of administrative and political decentralization initiatives saw the state find solace in focusing on fiscal decentralization through establishment of devolved funds. Such included The Roads Maintenance Fuel Levy (RMLF) in 1994, the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in 2004 among others. The CDF was the most successful in taking development to the grassroots, and what can be bailed as a viable pre-cursor to devolution (Nyanjom, (2011). The catalyst in having special governance model which envisages the distribution of resources can be traced to the vision 2030 economic pillar which provided for investment in arid and semi-arid district communities with high incidence of poverty , unemployed youth, women and all vulnerable groups (Republic of Kenya, 2010). The sessional paper on devolved governments by the Government of Kenya (ibid) would confirm the realization of the un-tenability of the model proposed by the 1965 sessional paper. Implementation of devolution in Kenya would therefore bring about uniform growth in economy, promote equity, inclusiveness, and employment, and contribute in attainment of vision 2030 (Transitional Authority-Kenya, 2013).

Devolution under the 2010 Kenyan constitution entails the transfer of fiscal, administrative and political power to the devolved entities with citizens playing a central role in governance. The constitutional architecture of devolution was a departure from the past where power and resources were highly centralized and citizens had minimal participation in governance (CoK, 2010). In devolution responsibilities, resources and authority are transferred from higher levels of government to lower levels as one way through which the governed participate in governance (Muia, 2008).

The national government cedes some powers to clearly defined sub-national geographical units (Katsiabuni, 2003). Manor (1999) observes that in the administrative devolution, there is a set of policies that transfer the administration and delivery of social services like health, education, social welfare or housing to the sub-national units. Devolution therefore is defined by high autonomy and downward accountability. The sub-national entities are not directly accountable to national government though they have to work within set statutes and rules (Oloo, 2006). This study seeks to demystify the devolution model in Kenya by tracing its key tenets as embraced by the Kenyan constitution, Article 174 (CoK, 2010). The selected variables for the devolution framework are inspired by the objects of devolution and hereof identified among others, and heavily influenced by the spirit of article 175 of the Kenyan constitution.

The variables being evaluated on their influence on democratic governance in Kenya are; Social Equity, Legal Framework, Decentralized Units, Public Participation and Capacity Building. This study will therefore determine the relationship between the devolution framework in Kenya and democratic governance variables of transparency, accountability, inclusion and responsiveness.

Kenyan devolution framework sought to address key bottlenecks to the country's democracy and representation manifested by decadent of two institutions; the Provincial administration and the Local governments. The dalliance with the idea of overhauling these two institutions bred some great fear among various stakeholders with major concern being the sabotage of the entire process due to those being affected by the changes. Still, the country was not willing to go the Uganda experience in what Kauzya (2007) refers to as the better experience where Uganda experimented their devolution with ten counties to test the waters.

To crown the democratic governance infrastructure, the 2010 Constitution entrenched a Constitutional devolution in an attempt to put to good use the lessons learnt from the short-lived Kenya's 1963 devolution model governance. Chapter 11 of the 2010 constitution came to entrench the widely consulted ingredients for a governance model that had taken a decade of consultations (SIDA, 2011).

Article 174 of the Constitution establishes the objectives of the devolved governance structure which include promotion of democratic and accountable exercise of power, fostering national unity by recognition of diversity, awarding powers of self-governance to the people, recognition of the right of communities to manage own affairs, protection and promotion of social and economic development, equitable sharing of national and local resources, facilitation of decentralized units and enhanced checks and balances.

The framework is for purposes of this study derived from the Objects of Devolution as captured in Article 174 of the Constitution of Kenya and underpinned by the Principles of Devolution (Article 175). Kenya's devolution framework is anchored on nine (9)

interlinked pillars, namely: promotion of democratic and accountable exercise of power; fostering of national unity by recognizing diversity; self-governance and enhanced public participation in the exercise of power and decision making; the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their development; the protection and promotion of the interests and rights of minorities and marginalized communities; promotion of social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible services throughout Kenya; equitable sharing of national and local Resources throughout Kenya; the decentralization of state organs, their functions and services, from the capital of Kenya; and enhanced checks and balances and the separation of powers (RoK, Devolution Policy 2016). For purposes of this study, five pillars to the devolution framework will be interrogated as independent variables and measured on how they impact on democratic governance.

1.1.2 Democratic Governance

The struggle for independence in Kenya was argued to have been premised on the desire to establish a democratic government after nearly half a century of authoritarian British colonial rule. The colonial rule brought Kenya under the cloud of wide spread poverty, economic hardships and social strife (Murunga, & Nasong'o, 2007). Democratic governance provides the space required for citizen participation and empowerment in the development process with the term 'participatory governance' or 'good governance' emerging as favorite substitutes of the term. In this line of argument, democratic governance summarizes the goal and desired outcome of democratization as involving expansion of spaces for inclusion, participation and accountability (Mushemeza, 2004).

Governance relates to the legitimate, transparent, responsible, accountable and efficient exercise of power to manage a country's affairs to the ends of development (Smith, 2007). This is unbundled into social, economic and political governance, where social governance relates to social foundations and relations with civil society, economic governance to the management of economic institutions and processes, and political governance to matters that traditionally have had to do with the business or process of government (Okongo, 2010). Osaghae and Osaghae (2013) content that democratic governance has been traded on the basis of process ownership, participation and accountability rather than the traditional perception which hinged on externalized, top-bottom and transitory interventions.

The culture of democratic governance moves beyond the mere procedures of democracy and the establishment of democratic institutions. It involves promoting the sustainability of democracy which includes an enduring capacity for: the separation of powers and independence of the branches of government; the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law; the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and, the transparency and accountability of a responsible civil service, functioning at both the national and local levels.

A state which identifies with the culture of democratic governance is one which welcomes a wide scope of political participation embracing a pluralistic system of political parties, a vibrant civil society and media. Further, strong democratic institutions promote and integrate women and minorities in all levels of the Government and society as a whole. Also, a state which embodies the culture of democratic governance is one which protects the rights and dignity of children (Reno, 2006).

Decentralization has transformed governance designs in Africa as many states are now transferring power, resources, and responsibilities to lower levels of government (Malone, 2013.). Governance and leadership remains the single most challenge for African states, characterized by weak accountability, poor institutions and absence of rule of law (Singer, 2013).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Devolution, a major hallmark of the 2010 Constitution presented a governance model with the aim of engendering accountability on the state exercise of power. It provides for a legal and policy framework for ordinary citizens to participate in the process of governance, hold leaders to account and allow for open leadership (Ochieng, 2012). This framework is meant to ensure that powers of self-governance are devolved and that participation of the people in the exercise of public power of the state is guaranteed. Baseline survey report on governance in Kenya (SIDA, 2012) indicated that Kenyans had high hopes on devolution to decentralize power and share national resources among counties. The devolution mode of governance has however disappointed the democratic threshold expected by Kenyans. The very principles of democratic governance aspired by the 2010 Constitution have manifested a mixed results and wanton political disillusionment. The executive arm of the county governance has highly escaped unchecked by the legislature, as the battle and war on accountability fails to be checked by the doctrine of separation of powers envisaged by the devolution model.

County assemblies' attempts to hold the county executive accountable have often been countered by the Courts as the case of Embu County demonstrates (Kakah, 2014). This is despite the fact that twenty-three (23) MCA's voted against eight (8) to impeach the governor for flouting the County Government Act by appointing public servants without the assembly's approval. Indeed, their decision was upheld by the Senate and the High Court of Kenya. The decision was however overturned by the Court of Appeal (Goan, 2015). The accountability riddle will show its ugly face yet again in Muranga County, where the County Assembly will use the accountability power bestowed to it to blackmail its County executive chief by impeaching him for failing to allocate ten million for the County assembly expenditure on local and foreign travel (Odunga, 2015). The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (2016) survey released a report on corruption indices for counties and in a deep blow to transparency in Kenya ranked Counties on their levels of corruption as ranked by their own electorate, based on preset criteria of transparency. The report was in tandem with citizen's perception on the state of transparency in the various counties. The very justification of devolution was to bring accountability closer to the people and improve the levels of transparency (Kauzya , 2007). This study became a timely tool to interrogate the desired objective of the devolved model of governance and determine the extent to which the main objective of devolution could have had on the democratic governance process in Kenya.

Kenya's performance on accountability and transparency performance of devolved units on trial, this study seeks to establish the influence of the devolution framework on democratic. The democratic governance indicators of transparency, accountability, responsiveness and legitimacy will therefore be determined on how they are related to

the objects of devolution indicators of devolved units, capacity building, public participation, social equity and legal framework.

1.3 Objectives

1.3.1 General Objective

The study sought to examine the influence of devolution framework on democratic governance in Kenya.

1.3.2 Specific objective

The study sought;

1. To establish the influence of decentralized units on enhancing democratic governance process in Kenya.
2. To establish the influence of public participation on enhancing democratic governance process in Kenya.
3. To determine the influence of capacity building on democratic governance process in Kenya.
4. To establish the influence of social equity on enhancing democratic governance process in Kenya.
5. To establish the influence of legal framework in enhancing democratic governance process in Kenya.
6. To assess the moderating effect of political interests in the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance process in Kenya.

1.4 Research Hypotheses

The study sought to test the following hypotheses; -

1. H₀₁: decentralized units has an influence on the democratic governance process in Kenya
2. H₀₂: public participation has an influence on democratic governance process in Kenya
3. H₀₃: capacity building has an influence on democratic governance process in Kenya
4. H₀₄: social equity has a significant influence on democratic governance process in Kenya
5. H₀₅: legal framework has a significant influence on democratic governance process in Kenya.
6. H₀₆: there is a moderating effect of political interest in the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance process in Kenya.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study highly contributes to knowledge on the nexus between devolution framework and democratic governance in Kenya. Democratic governance has for some time preoccupied the basis for various institutional reforms in Kenya and that the very search for new constitutional order has been influenced by better and improved governance practices in the society in general and institutions in particular. For policy makers, the study provides impetus to the various benefits of devolution in Kenya after the adoption of the 2010 constitution that devolved governance to the local levels.

It will highly increase concern on the import of the devolution concept on improving service delivery and efficiency by lowering the unit of resource allocation and distribution to the consumers and service demand line. For researchers and scholars, the study will be of great importance to the researcher as it will provide an avenue to gain both theoretical and hands on experience on influence of devolution framework on democratic governance. It will further fill the existing gaps on why devolution must not exist for its own sake, but that it must yield to tangible outcomes that deepen democracy in Kenya.

1.6 Scope of the study

The study focused on the influence of devolution framework on democratic governance in Kenya. The study was undertaken to research on activities within the scope of the issues addressed by the research objectives, hence ensuring the study findings contribute towards realization of the main objective of the study. The study reviewed related prior literature of the study. The study further was framed by five research questions which were tested by research findings and scientifically analyzed. The study targeted 47 counties in Kenya.

1.7 Limitations of the study

The study anticipated limitation on the willingness of the various county officials to honestly respond to study inquiry out of the fear that the study was political or based on Audit premises given that most of the counties have audit queries and others have ongoing ethical issues being investigated. The study envisaged overcoming this limitation by having a letter of transmittal from the university that assured the

respondents that the information provided was to be used for academic purposes only and thereby treated with utmost confidentiality.

Further, the study was limited to the study of the influence of the selected five objects of devolution on the democratic governance process in Kenya. Whereas devolution framework consists of other variables, they will not be considered in this particular study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviewed relevant literature to investigate the influence of Devolution framework on democratic governance in Kenya. The chapter reviewed various theoretical approaches as applicable in each study variable and as projected by the study objectives. A conceptual framework is presented to demonstrate the proposed relationship between the independent and the dependent variables. Empirical review is also presented, alongside a critical review to bring out the research gaps being pursued by the study.

2.2 Theoretical Review

A theory is a framework of explaining phenomena by stating constructs and laws that inter-relate these constructs to each other (Mugenda 2008). The construct as envisaged by Mugenda (ibid) ought to exist within the predicts of a scientific concept, abstraction or idea drawn from the specific. Scientific theories, Mugenda (ibid) observes, “Serves several purposes, such as showing commonalities in phenomena that may seem isolated at a glance and helping one to make predictions by defining structural linkages, rhythm and regularity of events”.

This position is upheld by Nelson and Knight (2010) in their assertion that “A theory consists of a systematic body of ideas about a particular topic or phenomenon. Theories organize and explain a variety of specific facts or descriptions of behavior”. Malhotra (2010) posits a theory to be a set of ideas assembled to demonstrate or explain a given

phenomenon by employing rationality and factual based premises either grounded by empirical realities or some universal truth or knowledge which is widely shared and accepted. Aligood (2013) posits a theory as a set of interrelated concepts that demonstrate an abstract imagery of a given phenomenon. This attribute of theoretical perspective provides it the prerequisite to give direction to research undertakings. Theory therefore organizes statements of purpose in a rather systematized order and groups them into related concepts that define a given nature of association of two or more variables with the objective of understanding, explaining or describing a phenomenon or a class of phenomena (Fain, 2004).

Theoretical framework is critical in providing a paradigm for any literature review and data relation to a study (Fulton & Krainovich-Miller, 2010). Indeed, it can be argued that researchers go out there to generate data that exists to create theories and explain them (Robson, 2002). This position of generation of theory as the ultimate purpose of qualitative research is shared by Parahoo (2006). Theoretical framework provides a basis for research findings and to anchor unto meaning and generalization (Polit & Beck, 2004).

2.2.1 Regulation Theory

Regulation theory explains the axis between economic and social relations, and why institutions are established to order their interactions. The theory has largely emerged to replace the public interest theory which portents that the society is self-regulatory and can order its relations (Mitnick, 1980). It proposes the need for existence of an

institution or regulator with the prerequisite tools to guide its operations and safeguard its existence and operations.

The regulation therefore has become necessary especially after the advent of liberalism characterized by market failure absence not enticed by market imperfections (Posner, 1974). The theory is expected to elicit a scenario of pricing in certain competitive industries and trigger institutions to be internally efficient and offer the best quality of services to citizens under their jurisdiction (Noll, 1985).

The theory has been dominated by United States perspectives and philosophy, motivated by the permeating regulations in the country. This has since changed and the entire Europe, Africa and Asia is conceding to its ideas. It lies to bare the tension between institutional design and public preference as provided in the traditional actor assumptions from economies and those that relax the assumptions and their consequences as more useful than utility maximizing behavior.

The theory is characterized by institutional design that have the structure, scope and objective which is independent of all the others with the objective of attending to a prescribed theme that attends to a given population of people, united by common challenges, needs or priorities (Horn, 1995). The institutions therefore must embrace some key features unique to its being that prescribe its structure, the rules of engagement and interactions and at the same time propose on how its operations will stand the test of accountability and transparency (Horn, 1995).

Regulatory theory contends that the units or institutions thereof derive their authority and objectives from legislative instruments that not only define them but also determine their scope and limitations. This highly relates to the core functions and the role the institution plays in making its own rules for implementation or implementing the rules or procedures of another institution or government (Ogus, 1994). This is mostly in cases where agencies have delegated roles and responsibilities from the national governments or Constitutions.

The theory observes that every entity created ought to have a match between its functions, mandate, authority and accountability. This is reflected at best by the balance between agency expertise and delegated tasks therein (Baldwin & McCrudden, 1987). For the institutions to thrive, independence should be granted to them and their decision making process must be cushioned from external interference. Its officials must be recruited on merit and on a bi-partisan basis and guarantee the leaders of the agencies some security of tenure to discourage their dismissal except on grounds of misconduct (Horn 1995; Majone 1994).

Regulatory theory holds that agencies must have clear guidelines of their operations and their processes must be understood by all. This is mostly to allow transparency and public participation on its operations and processes. The public participation is expected to compel the institution or agency to put into consideration and priority, the societal interests (Stewart 1975). The idea is to ensure that operations of an agency respond to the priorities of the citizens and cushion them from political pressures.

The theory however concedes to existence of external forces that interfere with the agency processes, mostly intertwined with “mosaic forces” (Horwitz, 1989) that more often put pressure on agencies to behave on a given way. The theory at the same time appreciates the role of interest groups which maximize their utility and heavily borrows from their experiences in the past, making the regulatory process a culmination of product allocation, governed by a set of laws closely related to the law of supply and demand (Posner, 1974).

This theory is ideal for Kenya’s 47 counties who have to generate their own revenue and forward them to the national government which in turn redistributes the revenues to the counties using a laid down formula. Agleitta (1979) had concluded that “structural forms can only form a complex structured whole able to reproduce itself and evolve in an orderly manner, by their location within the state. It is within the state that cohesion of these structured forms can be assured”.

For purposes of this study, regulation theory has been operationalized to denote the employment of legal instruments for the implementation of socioeconomic policy objectives. A characteristic of legal instruments is that individuals or organizations can be compelled by government to comply with prescribed behavior under penalty of sanctions (Hertog, 1999). Counties thus can be forced to comply to prescribed mode of institutional behavior and monetary systems in order to safeguard the public interests. This theory captures exactly how counties under Kenyan model cannot exist on their own despite the intense constitutional desire of their autonomy. It thus explains the import of Kenyan independent commissions which were established by the devolved governance legislation to offer oversight and checks on the decentralized institutions.

This theory holds the view that capitalist development requires the establishment of a relatively stable relationship between the system of accumulation and accompanying mode of regulation. As such, devolution ought to ensure some degree of equilibrium between the national government and county government interests even as it devolves functions to the decentralized institutions. The theory holds that harmonious economic growth needs control from the outside. This situation is very relevant to the control the devolution model in Kenya grants the national government in regulating the county governments (Agleitta, 1979). Whereas the devolution model has granted measurable autonomy, control by the national government is evident in various institutional structures. It is the view of the theory that once decentralized units are left unregulated by the national governments, growth will not be experienced and the generic objective of devolution would fail.

The regulation theory easily captures the Kenya's legal framework on the relationship between the national governments and the county governments. The theory observes that the centre establishes a sustainable and coherent production system (such as capital invested, distribution of capital, norms of production and consumption patterns), which is controlled by mode of social regulations (habit and customs, social norms and enforceable law and state forms). The theory further notes that the systems away from the centre must operate under an environment where independent dynamic, such as an economic or social system which is controlled by a 'governing mechanism' and which seeks to ensure that the system reproduces itself (Hancher & Moran, 1989).

The mode of regulation proposed by this theory involves a complex assemble of productive institutions, social and political relations and regulate the society – wide process of accumulation (Schoenberg, 1989). The principal contribution of the theory thus lies in the integration of the role of political and social relations (state actions and legislatures, social institutions, behavioral norms and political practices).

Jessop (1990) sought to establish the relationship between smaller units and the bigger units' relationship and whether there is chance for fairness in their engagements. Obviously, the matter as it pertains Kenyan devolution model is critical for attention. There are times that devolution proponents argue on national government interference on delay of certain expectations such as release of annual resource allocation and the debate of the degree of control of the national government over the counties. Equally related is the scope of the national functions and the appropriate services that ought to be devolved to the counties. Lipietz (1987) stresses the history of capitalism as full of experiments and bound to balance imperial tendencies which were bound to end at partial totalization.

Lipietz (1987) traces imperialism to be fueled from the diversities of national formations. Kenya has 47 decentralized units with different levels of resource, culture, climatic and geographical placements, which puts them under different historical paths and social capital strengths. He observes as thus “the changing imperialist system is a contingent historical outcome of diverse national strategies and various relatively autonomous processes operating in a space which is plurinational, international and transnational”. He concludes that in reality, struggles and institutional compromises take place mainly at the national framework, and that social formations of each decentralized

unit should at all times be studied together with the external linkages, a position Jessop (1990) concurs with. This theory provides hope for adherents and proponents of devolution in Kenya to stay focused to its realization and implementation challenges.

2.2.2 Neo-institutional theory

The theory is attributed to John Meyer, Brian Rowan, Lynne Zucker and Richard Scott whose collection of works on the theory are found ranging from 1977 to 1983 (Powel, 2007). The theory is founded on the view that organizational structures outlay the inherent technical forces, rational myths, knowledge legitimated through schooling. The theory emphasized on the core symbols of organizations, such as symbolic systems, cultural scripts and mental effects. The theory holds that these symbols shape institutional effects. The symbols of an institution set the stage for institutional effect to be concerned with social stability, attracting attention to reproductive processes that operate as stabilizing patterns for sequences of activities that were routinely enacted (Jepperson, 1991). Institutionalism is therefore attributed in terms of the various processes that facilitate the appearances that achieve normative and cognitive fixity (Meyer, Boli & Thomas 1987).

The theory largely cements its philosophy on coercive, normative and mimetic processes of production (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The coercive factors are rooted on such state actions such as political pressures, force of the state and the regulative role of the state. Normative factors are traced from the potent influence of the participants' education, and to a large extent that population of the society that is able to draw the line between quality and less important decisions. Institutions therefore are affected by various

stakeholders whose input is critical for the survival of the institution (Friedland & Alford, 1991).

Meyer and Scott (1983) observe that any institutional environment and situation is but an output of both internal organizational dynamics and external actions of other organizational stakeholders who interact with the organization at different levels of time and structure of production. This view is further enhanced by Bourdieu, Loic and Wacquant (1992) who underscore the import of both relational and cultural influences on any organizational behavior. The theory illustrates a state as a community of disparate organization, with producers, consumers, overseers, and advisors who engage in common activities, in line with the laid down procedure. This avers to an acceptable scenario for the actors to influence on the state and the existence of a criteria or procedure for their actions.

Hoffman (1999) avers that the state is seen as a contested centre of debates, where various interests exist in competition to each other and in negotiation to interpret the key issues that preoccupy the desires and aspirations of the citizens. This is determined by four key stages. First, an increase in the number of interactions among institutions, both inter and intra institutional relations. Second is the emergence of a structure of relations between the various sub units and the third is upsurge in the information load that each unit of the organization must contend. Finally, is the existence of mutual awareness among the stakeholders that all are involved in the common enterprise of bettering the organization.

The challenges of an organization to capture what the stakeholders desire is well captured by Clemens and Cook (1999). The decision therefore to create a provision for engagement with organizations by the stakeholders was supported by Eldelman (1992), Dobbin and Sutton (1998). This was instrumental to rid of the potent mentality, and reflect the state as that entity that considers worthwhile the contribution of its citizens. By embracing citizen participation, an organization attracts the attention of internal organizational logics and the heterogeneity of participation towards institutionalizing organizational behavior. This resultant process confers institutionalization its political attribute as a political exercise, with its success embedded on the relative power of the actors who strive to drive it (DiMaggio, 1988).

The signature of this theory has been the development and diffusion of new modes of governance, which has rules and laws with appropriate regulations and processes to sustain and reproduce those (Drori et al. 2006). In addition, the governance model ought to have appropriate mechanisms to resolve conflicts emerging therein as the stakeholders relate to each other (Djelic & Andersson, 2006). The Kenyan model of devolved government and the role of public participation is well defined and explained in this theory. No public participation that can take place outside a regulated environment and at the same time, no state can make the most useful decisions of a people devoid of their participation.

2.2.3 Theory of Change

The theory of social change defines social change as the process whereby individuals and communities adjust or abandon customs and associated leading ideas, values, and

purposes to act differently in response to random or systematic factors (Serrat, 2013). Social change thus is any alteration in the social order of a society as reflected in institutions, brought about by modified thought process.

The theory of change is a purposeful model of how an initiative such as a policy, a strategy, a programme, or a project contributes through a chain of early and intermediate outcomes to the intended result. Theory of change traces its history from the works of Augustine Comte (1798-1857); (Spencer, 1820-1903); (Durkheim, 1858-1917); (Marx, 1818-1883) and (Parsons, 1902-1979).

The theory of social change involves different approach to composite array of cultural, demographic, economic, environment, political, religious, scientific and technological forces, singly but more often than not in co-evolutionary combination, and almost always in the face of vested interests that favor the status quo. The change theory proposes various forms for its applications, namely discursive, procedural, content based, attitudinal and behavioral. Discursive entails a change in the narratives that actors hold about a concern, problem or issue. Procedural entails a change in the way the processes that manage a concern are carried out. Content based entails the change in the nature of a concern, attitudinal concerns with a change in the way actors think about a concern and behavioral involves a change in the way actors behave vis-à-vis a concern (Serrat, 2013). Change theory explains how and why a sequence of logically – linked events and pathways of change, should lead to an ultimate outcome. The figure below represents the elements in a pathway of change as observed by Gready (2013).

The theory of change is a conscious and creative visualization exercise, preferably a habit, not a product. The initiative of capacity building underpins the theory to a measure of time to evolve with reflective analysis and practice, and as such, should not be set in one single attempt because assumptions can take time to firm up, an iterative, staged process-integrated with other approaches for continuous improvement (Serrat, 2013). Capacity building in the spirit of the change theory help in developing joint understanding of a initiative and surface differences, circumscribe and bridge the gaps between local and national level changes, unearths assumptions and strengthen the focus, clarity and effectiveness of an initiative by better locating the rationale, means and ends and consequently designing strong plans of action (Serrat, 2013).

2.2.4 Theory of Distributive Justice

Theories of distributive justice are associated with Rawl's justice as fairness argument. In his *Magnus opus, a theory of Justice* (1971), it offers a modern form of social contract theory which argues on the appropriate arrangement of a society's basic structure, which is embedded on social and economic institutions. For the social and economic institutions arrangements can be ascertained by imagining the arrangements that would be selected by self-interested individuals in a hypothetical 'original position' (Knight, 2014). In the original position, individuals are behind a 'veil of ignorance' that deprives them of information about their particular preferences, objectives, and talents, though they have access to general social and economic information (Rawls, 1999a).

Rawls contends that persons in the original position would be highly interested and preoccupied to secure the issues and values which are most essential to pursuing their goals, whatever they may prove to be, even if at the cost of foregoing the possibility of great material benefits (Knight, 2014). Rawls thus offers that individuals would prize equal provision of the basic liberties which comprise of political liberties, freedom of thought, and freedom of association among others.

Above all, once all these were satisfied, insist on a robust form of equal opportunity that maximizes fair equality of opportunity. Only then, Rawl argues, would there be concern to secure income and wealth, and given that there may be worst off members of the community, they would choose to maximize the amount of income and wealth of the poor in the society, choose to maximize the amount of income and wealth of the poorest in the society, as dictated by the 'difference principle'. This clearly depicts Rawls justice principle to be embedded in three considerations; first, equal basic liberties are to be secured, second, fair equality of opportunity is to be secured, finally, economic inequalities are to be arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged group (Rawls, 1999).

Utilitarianism theory reinforces the Rawls argument on Justice as argued by (Bentham, 1970) who is the chief proponent of the theory. Rawls concedes to the works of Bentham by noting that utilitarianism is a dominant theory of morals and politics, and notes that justice is the fairness in response to it. At the heart of the utilitarianism theory is individual utility or welfare, which is a matter of how well an individual's life is going for them. Utilitarianism holds that a justice theory of action is good insofar as it increases overall welfare and bad insofar as it decreases overall welfare. Utilitarianism

therefore corresponds to the theory of justice, which equates distributive justice with maximizing welfare (Mill, 1969; Hare, 1981; Kelly, 1990).

Luck egalitarianism is yet another theory under distributive justice. It is concerned with how distribution has been arrived at and bears on its justifiability (Dworkin, 2000). Kymlicka (2002) presents scenarios of two different persons whose difference in income is determined by their different efforts of labor and observes that the two chose to exercise their responsibility differently, one choosing to work hard and the other sleeping on the job. This situation brings out the scenario where enforcement of an equal distribution seems implausible given that unequal outcome has resulted from individual choices against a backdrop of initial equality (Knight, 2014). Luck egalitarianism moves away from the pursuance of outcomes but combines them with a presumption in favour of equality (Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989). It therefore becomes unjust for some to be poorer than others through no fault or choice of their own (Temkin, 1993).

This however does not deny the existence of some form of inequality that is as a result of individuals' choices and such does not translate to injustice, the theory holds. The issue of equity and its contribution to democratic governance through the pursuance of justice has been invoked as a non-instrumental consideration for taking into account the interests of a wide range of stakeholders in the management of economic enterprises (Freeman, 1994; Hartman, 1996, 2001). Although their accounts differ in a number of ways, they both ask what a conception of justice would be required if transposed from the level of society to the level of an economic enterprise. Relying on Rawls (1971), freeman argues that economic enterprises ought to be 'managed in the interests of its stakeholders, financiers, customers, employees, and communities' (Freeman, 1994).

(Rawls, 1971) account ‘the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. they are the principles that free and rational persons concerned about furthering their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association’. The theory will therefore be useful in investigating the significance of equity on democratic governance.

2.2.5 Critical theory

Proponents of the critical theory include (Horkheimer 2002, 1995), (Adorno 2007), (Benjamin 1999), (Marcuse 2004) and Fromm (1941, 1956, 1965). The team upheld the analytical tools and concepts of Marx in high regard despite their assertion that his ideas needed to be reframed for the industrial age and mass society (Brookfield, 2014). The theorists focused on the burden of identifying, challenging and changing the processes by which a society holds together its collective values and how it uses dominant ideology to convince people that this inequality often perceived in the society is a normal state of affairs. The critical theory is grounded on three assumptions as articulated by Horkheimer’s (2002) classic 1936 essay.

The theory holds that apparently open, western democracies are usually highly unequal societies in which economic inequality, racism, and class discrimination are empirical realities. Secondly, the theory holds that the way the state of affairs is reproduced as seeming to be normal, natural and inevitable is through the dissemination of dominant ideology. Finally, the theory attempts to understand this state of affairs as a prelude to changing it (Brookfield, 2014).

Critical theory acknowledges that power and ideology are the single most analytical constructs. Foucault (1980) concur that they work symbiotically. It takes note that structural inequalities are maintained by the ruling class exercising power to define what counts as 'common sense' ways of explaining the world. The theory holds that 'if the ruling group in a society, community, or organization could persuade the vast majority that the way the social and economic world was organized was somehow pre-ordained, good for all, then control was easily maintained without recourse to force (Foucault, 1980).

Critical theory exists to analyze and explain the interconnection of power and ideology. Accordingly, whoever held power retained the position by disseminating a dominant set of ideas and beliefs that served their interests (Brookfield, 2014). Laws are thus established by ruling class to sustain their stay in power and safeguard their stay in power and make it appear that the said rules and laws serve the interests of the majority. Recent critical studies of in history and the philosophy of science trace the influence of political ideologies and institutional governance structures during the Cold War (Winseck, 2001). Sociologists have followed suit and observed that identity has been individualized and 'privatized, causing a loss to overall 'social capital' and threatened the majority perception of good laws. 'Divide and rule' has become individualization, privatization and the intimidations of behavior. The laws of devolution will largely serve the interests of the political elite and that as they serve to deepen democratic governance, it will be mostly for purposes of promoting the long term interests of the political elites. The laws are created largely to accommodate the growing appetite of the

political class and hardly for the average citizens. It will not be surprising thus if some of the laws are not able to be implemented or takes too long to be actualized.

2.3 Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework is a concise description of the phenomenon under study accompanied by a graphical or visual description of the major variables of the study (Cooper & Schindler, 2008). Young (2009) states that, a conceptual framework is a diagrammatical representation that shows the relationship between dependent variable and independent variables.

A conceptual framework is also a set of broad ideas and principles used to structure a subsequent presentation (Kombo & Tromp, 2009). This study's conceptual framework sought to demonstrate the relationship between corporate Kenya's Devolution framework and democratic governance.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework

Moderating Variable (MV)

2.3.1 Decentralized Units

Devolved units under the framework of law of autonomies and Decentralization exist to achieve the goal of “the effective participation of citizens in decision making, the deepening of democracy, the satisfaction of collective necessities, and the integral socioeconomic development of the Country.

Article 6 of the COK, 2010 divides Kenya into forty-seven (47) counties and requires state organs to ensure reasonable access to their services in all parts of the Republic. At the same time Article 184 provides for urban areas and cities as units of decentralization under the counties. Moreover, Article 176(2) requires county governments to decentralize their functions and the provision of services to the extent that is efficient and practicable. Furthermore, Part VI of the County Government Act, 2012 requires that the functions and services of the county government should be decentralized along the units specified in the Act. The counties are administratively devolved further into sub-counties, wards and village units.

Functional devolved governments are expected to bring services closer to the people and espouse the prerequisites for an economy that attracts and retains local and foreign investments. Efficient and effective devolved units have the potential to spur economic growth, political stability and social advancement in line with the precepts of the Constitution and national and county development plans including the Kenya Vision 2030. The second Medium Term Plan outlines the importance of decentralized units such as the cities, urban areas, sub counties, wards and village councils in delivering accelerated and inclusive socio-economic development, improved standards of living and new employment opportunities. These efforts shall in their whole address the key barriers to economic consolidation such as poverty, joblessness and inequality and pave way for faster realization of Vision 2030.

2.3.2 Public Participation

Article 10 identifies public participation as a National Value and principle of governance. Article 174 of the COK, 2010 that articulates the objects of devolution provides for the participation of the public in the exercise of the powers of the state and in the making of decisions affecting them. Article 232(d) guarantees the involvement of the people in the process of policy making in the public service. Article 196(1)(b) requires county assemblies to facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative and other business of the assembly and its committees. The Fourth Schedule to the Constitution allocates county governments the role of ensuring and coordinating the participation of communities in governance at the local level. Section 3(f) of the County Governments Act, 2012 provides for public participation while section 87 of the same Act requires county governments to facilitate public participation in conducting its affairs.

2.3.3 Capacity Building

The Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (Section 15 [2a]) mandates the National Government to facilitate the devolution of power; assist and support county governments in building their capacity to govern effectively and to provide public services. Section 121 of the County Governments Act 2012 provides for the National Government ministry or department responsible for matters relating to intergovernmental relations to provide support to county governments to enable them to perform their functions effectively.

The Kenya School of Government Act No. 9 of 2012 mandates the School to build capacity and provide training, consultancy and research services for the Public Service. A National Capacity Building Framework has been developed to support the capacity building for devolved governance. KSG, CPST and other institutions of higher learning are obligated to use the framework.

2.3.4 Social Equity

The Preamble and Article 10 of the Constitution on the National Values and principles of governance reiterate the aspiration of all Kenyans for a government based on equity, equality, human rights, social justice, inclusiveness, non-discrimination and the protection of the marginalized. The Bill of Rights in Chapter 4 is an integral part of Kenya's democratic state and forms the framework for all social, economic and cultural policies. It proscribes discrimination against all persons and states at Article 27(4) that the State shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against any person on any ground, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth. In addition, Article 100 of the COK, 2010 enjoins Parliament to enact legislation to promote the representation in Parliament of women, persons with disabilities, youth, ethnic and other minorities as well as marginalized communities. Article 174(e) protects and promotes the interests and rights of minorities and marginalized communities.

2.3.5 Legal Framework

Parliament has enacted enabling laws. In addition to these, several legal, policy and institutional frameworks have been put in place by the national government, the Senate, the National Assembly and the County Assemblies to guide the devolution implementation process at both levels of government.

2.3.6 Political Interests

Devolution framework will largely operate within a political system, which ought to provide the necessary environment to facilitate the framework. The political interests are largely on the political will to avail the required resources and institutional variables such as appropriate personnel, policies and strategies required to operationalize the framework.

2.4 Empirical literature

Empirical literature is a way of gaining knowledge by analyzing quantitatively and qualitatively previously conducted researches (Dayahka, 2007; Goodwin, 2005). The next section will sufficiently review previous studies on dependent and independent variables as represented by the conceptual framework figure.

2.4.1 Decentralized Units

Abdumlingo and Mugambi (2014) undertook a study ‘challenges of managing devolved funds in the delivery of services: a case study of Mombasa County. The study sought to investigate the various challenges in managing devolved funds and services. The

methodology involved descriptive research study and interviews conducted in four constituencies namely Likoni, Kisauni, Changamwe and Mvita.

Don (2014) undertook a study on the challenges of strategy implementation in Nairobi County Government. The objective of the study was to establish the challenges of strategy implementation at the devolved unit. The study adopted a descriptive cross-sectional research design. It employed face to face interviews as a primary data collection method. A structured interview guide was used as the sole research instrument. The study concluded that the level of management skills influences the strategy implementation in the devolved unit. The study also concluded that organizational structure of the devolved unit influences strategy implementation.

This was through bureaucratic bottlenecks, differentiated roles that lead to specialization, number of reporting lines, harmony or reporting lines and employee placement. The study further revealed that the challenges that highly inhibit the devolved unit's performance include lack of support from the top management, slow budget approval, lack of clear individual role, lack of alignment with the organization strategic plan, lack of employee involvement, poor staffing level, and ineffective communication during strategy implementation and lack of coordination of activities during strategy implementation.

2.4.2 Public Participation

Mattes, Gyimah, and Bratton (2005) studied the relationship between public participation and democratic deepening. The study found out that half of the citizens of Mali, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Zambia interviewed were psychologically disengaged

from politics. The study found out that ‘voter turnout has declined across Sub-Saharan Africa between founding and subsequent elections. Neshkova and Hai (2011) undertook a study to examine the importance of public participation in organizational democracy. The findings indicated that governments’ inclusion of public input highly contributed to democratic governance and the feel of belonging of the people. Public participation was pegged on the high performance of the leaders and the economy at large. Herian, Hamm, Tomkins, & Pytlik (2012) undertook a study on the role of public participation in Lincoln, Nebraska on effective budgeting. The objective of the study was to examine the attitudes of individuals who were presented with information about public input processes used by a local government to develop its budget. The study used the 2010 US Census Bureau estimates to do a random telephone survey, a purposive sampling online survey, a series of town hall meetings, and one public meeting for residents who had attended a prior held meeting on budget issues.

This multifaceted approach to collect input was designed to give individuals multiple outlets through which to state their opinion about their city’s affairs and perception towards measuring the impact of public deliberation upon perception of fairness. The sample included 607 respondents. The study concluded that public participation is very critical for perception of fairness and justice. It also captured that process fairness positively impact on overall evaluation of governmental performance and legitimacy. The findings also indicated that the effects of process fairness though public participation were greater among individuals high in uncertainty over the devolved unit.

2.4.3 Capacity building

Dejaeghere, (2009) studied the national assessment educational progress in which they found out that civic education increased political knowledge by four percent. They therefore concluded that ‘contrary to over 30 years of research findings on this phenomenon, civic education has an impact of a size and resilience that makes it a significant part of political learning.

Reacting to the findings, Evans (2009) acknowledged that the four percent effect that the findings detected constitutes an important finding in contrast to those which found absolutely no connection between civic education and civic outcomes. These findings are later praised and commended by Finkel (2003) in their assertion ‘the findings are a significant revision since the 1990’s to the pessimism of the early studies’.

Finkel (2003) undertook a study based on comparing effects on knowledge to that of attitudes on students in South Africa. The study concluded that ‘exposure to civic training has weaker attitudinal than pure knowledge effects and more difficult to impart values and political orientations in the classroom than simple factual information. The findings were summarized as thus ‘civic education matters in predicting students’ level of political knowledge as much as their exposure to the mass media, their age and grade level, whether they come from a family that discusses politics often, and whether other members of their family are political active. This study concluded that the ‘privileged elements in the society benefit most from civic education programs in that they are able to translate mobilization messages into actual behavior (Finkel, 2003).

USAID (2002) report deducted that ‘in more cases than not, the less educated benefitted more from civic education than their more highly educated counterparts. The implication is that civic education, well managed, can help overcome some of the political advantages enjoyed by better educated citizens’. Flanagan (2003) in his study of impact of civic education in Mexican schools notes that one concern about the program’s effectiveness is ‘the cultural and political immaturity of the broader society to sustain whatever democratic habits and attitudes the school manages to develop in students’.

2.4.4 Social Equity

Auer and Welte (2013) did a study on ‘the impact of single agents on Gender Equity in Organizations’. The focus of the study was on the works of Councilors as equal opportunity agents in large profit organizations in Austria, because of their unique institutional position regarding organizational change in the direction of gender equity. The study was based on a qualitative approach that draws upon open, usually not standardized and ambiguous empirical material and emphasizes reflection and interpretations. Purposeful sampling was used to offer a qualitative picture of the impact of equity in organizations active works councilors on gender equity in organizations. The study was based on eleven semi-structured, face to face, in-depth interviews with wards Councilors.

The findings indicated that councilors were confronted with societal characteristics as organizational cultures drew heavily on wider cultural meanings. Liff and Cameron (1997) captured the situation as thus “that’s a problem of society, not a particular problem of our company. In general, women don’t see themselves in a leading position.

That does not fit the societal picture of a woman. She is seen as a leader but as a team player and as a busy worker”. This finding is clear on equity of leadership is yet to be achieved. Anderson, John, Keltner, and Kring, (2001) undertook a study to compare socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of residents living with or without a waste treatment, storage and disposal facility (TSDF). The study used the Texas 1980 and 1990 census; the findings established that populations in the high pollutant area were not necessarily poor, black or Hispanic as it had been anticipated.

All groups in Texas were represented in those high pollutant areas, and the population therein characterized as young, predominantly white families who were not living in poverty. This was in tandem with an earlier study by Napton and Day (1992) on the same variables which found that equity of poverty in Texas was widespread. Eyles, Jerret, Cole and Reader (1997) undertook a study on environmental equity in Canada whose objective was to establish the level of environmental justice in Canada found that household income displayed a positive relationship with pollution emissions, as did manufacturing employment and population size. The poor in the society were found to live near their working stations-industries and out rightly disadvantaged their natural right to a clean environment.

2.4.5 Legal Framework

Agrawal and Ribot (2002) studied ‘types of powers in decentralized units. The scholars sought to establish the powers actors created by devolved systems of governance. They used the hypothesis that ‘the set of powers that any actor exercises are usually located within an area of decision making partly defined by existing laws. The study sampled

randomly the various institutions of governance which had been tasked with decision making. The finding of the study indicated that the nature and reality of devolved governance is determined by the powers exercised under the laid down legal infrastructure. The study concludes that if devolution of powers by a government does not effect changes in the existing powers of actors at lower levels of the political hierarchy, it may be argued that devolution has not taken place. By and large therefore, the legal framework structures service delivery and decision making in any democratic governance process.

The study brings forth four broad powers of decision making, as critically important to understanding and contextualizing devolution. These powers are the power to make decisions about how a particular resource or opportunity is to be used, the power to create rules or modify old ones, the power to ensure compliance to the new or altered rules, and the power to adjudicate disputes that arise in the effort to create rules and ensure compliance. The study noted that enlarged powers of decision making at lower levels of the political – administrative hierarchy in relation to any of the above four categories constitute some form of devolution.

2.5 Critique of Related Literature

2.5.1 Decentralized units

Devolved units under the framework of law of autonomies and Decentralization exists to achieve the goal of “the effective participation of citizens in decision making, the deepening of democracy, the satisfaction of collective necessities, and the integral socioeconomic development of the Country (Kamalak, 2013). In the United Kingdom,

the Labour government's devolution was aimed at "re-balancing power between citizens and government" in order to "move us away from a centralized Britain into a more democratic, decentralized, plural state" (Bardhan, & Mookherjee, 2006). In Egypt, the Mubarak regime embraced devolved governance in 2004 as a way of deepening democracy "and enhancing community partnerships" (Nazeef, 2004). The Peruvian government views devolved governance as an opportunity to confront the inequalities that have historically defined the country and engender equal access to opportunities for all (Kamalak, 2013).

According to the Cambodian government, devolved governance is being preferred in order to strengthen and expand democracy by devolving it downwards to the local level. Devolved units, it is hoped, will strengthen public accountability, and improve service delivery and government effectiveness (Government of Cambodia, 2005; Romeo & Spyckerelle, 2003). These issues are similarly shared by the Government of the republic of Uganda (Mulumba, 2004). Mexico also undertook devolved governance to "improve the political involvement of the people in public decision making", and to "strengthen democracy and spur the country's development efforts" (Munoz, Acosta & Moreno, 2006).

2.5.2 Public Participation

Brynard (2009) defines public participation as a two-way exchange of information between the public and their local authority. To him, public participation entails an act of taking part in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of policies by interest groups such as trade unions, pressure groups, professional associations, among others.

As such, it is an open governance process which opens up direct citizen participation in public affairs. Public participation has its genesis from community participation concept, which focuses on the idea that involving stakeholders in decision making about their communities and broader social issues has important social, economic and political benefits (Devarajan, & Widlund, 2015). Community participation processes include the identification of stakeholders, establishing systems that allow engagement with stakeholders by public officials, and development of a wide range of participatory mechanisms (Commins, 2007).

Devarajan, and Widlund, (2015) posits public participation to encompass an open, accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities can exchange views and influence decision making. As such, the process includes engaging people, deciding, planning and playing an active part in the development and operation of services that affect their lives. It is important the public participation is understood in its appropriate context. Kotze (2009) suggest that participation is more than just involving or mere consultation. African states are noted to mis-apply the concept and still assume that they have fulfilled its context of intent.

Nelson and Wright (2011) observes that public participation is popular participation which refers 'only on how a large number of people should be persuaded to get involved in public decision – making'. The scholar further notes that it is the public participation process that gives the decisions so arrived at their legitimacy. Participation in projects often entails contribution in form of labour, cash or kind and importantly, contribute ideas that can shape and set the priority framework in the development plan of the citizen's needs. Public participation therefore is an indication of awareness of social

capital as critical governance variable that guides towards critical understanding, fostering and guiding development (Fukuyama, 2001).

Swanepoel and de Beer (2006) observe that people are mobilized as a routine in most African states whenever projects and programmes emerge in a community. To the scholars, it is critical that a clear understanding of what participation is be expounded to the citizens. They content that people should not be mobilized to a limited, prescribed or token extent. They suggest that when people participate, they should do so fully in all aspects of the programme.

This means they are part of implementation and evaluation and if need be, they decide on projects course adaptations to keep the project on track. It is argued that people who do not participate in their own development initiatives have no affinity for development efforts and their results (Swanepoel & de Beer, 2006).

The South Africa National Framework for Public Participation (2007) observes that public participation is an open and accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities can exchange views and influence decision making. The framework further contends that public participation is a democratic process of engaging people, deciding, planning and playing an active part in the development and operation of services that affect their lives. Public participation process is embedded on the principle of inclusion which has its trace on the representative tradition, an important aspect of democratic sovereignty, which holds that it is essential that those passing judgment on behalf of the citizenry are representative of the larger public. This requires

that participants in such procedures must be statistically representative of the general population (Kahneman, & Thaler, 2006).

The guiding principles of the public participation concept include representative and participatory democracy, the promotion of good ethics and promotion of good conduct. Public participation helps construct informed citizenry blocks with a sense of ownership of all amenities and services accessed to them. Democratic governance therefore thrives where politics becomes an arena where different groups struggle to have their interests recognized. For the struggle to play out in a fair manner, it becomes essential that decisions are made in a transparent and accountable manner to avoid negating the democratic gains on states (Biegelbauer & Hansen, 2011).

2.5.3 Capacity Building

Capacity building refers to a broad set of activities to which actors in the international development aid 'system' undertake to catalyze social change in what Baser and Morgan (2008) refer to 'capacity, change and performance' principle. It is argued by the two scholars that performance towards social change in the society has everything to do with capacity building. As such, 'effective performance is purely as a result of the application and implementation of capacity building efforts' (Baser & Morgan, 2008). Capacity building is associated with activities designed to increase the competence and effectiveness of individuals and organizations (Stryk, Damon & Haddaway, 2011).

Capacity building broadens the participation for the masses and becomes a prerequisite for democracy's survival. Bratton & Gyimah (2005) observes 'absent mass participation, the door is open for autocrats to assume responsibility for governance and economic

management'. For this to be realized, capacity building of the masses is critical. Vila & Carnales (2008) remarked thus 'democracy can only survive and mature where citizens take active role in the governance of their country, such as voting, contacting representatives, and taking part in community affairs'.

Moehler, (2005) observes that 'lack of understanding of the effects of civic education programs is symptomatic of the lack of understanding of what democracy aid, in general achieves. Whereas the Swedish International Development Cooperation agency (SIDA) argue of an absence of accepted theories or models to measure the impact of civic education on deepening democracy, it underlines its importance (SIDA, 2000). Devolved governance is key in precipitating civic education as observed by Moehler, (2005) in his analysis of how bringing governments closer to the citizens breeds local problem solving programs that provide instruction about the society and political rights of women, and collective action to benefit local communities.

Capacity building promotes professionalism in governance, which is critical, not only in fending off catastrophes and effectively responding to winds of change, but also the threats to smooth integrity and governance values such as populism and corruption (Fraser-Moleketi, 2012). There is a reason to believe that an important factor fueling gravity to crises in several parts of the world was the populist rhetoric which skillfully confused the existence of 'bureaucracy' within the state apparatus with public service systems adhering to the principles of merit and professionalism (Vila & Carnales, 2008). Capacity building shields public services to clientelist practices and politicization (Terry, 2001). It assists governments in appreciating service to its citizens by conceptualizing the representation of citizens as 'clients' and related concept that government, in

essence, was really no different from private enterprise that could behave as such. This means that the government was in 'business' of providing services to its citizens (Fraser-Moleketi, 2012).

Increasingly, the concept of democratic governance has come to include a role for the civil society, and to highlight accordingly, citizen participation and organized communities, including minority groups, interfacing with the government, at the centre or the periphery and, through consultative process, partaking of policy-making and programme implementation. For this to succeed, governments must invest in building the capacity as well as credibility of community based institutions. Inclusivity, transparency, and accountability are key to the success of any public activity. Soss, Fording & Schram, (2008) observes that 'rigged elections, which effectively deny all opposition any representations in legislative bodies, end up discrediting the electoral process. This is because elections represent a means through which the people express political preferences and choose their representatives (Fraser-Moleketi, 2012).

Vila & Carnales (2008) observe that capacity building will define the primacy of politics and economics in public life while Nabatchi (2010) underscores the import of capacity building in citizenship and community solidarity for deepening democratic governance. The capacity to govern is very important to governance (Terry, 2001) as it largely provides the basis and framework for organizing and operationalizing leadership. Capacity building in government bridges the inadequacy in any political system and limits the chance for power holders to look for expedients and shortcuts in order to effectively satisfy the demands of the led (Soss, Fording & Schram, 2008).

Capacity building in governance sets the stage for efficiency and effectiveness, and becomes an essential precondition for building public trust, that is, transparency, integrity and professionalism in democratic governance. It is only when the government is staffed and surrounded by true professionals, committed to performing at a high level of competence, that the affairs of state may likely be conducted in a proper and due manner (Fraser-Moleketi, 2012). This sense of shared predicament and shared responsibility bred by capacity building has not been manifest in several countries and it's no wonder the world is awash with debt crises and recession due to waning confidence driving a wedge between power elites at the top and large segments of the citizenry, the more disadvantaged especially. The clamor from tent cities, from Tel Aviv to Athens, from London to Madrid, with notable pitched in Wall Street and other US cities, should not be dismissed lightly (Terry, 2001).

2.5.4 Social Equity

Equity is directly related to rules and rule-making processes and to the exchange and distribution of material or immaterial resources in specific settings. It is defined in law that governs states and informed by deeper ethical principles (Bozeman, 2013). Equity is a component of public values under the pillar of progressive opportunity (Moulton, 2012). Social equity refers to the act of trying to strengthen capacities of an individual, organization or group of organization, whereas capacity development refers to the actual emergence of stronger or increased capabilities (Valdivia, 2011).

Social equity is about government leadership which exercises political morality. It is a process that concerns with preparedness in terms of knowledge, skills, and institutional competence to restore and boost a mood of confidence, which would motivate people, as well as partner countries and other stakeholders to follow the government lead (Fraser-Moleketi, 2012). This argument is derived from the argument that leadership with a difference must comprise of: Leadership; professionalism; institutional capacity and the ability to mobilize public support and trust (ibid). Public service professionalism is a critical pillar for democratic governance. This is mostly desired to overcome the complex challenges constantly emerging and confronting governments. The mastery of field and institutional memory in governance issues is a crucial ingredient to democratic governance. Contemporary literature highlights its importance and the perils that emerge from its absence (de Vries, & Steenbergen, 2013).

2.5.5 Legal Framework

The adoption of the constitution of Kenya 2010 aims at fundamentally altering the governance through far reaching reforms. Of these, devolution of political power, responsibilities and resources have the most profound and transformative impact on governance and management of resources (Ochieng, 2012). The Kenyan 2010 constitution therefore provides a legal framework with a republic founded upon the idea of all sovereign power belonging to the people of Kenya and the establishment of two levels of government namely; the national government and the County government (Article 1 (4) Constitution of Kenya). The legal framework provides for the devolution of legislative and executive powers whereas the judicial powers are not devolved. The

constitution further creates 47 counties with delineated functions and responsibilities (Art. 6 (1) and Schedule 1 of the Constitution).

Devolution presents itself in various models depending on the legal framework of each country (Kincaid & Tarr, 2005). Kenya has adopted a form that is unique to itself. The devolution model is based on Article 6 (2) of the Constitution which describes the governments at the two levels as being distinct and inter-dependent and which conduct their mutual relations on the basis of consultation and cooperation. The devolution model therefore is not grounded on the principle of absolute autonomy, but on that of inter-dependence and cooperation. The system combines a measure of autonomy and inter-dependence leading to a cooperative system of devolved government. Cooperative devolved government is founded upon three relational principles: the principles of distinctness, interdependence and the principle of consultation and cooperation (Simeon & Conway, 2001).

The two levels of government are distinct in their constitutional functions, institutions, resources and legal frameworks. The governments are coordinate and not subordinate to each other and therefore none is a mere agent of the other and neither can be abolished by the other. This engenders a legal framework where national and county governments have to work in cooperation because they must be distinct from each other, with the county governments drawing their authority direct from the Constitution (Ochieng, 2012).

The legal framework posits a legal positioning of the county governments to be respected by the national government in a relationship of equals through a moderating national and county government summit and the intergovernmental Relations Technical Committee (Section 7 & 11 of the Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2012). This framework for mutual respect is a unique model that will determine the success or lack of smooth devolution implementation in Kenya. The framework requires that the national and county governments cooperate with, assist, support and consult each other and, as appropriate implement the legislation of other levels of government. The national and county governments are also obligated to liaise with each other for purposes of exchanging information, coordinating policies and administration and enhancing policy (Art. 6 (2); 189 (1)(b)(c) of the Constitution).

Several legal frameworks shall be interrogated in this study to test their impact on democratic governance in Kenya. Such frameworks will include; Article 6 of the Constitution on the territories of Kenyan counties, article 176 (2) on devolved governments functions, Article 174 on the Objects of Devolution, the County Governments Act, 2012, the Urban Areas and Cities Act, 2011, the Public Finance Management Act, 2012, intergovernmental Relations Act, 2012 and the Transition to Devolved Government Act, 2012.

Besley and Burgess (2002) did a study about devolution on federal state of India established that devolved governance enhances governments responsiveness in service delivery; especially if the media is adequately active at the local level. This study was an additional literature, provided by Ndegwa (2002) which had delved into taking stock of decentralization efforts in Africa across 30 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries based

on the perceptions determined by the World Bank experts at the various countries. Ndegwa (2002) findings on the aggregate country levels of administrative, political and fiscal devolution showed the constitutionally devolved states of South Africa and Uganda to have the highest levels of decentralization and early administrative decentralization led to a more advanced form of political decentralization. Oyugi (2006) studied the administration and performance of the local authority transfer fund, an important mechanism for addressing inequalities across local authorities. The study identifies the critical challenges that face the implementation of this innovative reform of financing development projects at the local levels. Oyugi and Kibua (2008) studied the extent of local community involvement in the preparation of Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plans (LASDAP).

The study acknowledged that such local community involvement is critical to access by local authorities of transfer of funds. In this study, the various inhibitors to effective community participation in the budgeting and financial control mechanisms of local authorities were identified. Cabral (2011) reviewed the efficiency impact of decentralization in Africa.

The study established that participation was actively significant factor in enhancing efficiency, among other factors such as planning and effective coordination. Fukuyama (2007), in his study on Papua New Guinea looked at the process of devolution from a donor – funding perspective.

The study concluded that if no one took up the opportunity and challenge, then no reforms would happen. The study underscored the fact that donors cannot succeed in pushing forward institutional change in the absence of local demand for reforms. This study put on focus the role of locals and local institutions in playing a leading role in governance reforms. Maina and Kibua (2008) evaluated the effectiveness of sector – specific management systems in the delivery of services with a focus on health care. They argued that both District Health Management Boards and District Health Management Teams were established in order to empower community representatives in making their health care decisions at the local levels. Indeed, a social audit undertaken in four constituencies in Nairobi in October 2010 found that community participation was relatively high during the identification cycle stage. The study however observed that community participation remained low at the implementation and monitoring stages of development projects.

Muturi (2015) undertook a study to analyze the administration and performance of the LATF in Nyeri County. The study identified the critical challenges that face the implementation of this fund and also the utility of devolution in reducing unnecessary layers of government to make service delivery to the citizens more effective. The SPAN and KHRC have undertaken a study on the harmonization of decentralized development in Kenya.

The study established that these have largely deterred citizen engagement in local governance (KHRC & SPAN, 2010). It was clear from the findings that citizens have been confused by the existing overlaps between administrative boundaries which have made it difficult for them to understand or recall the processes involved in fund

administration. The referred overlaps as well have made it impossible for undertaking monitoring and evaluation.

2.6 Research Gap

The empirical research indicates that research in the area of democratic governance and devolution is yet to crystallize. Studies have been done on the functions of devolution and how it impacts on development. Bosire (2013), sought to investigate the nexus between devolution, development, conflict resolution and limiting power. The researcher sought to interrogate the extent to which devolution helps to mitigate underdevelopment, conflicts and centralization of power. The study utilized data gathered by the author and closely linked devolution to attainment of development, harmonious relations among tribes and limited power at the centre. Bardsley (2012) did a study on the ‘Politics of Devolution: Institutionalizing sub national legislatures in Scotland and Wales’. The study interrogated devolution impact on institutions and the author utilizes data collected from primary data which concluded that devolution provides the best governance model to nurture and grow viable democratic institutions.

Chernyha and Burg (2008) did a study on ‘devolution and democracy: Identity and voting in the Spanish state of autonomous’, whose purpose was to link the impact of devolution on democracy, and concluded that devolution is a critical catalyst for democracy.

This study seeks to seal the existing gaps in literature by studying the chosen variables on the correlation linking devolution framework in Kenya and democratic governance. The study will add value to accessible literature by providing empirical evidence on the influence of devolution framework on democratic governance.

2.7 Summary

The chapter has reviewed various literature on devolution sub constructs and manifested broadly manifested that devolution is yet to be substantially researched and especially how the variable interacts with democratic governance in Kenya. It is noted that Kenya embraced devolution as an advanced form of decentralization with the view of consolidating her democratic credentials. This study will therefore greatly provide the much desired forum to interrogate the anticipated impact of devolution on democratic governance in Kenya.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology that was used in undertaking the study. The chapter captures the research design that was adopted. This chapter covers the research paradigm and research methodology in line with the theories and variables developed in chapter two. The geographical area where the study was conducted, the sampling design and the population sample are described. The instrument used to be used to collect the data, including methods implemented to maintain validity and reliability of the instrument are described.

3.2 Research Design

This research adopted descriptive and correlation research design. Research is basically the search for any kind of knowledge. During that process, a particular approach has to be adopted depending on what is to be researched. Creswell (2008) asserted the importance of illustrating the research approach as an effective strategy to increase the validity of social research. Research design is the plan, structure of investigation conceived so as to obtain answer to research questions and to control variance (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000; Wiersma & Jurs, 2009). Serakan (2003) argues that a research design can either be exploratory, descriptive, experimental or hypothesis testing. Bryman and Bell (2003) defined research design as a framework for the collection and analysis of data that is suited to the research question. Orodho (2003) defines research design as the scheme, outline or plan that is used to generate answers to research problems.

Tashakkori & Teddlie (2010) posits descriptive research design to answer research questions who, what, where and how.

3.2.1 Research Paradigm

This study embraced the philosophical foundation of naturalist and positivist forms of inquiry, which are loosely referred to as the qualitative and quantitative methods respectively. These two approaches aim at building a body of scientific knowledge about phenomenon including casting that knowledge in form of verifiable theoretical frameworks. Positivism and naturalist paradigms are distinguished on the basis of four axioms namely; views about reality, cause and effect relationship between the inquirer and the object and views about knowledge and truth (Mugenda, 2003).

The assumption of a single, tangible reality under the positivist paradigm gives rise to four basic purposes of research that include describing, predicting, controlling and explaining the phenomenon of interests. The study philosophy thus ensures that the purpose of the research or study is clear on the description of the phenomenon being investigated. The philosophy also enables prediction. This is the ability to estimate phenomenon. This is what is referred to as correlation research. The study philosophy further enables control of phenomena. This is done by manipulating some part of the variables to in order to exert control over another. Finally, the study philosophy enables explanation of phenomena. The explanations involve accurate observations and measurement of a given phenomenon.

3.3 Population

Castillo (2009) and Agarwal (2009) defined population as the large collection of individuals or object that is the main focus of a scientific query and have similar characteristics. According to Creswell (2008), a population is defined as all elements (individuals, objects and events) that meet the sample criteria for inclusion in a study. The study population consisted of all the 47 Counties in Kenya.

3.3.1 Target Population

Target population is the entire set of units for which the study data will be used to make inferences (Nachmias & Nachimias, 2003). Targeted population defines those units for which the findings of the survey are meant to be generalized (Gall & Borg, 2007). The study used a census for all the forty-seven counties in Kenya, targeting critical officers in the implementation framework of devolution in Kenya. The County executives were represented by the governor or his representative, while the county Assembly Speaker was represented the County Assembly. The IEBC County Coordinator represented the electoral agency, which is tasked with the enormous task of civic education in the country. County Attorneys provided the much desired legal framework situation of the devolution framework in the Counties.

3.4 Sampling Frame

Sampling is the process of selecting a number of items for a study in such a way that the items selected represent the larger group from which they were selected. According to (Zikmund, Babin, Carr & Griffin, 2010 & Black, 2004), sampling is described as a selection of a subset of individuals from within a population for making prediction based

on statistical inferences. A sample is a true representative of the entire population to be studied (Lindholm-Leary (2004). Malhotra & Krosnick (2007) argues that the sampling frame facilitates formation of a sampling unit that refers to one member of a set of entities being studied which is the material source of the random variable. Kothari (2004) posits a good sample to be truly representative of the population, result in a small sampling error, viable, economical and systematic. Ader, Mellenbergh & Hand (2008) states the advantage of sampling as cost, speed, accuracy and quality of data. A sampling frame therefore is a list of population from which a sample will be drawn (Gall & Borg, 2007). This study will sample those key officials at the County Level, who have the highest responsibility of implementing the devolved government governance agenda. The officials will include, the 47 governors or their representatives, the 47 County Assembly Speakers, the 47 IEBC County Coordinators and the 47 County Attorneys.

3.5 Sampling Techniques

The study adopted a census technique with respect to the unit of analysis. The census approach is justified since according to Orodho (2009), data gathered using census contributes towards gathering of unbiased data representing all individuals' opinions in the study population on a study problem. The census approach was also justified since according to Gall and Borg, (2007) results obtained from a census are likely to be more representative accurate and reliable than results obtained from a population sample and thus census assists in generalization of research findings. Census provides a true measure of the population since there is no sampling error and more detailed information about the study problem within the population is likely to be gathered (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010).

Table 3.1: Sample Distribution

S/No.	Type of agency	Total
1	County Governors	47
2	County Assembly Speakers	47
3	County Attorneys	47
4	County IEBC Coordinators	47
Total		188

3.6 Data Collection Procedure

3.6.1 Questionnaires

Questionnaires were designed to collect information on the influence of devolution framework in Kenya on democratic governance. The questionnaire instrument for data collection was preferred as it helps the respondents to be objective and more precise in responding to research questions. A questionnaire is a method of data collection in which respondents provide written answers for written questions (Leary, 2001; Gillham, 2008). Data collection is a means by which information is obtained from the selected subjects of an investigation (Creswel, 2003).

In designing the question items, both closed and open ended format of the item will be used. Care will be taken to ensure that the design is simple and respondent friendly. A five – point likert scale (Likert, 1961) which ranges from ‘very great extent’ to ‘very low extent’ (5= ‘very strong extent’, 4=’great extent’, 3=’moderate extent’, 2= ‘low extent and 1= very extent’) will be used, to reflect the strength of agreement or disagreement of

the respondents. The questionnaires will be divided into the various sections of the variables.

3.6.2 Secondary data

Secondary data was instrumental in literature review, theoretical orientation and complemented the primary sources of data. Further, it was employed to bring out the various legal frameworks as envisaged by the Constitution of Kenya 2010, devolution laws, frameworks, policies and related legal instruments.

3.7 Pilot Study

According to Cooper & Schilder, 2011 and Creswell, 2003, a pilot test should constitute at least 10 percent of the sample. The pilot test is conducted to detect the weaknesses in design and instrument as well as provide proxy data for selection of a probability sample (Cooper & Schilder, 2010). A pilot study is a small scale research project that collects data from respondents similar to those that will be used in the full study (Zikmund, Babib, Cartr & Griffin, 2010). Bryman & Bell (2003) states that it is always desirable if possible to conduct a pilot study before administering questionnaires to the sample. It is a way of pre-testing the questionnaire and it is done to obtain feedback, to confirm if the questionnaire is effective and well understood by the respondents. In this research, five counties were piloted, namely, Kwale, Migori, Nyamira, Machakos and Kericho. The five were selected in a purposive sampling approach to represent the diversity of the country.

3.7.1 Validity

Validity refers to the extent to which an instrument measures what is supposed to measure. Data need not only to be reliable but also true and accurate. If a measurement is valid, it is also reliable (Gillham, 2008). The content of validity of the data collection instrument was determined through discussing the research instrument with the research experts in the university.

3.7.2 Reliability

Reliability refers to the consistence, stability, or dependability of the data. Whenever an investigator measures a variable, he or she wants to be sure that the measurement provides dependable and consistent results (Cooper & Schindler, 2006). A reliable measurement is one that if repeated a second time gives the same results as it did the first time. If the results are different, then the measurement is unreliable (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2008). To measure the reliability of the data collection instruments, an internal consistency technique using Cronbach's alpha was applied (Mugenda, 2008). Cronbach's alpha is a coefficient of reliability that gives an unbiased estimate of data generalizability (Zinbarg, 2005). An alpha coefficient of 0.75 or higher indicates that the gathered data are reliable as they have a relatively high internal consistency and can be generalized to reflect opinions of all respondents in the target population (Zinbarg, 2005).

3.8 Data Analysis

Data analysis involves ordering and organizing raw data so that useful information can be extracted from it (Saunders, Lewis & Thornbill, 2009). In this study the primary data

obtained from the questionnaires was checked for omissions, legibility and consistency before being coded for analysis. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software was used to organize code and analyze information and generate quantitative report. Cooper & Schindler (2006) indicates SPSS's main advantage as includes many ways to manipulate data and containing most statistical measures.

In this research regression analysis was used to determine the relationship between the dependent variable (democratic governance) and the independent variables (devolved units, public participation, capacity building, social equity, legal framework). Multiple regression is a flexible method of data analysis appropriate whenever a quantitative variable (the dependent or criterion variable) is to be examined in relationship to any other factors (expressed as independent variables or predictor variables). Relationship may be non-linear, independent variables maybe quantitative or qualitative, and one can examine the effects of other variables taken into account (Cooper & Schindler, 2006).

Study model (without moderator)

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \beta_5 X_5 + e$$

Where

β_0	=	Intercept coefficient
$\beta_1 \dots \beta_5$	=	Regression coefficient of the six independent variable
X_1	=	Decentralized Units
X_2	=	Public Participation
X_3	=	Capacity Building
X_4	=	Social Equity
X_5	=	Legal Framework
e	=	error term

Inferential statistics which include analysis of variance (ANOVA) was employed to test the level of significance. Bailey (2008) observes that Analysis of Variance is a technique that provides a statistical test of whether or not the mean of several groups are equal, and therefore generalizes t-test to more than two groups.

An F-test was done to test if two population variances are equal. A test of significance of R was also carried out and so was the test of significance for R squared. Qualitative data was analyzed using frequency and cross tabulation and coding data upon collection. Quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive statistics; measures of central tendency scatter plots will be used to show if the relationship is linear. To make this possible, SPSS Version 17 was used as a statistical tool for analysis.

Moderating Model

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 X_i Z + e$$

$$i = 1 \dots 5$$

Moderating effect was present if the interaction term will be significant.

3.9 Testing of Hypothesis

The study used statistical tests to reject or accept the hypotheses. This process keenly ensured reliability assessment of the study by means of coefficient alpha. One tailed and two tailed test were employed to determine the level of significance, which was largely attending to the quantity of type 1 error in making decisions. The F test, t- test and chi square were employed to test the hypotheses.

3.10 Operationalization of variables

Table 3.2: Operationalization of variables

Type of variable	Variable name	Operationalizing indicator
Dependent Variable	Democratic Governance	Transparency
		Accountability
		Responsiveness
Independent Variable	Decentralized Units	proximity to services
		Timely access to services
		Sufficient Services
	Public Participation	Informing
		Involving
		Consulting
		Collaboration
	Capacity Building	Training
		Empowering
		Exposure
	Legal framework	Constitution of Kenya
		County Government Act
		Intergovernmental Relations Act
Transition to devolved Government Act		
Social Equity	Gender	
	Marginalization	
	Inclusivity	
Moderating variable	Political interests	Budgets

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of analysis of data collected from the field using questionnaires. The analyzed data was arranged under themes that reflected on the research objectives. The study sought to examine the influence of devolution framework on democratic governance process in Kenya. Specifically, the study looked at;

1. To establish the influence of decentralized units on enhancing democratic governance.
2. To establish the influence of public participation on enhancing democratic governance.
3. To determine the influence of capacity building on democratic governance.
4. To establish the influence of social equity on enhancing democratic governance.
5. To establish the influence of legal framework in enhancing democratic governance.
6. To assess the moderating effect of political interests in the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance.

4.2 Response Rate

The number of questionnaires that were administered was 188 and a total of 166 questionnaires were properly filled and returned. The response rate result is shown in Table 4.2.1.

Table 4.2.1: Response Rate

Response	Frequency	Percent
Returned	166	88.29%
Unreturned	22	11.71%
Total	188	100.00%

The response rate was 88.29% as shown on Table 4.2.1. This represented an overall success according to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) and also Kothari (2004), a response rate of above 50% is adequate for a descriptive study. Cooper and Schindler (2003) also argues that a response rate exceeding 30% of the total sample size provides enough data that can be used to generalize the characteristics of a study problem as expressed by the opinions of few respondents in the target population Based on these assertions the response rate of, 88.29% was adequate for the study and considered good representative to provide information for analysis and derive conclusions.

4.2.1 Pilot study

Pilot study was conducted to test for reliability. Reliability refers to the repeatability, stability or internal consistency of a questionnaire (Jack & Clarke, 1998). Cronbach's alpha was used to test the reliability of the measures in the questionnaire (Cronbach, 1951). According to Sekaran (2006), Cooper & Schindler (2003), Cronbach's alpha has the most utility for multi-item scales at the interval level of measurement, requires only a single administration and provides a unique, quantitative estimate of the internal consistency of a scale. Baker et al. (2001) states that the size of a sample to be used for piloting testing varies depending on time, costs and practicality, but the same would tend to be 5 - 10 per cent of the main survey.

According to Cooper and Schindler (2006) the respondents in a pilot test do not have to be statistically selected when testing the reliability of the instruments. In this study, data collection instrument which is a questionnaire was tested on 10% of the sample of the questionnaires to ensure that it is relevant and effective. Reliability was tested using questionnaire duly completed by 19 respondents from Kwale, Migori, Nyamira, Machakos and Kericho Counties. The five had been selected in a purposive sampling approach to represent the diversity of the country. The questionnaire responses were input into statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) and Cronbach's alpha coefficient generated to assess reliability. The closer Cronbach's alpha coefficient is to 1, the higher the internal consistency reliability (Sekaran, 2003). In general terms a Cronbach alpha of 0.8 is good, 0.7 is an acceptable range while if it is 0.6 and below, is poor (Sekaran, 2003).

Table 4.2.2: Reliability coefficient of variables

Variable	No of Items	Respondents	α=Alpha	Comment
Decentralized Units	10	19	0.893	Reliable
Distance	5	19	0.987	Reliable
Capacity Building	6	19	0.974	Reliable
Public Participation	6	19	0.976	Reliable
Social Equity & Inclusivity	6	19	0.964	Reliable
Legal Framework	10	19	0.975	Reliable
Political Interests	6	19	0.973	Reliable
Democratic Governance In Kenya	6	19	0.859	Reliable

Results in table 4.2.2 shows that the Cronbach alpha for all the variables was above the threshold of 0.75. Therefore, that section of the questionnaire relating to the entire construct was reliable.

4.3 Bio Data

This section consists of information that describes basic characteristics such as gender, age, marital status and academic qualifications. They were arrived by inputting the data into the SPSS software then running the descriptive frequencies to generate their frequencies before presenting in figures. *Gender of Respondents:* From the findings, 66% of the respondents were male while 34% were female. Figure 4.3.1 shows the analysis of male and female who participated in the study. This shows that majority of the respondents were male. This analysis is consistent with that of Cooper & Schindler 2006 studies that have identified male domination in the formal and informal sectors. Other studies however, found that in spite of women being major actors in Kenya's economy, men dominate in the formal sector citing (Ellis, Cutura, Dione, Gillson, Manuel & Thongori, 2007).




Figure 4.3.1: Gender of Respondents

Age of Respondents: The respondents were requested to indicate their age brackets. The aim was to find out if the age had an influence on response and overall results. From the results in Figure 4.3.2, majority of the respondents which was at 38% were on age bracket of 36-45 years, 28% were of age between 46 and 55 years, 21% were of age between 26-35 years while 13% who were the least were of age above 56 years old. According to the Population Situation Analysis Report (2014) the trend of population growth for persons aged 21-40 years has increased from about 12% in 1999 to nearly 15% in the year 2009. Therefore, the finding of this study reflects the current trend of the Kenya population indices.




Figure 4.3.2: Age of respondents

Education Qualification: The respondents were requested to indicate their level of education. From the results in Figure 4.3.3, 57% of the respondents had their highest level of education being first degree graduate level, 6% had PhD level qualification, and 26% had Masters level qualification while only 11% had diploma education qualification.

The results imply that, the respondents were expected to understand the questionnaire and give valid response since they had a better understanding as guided by their level of education.




Figure 4.3.3: Education Qualification

4.4 Descriptive Statistics

All the variables were measured using five-point scale. Descriptive statistics were obtained through running the statements of each objective using descriptive custom table and presenting in percentages. The mean and the standard deviations were obtained through running the descriptive statistics.

Independent Variables

Objective 1 decentralized units

In this study, decentralized units was measured by 10 statements. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5; where 1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree and 5= Strongly Agree. The analysis is on Table 4.4.1.

Table 4.4.1: Descriptive Statistics on Decentralized Units

Statements	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Mean	Std. Dev
Decentralized units have improved proximity to public services	3.6%	3.0%	7.8%	75.3%	10.2%	3.86	0.78
Decentralized units have enhanced timely access to services	1.8%	16.3%	17.5%	54.8%	9.6%	3.54	0.94
In order for devolution to function as expected, there are several structures that need to be set up including the office of the Governor, County Assembly, County Public Service Board, and the Senate	3.0%	3.0%	7.8%	65.7%	20.5%	3.98	0.82
Devolution may create or strengthen of independent units or tiers of Government	9.6%	15.1%	4.8%	56.0%	14.5%	3.51	1.20
Devolution may transfer of authority for decision making, finance and management to counties with cooperate status	0.0%	0.0%	9.6%	70.5%	19.9%	4.10	0.54
Devolution describes an inter-organizational pattern of power relationship.	2.4%	1.8%	1.2%	69.3%	25.3%	4.13	0.74
Devolved unit need to be given autonomy and independence without direct control of centre government	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	39.2%	60.8%	4.61	0.49
The local level units must have clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries to exercise authority and perform public functions	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	69.9%	30.1%	4.30	0.46
The devolved units should act on its own, not under hierarchical supervision of the Central Government	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	36.1%	63.9%	4.64	0.48
Devolved entities permit to establish and manage their own budgetary, evaluation system and monitoring	1.8%	1.8%	6.0%	31.9%	58.4%	4.43	0.83
Average						4.11	0.73

The results show that 75.3% agreed with the statement that decentralized units have improved proximity to public services. 54.8% agreed that decentralized units have enhanced timely access to services, 65.7% agreed that in order for devolution to function as expected, there are several structures that need to be set up including the office of the Governor, County Assembly, County Public Service Board, and the Senate, 56.0% agreed that devolution may create or strengthen of independent units or tiers of Government, 70.5% agreed that devolution may transfer authority for decision making, finance and management to counties with cooperate status, 69.3% agreed that devolution describes an inter-organizational pattern of power relationship, 60.8% strongly agreed that devolved unit need to be given autonomy and independence without direct control of centre government, 69.9% agreed that the local level units must have clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries to exercise authority and perform public functions, 63.9% agreed that devolved units should act on its own, not under hierarchical supervision of the Central Government while 58.4% agreed that asset management seminars had agendas on planning for retirement. The overall mean of the responses was 4.11 which indicates that majority of the respondents agreed with the statements on decentralized units. The standard deviation of 0.73 indicates that the responses were closely varied.

This is consistent with Munoz, Acosta & Moreno, (2006) that devolved governance improves the political involvement of the people in public decision making, and to strengthen democracy and spur the country's development efforts. Devolved units under the framework of law of autonomy and Decentralization exists to achieve the goal of "the effective participation of citizens in decision making, the deepening of democracy,

the satisfaction of collective necessities, and the integral socioeconomic development of the Country. Romeo & Spyckerelle, (2003) observes that devolved governance is being preferred in order to strengthen and expand democracy by devolving it downwards to the local level. Devolved units strengthen public accountability, and improve service delivery and government effectiveness.

Table 4.4.2: Social amenities rating

Statements	1-2 km	3-5 km	6-8 km	9-10 km	Above 10 km	Mean	Std. Dev
The distance of the nearest hospital from your home is	45.2%	39.8%	15.1%	0.0%	0.0%	1.70	0.72
The distance to the nearest public registration office	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	61.4%	38.6%	4.39	0.49
The distance to the nearest police station	0.0%	30.1%	50.0%	19.9%	0.0%	2.90	0.70
The distance to the nearest water point	39.8%	49.4%	10.8%	0.0%	0.0%	1.71	0.65
The distance to the nearest school	50.6%	49.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.49	0.50
Average						2.44	0.61

The results show that 45.2% indicated that the distance of the nearest hospital from the respondents' home was 1-2 km. 61.4% indicated that the distance to the nearest public registration office was 9-10 Km, 50.0% indicated that the distance to the nearest police station was 6-8 km, 49.4% indicated that the distance to the nearest water point 3-5 km while 50.6% indicated that the distance to the nearest school was 1-2 km.

These findings indicate a high improvement of health sector, in terms of proximity to the services after devolution in Kenya. The registration of persons, which is a national government function, is yet to reach the desired proximity to the citizens as 61.4% of the respondents rated it to be found at the location of 9-10 km from the respondents. The respondents also responded that most of the police stations are found on average of 50% at the location of 6-8 km. the security function is also for the national government and the study clearly illustrates the satisfaction with which the service as rated by the respondents.

The service of water is rated highly at 39.8 % of the respondents rating it to be found within 2 km distance from their homes and 49.4 rating it to be found within a radius of 3-5 km. This is certainly a well delivered sector of the devolved governance as it is a devolved government function. When the community enjoys water service within such short distances, more time is invested in other chores that strengthen the economic fabric of the society. Education centers enjoy a similar proximity to the respondents with over 70% of the respondents indicating that schools are found within an average of 3 km. this findings is in tandem with Cheema and Mohamand (2006) assertion, that devolution serves best when it facilitates services to the citizens to be delivered at their doorstep.

Objective 2 Public Participation

In this study, public perception was measured by 6 statements. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5; where 1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree and 5= Strongly Agree. The analysis is on Table 4.4.3.

Table 4.4.3: Descriptive Statistics on Public Participation

Statements	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Mean	Std. Dev
Effective public participation allows the public's values to be identified and incorporated into decisions that ultimately affect them	4.8%	3.6%	0.0%	62.0%	29.5%	4.50	0.75
Public participation ought to be appropriately legislated to operationalize its key objectives	10.8%	3.6%	0.0%	50.6%	34.9%	4.67	0.81
Public participation encompass an open, accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities exchange views on the development and operation of services that affect their lives	6.4%	3.2%	3.1%	74.1%	13.2%	4.39	0.70
Public participation is an indication of awareness of social capital as critical governance variable that guides towards critical understanding, fostering and guiding development	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	60.2%	39.8%	4.40	0.49
Public participation includes the promise that the public's contribution will influence the decision	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	22.3%	77.7%	4.78	0.42
Public participation promotes sustainable decisions by recognizing and communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including decision-making agencies	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	42.8%	57.2%	4.57	0.50
Average						4.55	0.61

The results show that 62.0% agreed with the statement that effective public participation allows the public's values to be identified and incorporated into decisions that ultimately affect them. 50.6% agreed that public participation ought to be appropriately legislated

to operationalize its key objectives, 74.1% agreed that public participation encompass an open, accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities exchange views on the development and operation of services that affect their lives, 60.2% agreed that public participation is an indication of awareness of social capital as critical governance variable that guides towards critical understanding, fostering and guiding development while 77.7% strongly agreed that Public participation includes the promise that the public's contribution will influence the decision. The overall mean of the responses was 4.55 which indicates that majority of the respondents agreed with the statements on public participation.

The standard deviation of 0.61 indicates that the responses were closely varied. The study is consistent with that of Brynard (2009) who posits that public participation encompass an open, accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities can exchange views and influence decision making. As such, the process includes engaging people, deciding, planning and playing an active part in the development and operation of services that affect their lives. It is important the public participation is understood in its appropriate context.

Objective 3 Capacity Building

In this study, capacity building was measured by 6 statements. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5; where 1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree and 5= Strongly Agree. The analysis is on Table 4.4.5.

Table 4.4.4: Descriptive Statistics on Capacity Building

Statements	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Mean	Std. Dev
Capacity building is a recognition that organizations need to build management systems as well as programs.	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	80.1%	19.9%	4.20	0.40
Seminars, workshops, are mode of capacity building used by almost all democratic institutions in Kenya	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	34.3%	65.7%	4.66	0.48
Training, Access to on-line data, documentation, and information on specific Capacity building facilitate democratic governance	0.0%	0.0%	25.9%	64.5%	9.6%	3.84	0.58
Capacity building is associated with activities designed to increase the competence and effectiveness of individuals and organizations	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	55.4%	44.6%	4.45	0.50
Capacity building broadens the participation for the masses and becomes a prerequisite for democracy deepening.	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	41.0%	59.0%	4.59	0.49
Developing a capacity building plan is to set objectives and indicators to show expected progress over a particular timeframe.	0.0%	0.0%	14.5%	64.5%	17.5%	4.14	0.79
Average						4.31	0.54

The results show that 80.1% agreed with the statement that capacity building is a recognition that organizations need to build management systems as well as programs. 65.7% strongly agreed that seminars, workshops, are mode of capacity building used by almost all democratic institutions in Kenya, 64.5% agreed that training, Access to on-

line data, documentation, and information on specific capacity building facilitate democratic governance, 55.4% agreed that capacity building is associated with activities designed to increase the competence and effectiveness of individuals and organizations, 59.0% agreed that capacity building broadens the participation for the masses and becomes a prerequisite for democracy deepening while 64.5% agreed that developing a capacity building plan is to set objectives and indicators to show expected progress over a particular timeframe. The overall mean of the responses was 4.31 which indicates that majority of the respondents agreed with the statements on capacity building. The standard deviation of 0.54 indicates that the responses were closely varied. The study agrees with that of (Fraser-Moleketi, 2012) that capacity building promotes professionalism in governance, which is critical, not only in fending off catastrophes and effectively responding to winds of change, but also the threats to smooth integrity and governance values such as populism and corruption.

Objective 4 Social Equity

In this study, social equity was measured by 6 statements. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5; where 1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree and 5= Strongly Agree. The analysis is on Table 4.4.5.

Table 4.4.5: Descriptive Statistics on Social Equity

Statements	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Mean	Std. Dev
Democratic governance involves developing leadership and people management that promotes diversity as a guiding principle that enforce inclusive practice	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	48.2%	51.8%	4.52	0.50
Democratic governance collaborate with others in order to strengthen its capacity and focus on issues of social equity	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	36.1%	63.9%	4.64	0.48
In democratic governance there should be communications that ensure the voices of people who are marginalized are heard	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	62.0%	33.1%	4.28	0.55
Social equity is addressed in all leadership and management training in a democratic governance	4.2%	45.8%	16.9%	30.7%	2.4%	2.81	1.00
Each country has a plan to address unjustifiable and under-representation	0.0%	16.9%	0.6%	75.3%	7.2%	3.73	0.83
The employment of people with disabilities is promoted across all the counties	8.4%	40.4%	9.0%	34.3%	7.8%	2.93	1.18
Average						3.82	0.76

The results show that 51.8% agreed with the statement that democratic governance involves developing leadership and people management that promotes diversity as a guiding principle that enforce inclusive practice. 63.9% strongly agreed that democratic governance collaborate with others in order to strengthen its capacity and focus on issues

of social equity, 62.0% agreed that in democratic governance there should be communications that ensure the voices of people who are marginalized are heard, 45.8% disagreed that social equity is addressed in all leadership and management training in a democratic governance, 75.3% agreed that each country has a plan to address unjustifiable and under-representation while 40.4% disagreed that the employment of people with disabilities is promoted across all the counties.

The overall mean of the responses was 3.82 which indicates that majority of the respondents agreed with the statements on social equity. The standard deviation of 0.76 indicates that the responses were closely varied. This study is consistent with that of (Fraser-Moleketi, 2012) that social equity is concerned with preparedness in terms of knowledge, skills, and institutional competence to restore and boost a mood of confidence, which would motivate people, as well as partner countries and other stakeholders to follow the government lead. De Vries & Kim, (2011) also observes that public service professionalism is a critical pillar for democratic governance and a crucial ingredient to democratic governance.

Objective 5 Legal Framework

In this study, legal framework was measured by 7 statements. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5; where 1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree and 5= Strongly Agree. The analysis is on Table 4.4.6.

Table 4.4.6: Descriptive Statistics on Legal Framework

Statements	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Mean	Std. Dev
The primary source of legislation on devolution is the Constitution of Kenya.	3.9%	4.6%	8.4%	24.7%	58.4%	2.69	1.22
Devolution Legal Framework Provides for public participation in the conduct of the activities of the county assembly	0.0%	0.0%	10.8%	63.9%	25.3%	4.14	0.59
Devolution Legal Framework Provides for the mechanism for capacity building requirements of the national government and the county governments	14.5%	18.1%	4.2%	59.6%	3.6%	3.20	1.21
Devolution Legal Framework Provides for the establishment of an administrative and institutional framework at the national, county and decentralized units to ensure access to national government services in all parts of the Republic	0.0%	1.8%	13.9%	66.3%	18.1%	4.08	0.62
Devolution legal framework promotes responsiveness to citizens needs and aspirations	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	28.9%	71.1%	4.71	0.46
Devolution legal framework engenders legitimacy of governance structures and systems	0.0%	34.9%	12.7%	42.8%	9.6%	3.27	1.05
Devolution legal framework enhances national and county governance transparency	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	62.0%	38.0%	4.38	0.49
Average						3.78	0.80

The results show that 58.4 % agreed with the statement that the primary source of legislation on devolution is the Constitution of Kenya, 63.9% strongly agreed that devolution Legal Framework Provides for public participation in the conduct of the activities of the county assembly, 59.6% agreed that Devolution Legal Framework Provides for the mechanism for capacity building requirements of the national government and the county governments, 66.3% agreed that Devolution Legal Framework Provides for the establishment of an administrative and institutional framework at the national, county and decentralized units to ensure access to national government services in all parts of the Republic, 71.1% agreed that Devolution legal framework promotes responsiveness to citizens needs and aspirations, 42.8% agreed that Devolution legal framework engenders legitimacy of governance structures and systems while 62.0% agreed that Devolution legal framework enhances national and county governance transparency. The overall mean of the responses was 3.78 which indicates that majority of the respondents agreed with the statements on legal framework. The standard deviation of 0.80 indicates that the responses were closely varied. This study is consistent with that of Ochieng (2012) which observed that the adoption of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 fundamentally alters the governance through far reaching reforms. Of these, devolution of political power, responsibilities and resources have the most profound and transformative impact on governance and management of resources (Ochieng, 2012).

Moderating Effect

Political Interests

In this study, political interest was measured by 6 statements. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5; where 1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree and 5= Strongly Agree. The analysis is on Table 4.4.7.

Table 4.4.7: Descriptive Statistics on Political Interests

Statements	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Mean	Std. Dev
Budget allocation in my county is done in good time	0.0%	0.0%	5.4%	65.7%	28.9%	4.23	0.54
Budget allocation to my county is usually sufficient	4.8%	51.8%	19.3%	24.1%	0.0%	2.63	0.90
Budgeting process in my county does not take long to complete	0.0%	19.3%	0.0%	75.9%	4.8%	3.66	0.84
My county has the requisite skills and expertise	9.6%	45.8%	9.6%	34.9%	0.0%	2.70	1.05
My county has a policy on staff recruitment, promotions, development and discipline	15.7%	50.6%	9.6%	24.1%	0.0%	2.42	1.02
My county has a code of conduct to regulate staff behavior	0.0%	0.0%	9.6%	66.3%	24.1%	4.14	0.56
Average						3.30	0.82

The results show that 65.7% agreed with the statement that Budget allocation their county was done in good time, 51.8% disagreed that budget allocation to their county was usually sufficient, 75.9% agreed that budgeting process in their county did not take long to complete, 45.8% disagreed that their county had the prerequisite skills and

expertise, 50.6% disagreed that their county had a policy on staff recruitment, promotions, development and discipline, while 66.3% agreed that their county had a code of conduct to regulate staff behavior. The overall mean of the responses was 3.30 which indicates that majority of the respondents agreed with the statements on political interest. The standard deviation of 0.82 indicates that the responses were closely varied.

Dependent Variable

Democratic Governance

In this study, democratic governance was measured by 6 statements. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5; where 1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4= Agree and 5= Strongly Agree. The analysis is on Table 4.4.8

Table 4.4.8: Descriptive Statistics on Democratic Governance

Statements	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Mean	Std. Dev
Transparency has improved under the devolved system	16.3%	20.5%	4.8%	58.4%	0.0%	3.05	1.20
Accountability has improved under the devolved system	0.0%	0.0%	15.7%	65.1%	19.3%	4.04	0.59
Legitimacy of governments has been enhanced by the devolved system	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	24.7%	75.3%	4.75	0.43
Political Leaders are accountable in my county	0.0%	39.8%	14.5%	45.8%	0.0%	3.06	0.93
Processes and institutions are more transparent in my county	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	65.1%	34.9%	4.35	0.48
Responsiveness to citizen's needs has improved under devolved system	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	84.9%	15.1%	4.15	0.36
Average						3.90	0.67

The results show that 58.4% agreed with the statement that transparency has improved under the devolved system. This finding is in congruence with the conclusions of Devas and Grant (2003) that devolution is a desirable phenomenon as the closer proximity of devolved governments to the citizenry increases transparency in the way local resources are used. This is due to strengthened downward accountability mechanisms, resulting to a decrease in corrupt practices.

Among the respondents, 84.4% agreed that accountability has improved under the devolved system. This can be attributed to the proximity of the leaders to the citizens and the public participation by citizens on the various financial budgets, bills and related decisions by the County Government. 100% of the respondents agreed that legitimacy of governments has been enhanced by the devolved system. This can be attributed to the proximity of the executive to the citizens, where the leaders can be accessed by the citizens. 45.8% agreed that Political Leaders were accountable in their county, 65.1% agreed that processes and institutions were more transparent in their county, while 84.9% agreed that responsiveness to citizen's needs had improved under devolved system. The overall mean of the responses was 3.90 which indicates that majority of the respondents agreed with the statements on democratic governance. Democratic governance therefore was found to be enhanced by devolution in many respects by the respondents.

These responses are in concurrence with Bay (2011), who observed that governments at sub-national levels are increasingly pursuing participatory mechanisms in a bid to improve governance and service delivery. The citizen participation is categorized into vote and voice. Vote entails the means through which citizens select their representatives

at the local level. This is facilitated by devolution through putting in place structures that allow citizens to exercise their voting power with limited hindrance from the central government. Kauzya (2007) observes that voice is where citizens have the opportunity to influence the making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of decisions that concern their socioeconomic and political wellbeing and to demand accountability from their local leadership. The standard deviation of 0.67 indicates that the responses were closely varied.

4.5 Factor Analysis

Factor analysis was used to summarize data to be more manageable without losing any important information and therefore making it easier to test hypothesis (Field, 2009; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). There are three main reasons for using factor analysis (Field, 2009) to develop a scale to measure PP legal framework implementation, reduce the variables to a manageable size and to have a better understanding of the variables. According to Cooper and Schindler (2008), factor analysis is a technique used for specific computational techniques. These factors, also called latent variables, aim to measure things that are usually hard to measure directly, such as attitudes and feelings (Field, 2009). It is a way of explaining the relationship among variables by combining them into smaller factors (Coakes & Steed, 2001; Zikumnd, 2003).

The scales usually start with many questions, and then by using factor analysis are reduced to smaller number (Pallant, 2007). The reduced results are then used for other analysis such as multiple regression analysis. Factors are a smaller set of underlying composite dimensions of all the variables in the data set while loadings are the correlation coefficients between the variables and the factors (Mugenda & Mugenda,

2012). Factor loading assume values between zero and one of which loadings of below 0.30 are considered weak and unacceptable (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008).

The KMO statistics vary between 0 and 1 (Babbie, (2004). A value of zero indicates that the sum of partial correlation is large relative to the sum of correlations indicating diffusions in the patterns of correlations, and hence, factor analysis is likely to be inappropriate (Costello & Osborne, 2005). A value close to 1 indicates that the patterns of correlations are relatively compact and so factor analysis should yield distinct and reliable factors (Cooper & Schindler, 2011).

According to Kaiser (1974), factor loading values that are greater than 0.4 should be accepted and values below 0.4 should lead to correction of more data to help researcher to determine the values to include. Values between 0.5 and 0.7 are mediocre, values between 0.7 and 0.8 are good, values between 0.8 and 0.9 are great, and values above 0.9 are superb. The study therefore used sub variables with values of 0.4 and above and dropped those with the values below 0.4. Table 4.5.1 shows the set of sub variables under the variable decentralized units that had factor loadings. All the sub variables with values more than 0.4 were accepted. The Kaiser-Mayor Olkins measures of sampling adequacy in Appendix III (i) showed the value of test statistic of 0.740 which showed a high partial correlation and that factor analysis was appropriate.

Table 4.5.1: Factor Loading for the Construct Decentralized Units

Statements	Factor Analysis
Decentralized units have improved proximity to public services	0.664
Decentralized units have enhanced timely access to services	0.595
In order for devolution to function as expected, there are several structures that need to be set up including the office of the Governor, County Assembly, County Public Service Board, and the Senate	0.655
Devolution may create or strengthen of independent units or tiers of Government	0.892
Devolution describes an inter-organizational pattern of power relationship.	0.795
Devolved unit need to be given autonomy and independence without direct control of centre government	0.717
The local level units must have clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries to exercise authority and perform public functions	0.755
The devolved units should act on its own, not under hierarchical supervision of the Central Government	0.431
Devolved entities permit to establish and manage their own budgetary, evaluation system and monitoring	0.413

Table 4.5.2 shows the set of sub variables under the variable Capacity building. All the sub variables had values more than 0.4 and therefore they were accepted and thus no sub variable was drop dropped. The Kaiser-Meyer Oklin measures of sampling adequacy in Appendix III (ii) showed the value of test statistic of 0.749 which showed a high partial correlation and that factor analysis was appropriate.

Table 4.5.2: Factor Loading for the Construct Capacity Building

Statements	Factor Analysis
Capacity building is a recognition that organizations need to build management systems as well as programs.	0.514
Seminars, workshops, are mode of capacity building used by almost all democratic institutions in Kenya	0.602
Training, Access to on-line data, documentation, and information on specific Capacity building facilitate democratic governance	0.662
Capacity building is associated with activities designed to increase the competence and effectiveness of individuals and organizations	0.593
Capacity building broadens the participation for the masses and becomes a prerequisite for democracy deepening.	0.636
Developing a capacity building plan is to set objectives and indicators to show expected progress over a particular timeframe.	0.761

Table 4.5.3 shows sub variables under the variable Public participation, that had factor loadings greater than 0.4 and were accepted for analysis. All the sub variables had values more than 0.4 and therefore they were accepted and thus no sub variable was drop dropped. The Kaiser-MayorOklin measures of sampling adequacy in Appendix III (iii) showed the value of test statistic of 0.769 which showed a high partial correlation and that factor analysis was appropriate.

Table 4.5.3: Factor Loading for the Construct Public Participation

Statements	Factor Analysis
Effective public participation allows the public's values to be identified and incorporated into decisions that ultimately affect them	0.701
Public participation ought to be appropriately legislated to operationalize its key objectives	0.791
Public participation encompass an open, accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities exchange views on the development and operation of services that affect their lives	0.773
Public participation is an indication of awareness of social capital as critical governance variable that guides towards critical understanding, fostering and guiding development	0.808
Public participation includes the promise that the public's contribution will influence the decision	0.517
Public participation promotes sustainable decisions by recognizing and communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including decision-making agencies	0.763

Table 4.5.4 shows sub variables under the variable social equity, that had factor loadings greater than 0.4 and were accepted for analysis. All the sub variables had values more than 0.4 and therefore they were accepted and thus no sub variable was drop dropped. The Kaiser-Mayor Oklin measures of sampling adequacy in Appendix III (iv) showed the value of test statistic of 0.852 which showed a high partial correlation and that factor analysis was appropriate.

Table 4.5.4: Factor Loading for the Construct social equity

Statements	Factor Analysis
Democratic governance involves developing leadership and people management that promotes diversity as a guiding principle that enforce inclusive practice	0.59
Democratic governance collaborate with others in order to strengthen its capacity and focus on issues of social equity	0.629
In democratic governance there should be communications that ensure the voices of people who are marginalized are heard	0.478
Social equity is addressed in all leadership and management training in a democratic governance	0.833
The employment of people with disabilities is promoted across all the counties	0.482

Table 4.5.5 shows sub variables under the variable Legal Framework, that had factor loadings greater than 0.4 and were accepted for analysis. All the sub variables had values more than 0.4 and therefore they were accepted and thus no sub variable was drop dropped. The Kaiser-MayorOklin measures of sampling adequacy in Appendix III (v) showed the value of test statistic of 0.831 which showed a high partial correlation and that factor analysis was appropriate.

Table 4.5.5: Factor Loading for the Construct Legal Framework

Statements	Factor Analysis
The primary source of legislation on devolution is the Constitution of Kenya.	0.789
Devolution Legal Framework Provides for public participation in the conduct of the activities of the county assembly	0.618
Devolution Legal Framework Provides for the mechanism for capacity building requirements of the national government and the county governments	0.735
Devolution Legal Framework Provides for the establishment of an administrative and institutional framework at the national, county and decentralized units to ensure access to national government services in all parts of the Republic	0.513
Devolution legal framework promotes responsiveness to citizens needs and aspirations	0.725
Devolution legal framework engenders legitimacy of governance structures and systems	0.715
Devolution legal framework enhances national and county governance transparency	0.564
Devolution legal framework enhances accountability at the national and county levels of government	0.816
Devolution Legal Framework Provides for promotion of respect for the diversity of the people and communities of Kenya	0.791
Devolution Legal Framework guarantees the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law	0.654

Table 4.5.6 shows sub variables under the variable Political Interest, that had factor loadings greater than 0.4 and were accepted for analysis. All the sub variables had values more than 0.4 and therefore they were accepted and thus no sub variable was drop dropped. The Kaiser-MayorOklin measures of sampling adequacy in Appendix III (vi) showed the value of test statistic of 0.885 which showed a high partial correlation and that factor analysis was appropriate.

Table 4.5.6: Factor Loading for the Construct Political Interest

Statements	Factor Analysis
Budget allocation in my county is done in good time	0.707
Budget allocation to my county is usually sufficient	0.872
Budgeting process in my county is does not take long to complete	0.753
My county has the perquisite skills and expertise	0.924
My county has a policy on staff recruitment, promotions, development and discipline	0.744
My county has a code of conduct to regulate staff behavior	0.523

Table 4.5.7 shows sub variables under the variable democratic governance, that had factor loadings greater than 0.4 and were accepted for analysis. All the sub variables had values more than 0.4 and therefore they were accepted and thus no sub variable was drop dropped. The Kaiser-MayorOklin measures of sampling adequacy in Appendix III (vi) showed the value of test statistic of 0.740 which showed a high partial correlation and that factor analysis was appropriate.

Table 4.5.7: Factor loading for the Construct democratic governance

Statements	Factor Analysis
Transparency has improved under the devolved system	0.583
Accountability has improved under the devolved system	0.536
Legitimacy of governments has been enhanced by the devolved system	0.78
Political Leaders are accountable in my county	0.487
Processes and institutions are more transparent in my county	0.471
Responsiveness to citizen's needs has improved under devolved system	0.494

4.6 Statistical Modeling

4.6.1 Decentralized Units

Scatter Plot of Decentralized Units and Democratic Governance

A visual examination of scatter plot indicates a positive linear relationship between decentralized units and democratic governance. This implies that an improvement in decentralized units leads to improvement in democratic governance




Figure 4.6.1: Scatter Plot of Decentralized Units and Democratic Governance

The Pearson's r correlation between decentralized units and democratic governance is 0.333. This means that there is a weak relationship between the two variables. It means the changes in one variable in one variable are weakly correlated to change in the second variable since 0.333 is not close to one. 0.333 is however positive therefore an increase in one value leads to increase of the other. There is a statistical significance between decentralized units and democratic governance (p=0.000).

Table 4.6.1: Correlation between Decentralized Units and Democratic Governance

		Democratic Governance	Decentralized Units
Democratic Governance	Pearson Correlation	1	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		
Decentralized units	Pearson Correlation	.333**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Fitness of Model

The fitness of model explains the relationship between decentralized units and democratic governance. Decentralized units were found to be satisfactory variable in determining democratic governance. This was supported by the coefficient of determination also known as the R-square of 0.111. This means that decentralized units explains 11.11% of the variations in the dependent variable. These results further mean that the model applied to link the relationship of the variables was satisfactory.

Table: 4.6.2: Model Fitness

Model	Coefficient
R	0.333
R Square	0.111
Adjusted R Square	0.106
Std. Error of the Estimate	0.35247

The ANOVA results indicate F statistic of 20.49 which was greater than f critical of 5.8 implying that the model was statistically significant. Further, the results imply that the independent variable, decentralized units was a good predictor of democratic governance. This was also supported by the reported $p=0.00$ which was less than the conventional probability of 0.05 significance level.

Table 4.6.3: Analysis of Variance

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	2.546	1	2.546	20.49	.000
Residual	20.375	164	0.124		
Total	22.921	165			

Table 4.6.4 results revealed a positive relationship between decentralized units and democratic governance ($\beta =0.240$). The relationship was also significant at 5% level of significance ($P\text{-value}=0.000$). This finding implied that an improvement in decentralized units by one unit led to a 0.240-unit improvement in democratic governance.

Table 4.6.4: Regression Coefficient

	B	Std. Error	beta	t	Sig
(Constant)	3.445	0.220		15.649	0.000
Decentralized Units	0.240	0.053	0.333	4.527	0.000

The specific model is;

$$\text{Democratic Governance} = 3.445 + 0.240 X_1$$

Where

X_1 = Decentralized Units

Hypothesis Testing

The hypothesis was tested by using the linear regression (table 4.6.4). The acceptance/rejection criteria were that, if the p value is less than 0.05, the H_0 is not rejected but if it's greater than 0.05, the H_0 fails to be accepted. Based on this objective and literature review, the following alternative hypothesis was formulated for testing.

H_1 : Decentralized units has an influence on democratic governance.

Results in Table 4.6.4 show that the p-value was $0.000 < 0.05$. This indicated that the alternative hypothesis was not rejected hence decentralized units has positive and significant influence on democratic governance.

This study is consistent with that of Munoz, Acosta & Moreno, (2006) which observes that devolved governance improves the political involvement of the people in public decision making, and to strengthen democracy and spur the country's development efforts. Devolved units, under the framework of law of autonomy and decentralization exists to achieve the goal of "the effective participation of citizens in decision making,

the deepening of democracy, the satisfaction of collective necessities, and the integral socioeconomic development of the Country. Romeo & Spyckerelle, (2003) observes that devolved governance is being preferred in order to strengthen and expand democracy by devolving it downwards to the local level. Devolved units strengthen public accountability, and improve service delivery and government effectiveness.

4.6.2 Public Participation

Scatter Plot of Public Participation and Democratic Governance

A visual examination of scatter plot indicates a positive linear relationship between public participation and democratic governance. This implies that an improvement in public participation leads to improvement in democratic governance.




Figure 4.6.2: Scatter Plot of Public Participation and Democratic Governance

The Pearson's r correlation between public participation and democratic governance is 0.386. This means that there is a weak relationship between the two variables. It means the changes in one variable is weakly correlated to change in the second variable since 0.386 is not close to one. 0.386 is however positive therefore an increase in one value leads to increase of the other. There is a statistical significance between public participation and democratic governance (p=0.000).

Table 4.6.5: Correlation between Public Participation and Democratic Governance

		Democratic Governance	Public Participation
Democratic Governance	Pearson Correlation	1.000	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000
Public Participation	Pearson Correlation	.386**	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Fitness of Model

The fitness of model explains the relationship between public participation and democratic governance. Public participation was found to be satisfactory variables in determining democratic governance. This was supported by the coefficient of determination also known as the R-square of 0.149. This means that decentralized units explains 14.9% of the variations in the dependent variable. These results further mean that the model applied to link the relationship of the variables was satisfactory.

Table 4.6.6: Model Fitness

Model	Coefficient
R	0.386
R Square	0.149
Adjusted R Square	0.144
Std. Error of the Estimate	0.34486

The ANOVA results indicate F statistic of 28.729 which was greater than f critical of 5.8 implying that the model was statistically significant. Further, the results imply that the independent variable, public participation was a good predictor of democratic governance. This was also supported by the reported $p=0.00$ which was less than the conventional probability of 0.05 significance level.

Table 4.6.7: Analysis of Variance

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	3.417	1	3.417	28.729	.000
Residual	19.504	164	0.119		
Total	22.921	165			

Table 4.6.7 results revealed a positive relationship between public participation and democratic governance ($\beta =0.370$). The relationship was also significant at 5% level of significance ($P\text{-value}=0.000$). This finding implied that an improvement in public participation by one unit led to a 0.370-unit improvement in decentralized units.

Table 4.6.8: Regression Coefficient

	B	Std. Error	beta	t	sig
(Constant)	2.758	0.314		8.783	0.000
Public Participation	0.370	0.069	0.386	5.360	0.000

The specific model is;

$$\text{Democratic Governance} = 2.758 + 0.370 X_1$$

Where;

X_1 = Public Participation

Hypothesis Testing

The hypothesis was tested by using the linear regression (table 4.6.7). The acceptance/rejection criteria were that, if the p value is less than 0.05, the H_1 is not rejected but if it's greater than 0.05, the H_1 fails to be accepted.

Based on this objective and literature review, the following alternative hypothesis was formulated for testing.

H_1 : Public participation has an influence on democratic governance

Results in Table 4.6.11 show that the p-value was $0.000 < 0.05$. This indicated that the alternative hypothesis was not rejected hence public participation has an influence on democratic governance.

This study is consistent with that of Cele (2015) who posits that public participation encompass an open, accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities can exchange views and influence decision making. As such, the

process includes engaging people, deciding, planning and playing an active part in the development and operation of services that affect their lives.

4.6.3 Capacity Building

Scatter Plot of Capacity Building and Democratic Governance

A visual examination of scatter plot indicates a positive linear relationship between capacity building and democratic governance. This implies that an improvement in capacity building leads to improvement in democratic governance




Figure 4.6.3: Scatter Plot of Capacity Building and Democratic Governance

The Pearson's r correlation between capacity building and democratic governance is 0.295. This means that there is a weak relationship between the two variables. It means the change in one variable is weakly correlated to change in the second variable since 0.295 is not close to one. 0.295 is however positive therefore an increase in one value leads to increase of the other. There is a statistical significance between capacity building and democratic governance (p=0.000).

Table 4.6.9: Correlation between Public Participation and Democratic Governance

		Democratic Governance	Capacity building
Democratic Governance	Pearson Correlation	1	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		
Capacity building	Pearson Correlation	.295**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Fitness of Model

The fitness of model explains the relationship between capacity building and democratic governance. Capacity building was found to be satisfactory variables in determining democratic governance. This was supported by the coefficient of determination also known as the R-square of 0.087. This means that capacity building explains 8.1% of the variations in the dependent variable. These results further mean that the model applied to link the relationship of the variables was satisfactory.

Table 4.6.10: Model Fitness

Model	Coefficient
R	0.295
R Square	0.087
Adjusted R Square	0.081
Std. Error of the Estimate	0.35722

The ANOVA results indicate F statistic of 15.620 which was greater than f critical of 5.8 implying that the model was statistically significant. Further, the results imply that the independent variable, capacity building was a good predictor of democratic governance. This was also supported by the reported $p=0.00$ which was less than the conventional probability of 0.05 significance level.

Table 4.6.11: Analysis of Variance

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	1.993	1	1.993	15.620	.000
Residual	20.927	164	0.128		
Total	22.921	165			

Table 4.6.11 results revealed a positive relationship between capacity building and democratic governance ($\beta =0.203$). The relationship was also significant at 5% level of significance ($P\text{-value}=0.000$). This finding implied that an improvement in decentralized units by one unit led to a 0.240-unit improvement in democratic governance.

Table 4.6.12: Regression Coefficient

	B	Std. Error	beta	t	sig
(Constant)	3.587	0.216		16.604	0.000
Capacity Building	0.203	0.051	0.295	3.952	0.000

The specific model is;

$$\text{Democratic Governance} = 3.587 + 0.203 X_1$$

Where X_1 = Capacity Building

Hypothesis Testing

The hypothesis was tested by using the linear regression (table 4.6.12). The acceptance/rejection criteria were that, if the p value is less than 0.05, the H_0 is not rejected but if it's greater than 0.05, the H_0 fails to be accepted. Based on this objective and literature review, the following alternative hypothesis was formulated for testing.

H_1 : Capacity building has an influence on democratic governance

Results in Table 4.6.11 show that the p-value was $0.000 < 0.05$. This indicated that the alternative hypothesis was not rejected hence capacity building has an influence on democratic governance.

This study is consistent with that of (Fraser-Moleketi, 2012) that capacity building promotes professionalism in governance, which is critical, not only in fending off catastrophes and effectively responding to winds of change, but also the threats to smooth integrity and governance values such as populism and corruption.

4.6.4 Social Equity

Scatter Plot of Social Equity and Democratic Governance

A visual examination of scatter plot indicates a positive linear relationship between social equity and democratic governance. This implies that an improvement in social equity leads to improvement in democratic governance.




Figure 4.6.4: Scatter Plot of Social Equity and Democratic Governance

The Pearson's r correlation between social equity and democratic governance is 0.601. This means that there is a strong relationship between the two variables. It means the changes in one variable is strongly correlated to change in the second variable since 0.601 is close to one. 0.601 is positive therefore an increase in one value leads to

increase of the other. There is a statistical significance between social equity and democratic governance (p=0.000).

Table 4.6.13: Correlation between Public Participation and Democratic Governance

		Democratic Governance	Social Equity
Democratic Governance	Pearson Correlation	1	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		
Social Equity	Pearson Correlation	.601**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Fitness of Model

The fitness of model explains the relationship between social equity and democratic governance. Social equity was found to be satisfactory variables in determining democratic governance. This was supported by the coefficient of determination also known as the R-square of 0.362. This means that social equity explains 36.2% of the variations in the dependent variable. These results further mean that the model applied to link the relationship of the variables was satisfactory.

Table 4.6.14: Model Fitness

Model	Coefficient
R	0.601
R Square	0.362
Adjusted R Square	0.358
Std. Error of the Estimate	0.29870

The ANOVA results indicate F statistic of 15.620 which was greater than f critical of 5.8 implying that the model was statistically significant. Further, the results imply that the independent variable, social equity was a good predictor of democratic governance. This was also supported by the reported $p=0.00$ which was less than the conventional probability of 0.05 significance level.

Table 4.6.15: Analysis of Variance

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	8.289	1	8.289	92.901	.000
Residual	14.632	164	0.089		
Total	22.921	165			

Table 4.6.15 results revealed a positive relationship between social equity and democratic governance ($\beta=0.512$). The relationship was also significant at 5% level of significance (P-value=0.000). This finding implied that an improvement in social equity by one unit led to a 0.512-unit improvement in social equity.

Table 4.6.16: Regression Coefficient

	B	Std. Error	beta	t	sig
(Constant)	2.477	0.204		12.117	0.000
Social Equity	0.512	0.053	0.601	9.638	0.000

The specific model is;

$$\text{Democratic Governance} = 2.477 + 0.512 X_1$$

Where;

X_1 = Social Equity

Hypothesis Testing

The hypothesis was tested by using the linear regression (table 4.6.16). The acceptance/rejection criteria were that, if the p value is less than 0.05, the H_1 is not rejected but if it's greater than 0.05, the H_1 fails to be accepted.

Based on this objective and literature review, the following alternative hypothesis was formulated for testing.

H_1 : Social Equity has a positive influence on democratic governance

Results in Table 4.6.16 show that the p-value was $0.000 < 0.05$. This indicated that the alternative hypothesis was not rejected hence social equity has a positive influence on democratic governance.

This study is consistent with that of (Fraser-Moleketi, 2012) that social equity is concerned with preparedness in terms of knowledge, skills, and institutional competence to restore and boost a mood of confidence, which would motivate people, as well as partner countries and other stakeholders to follow the government lead. De Vries & Kim, (2011) also observes that public service professionalism is a critical pillar for democratic governance and a crucial ingredient to democratic governance.

4.6.4 Legal Framework

Scatter Plot of Legal Framework and Democratic Governance

A visual examination of scatter plot indicates a positive linear relationship between legal framework and democratic governance. This implies that an improvement in legal framework leads to improvement in democratic governance.




Figure 4.6.5: Scatter Plot of Legal Framework and Democratic Governance

The Pearson's r correlation between legal framework and democratic governance is 0.276. This means that there is a weak relationship between the two variables. It means the changes in one variable is weakly correlated to change in the second variable since 0.386 is not close to one. 0.276 is however positive therefore an increase in one value leads to increase of the other. There is a statistical significance between public participation and democratic governance ($p=0.000$).

Table 4.6.17: Correlation between Public Participation and Democratic Governance

		Democratic Governance	Legal Framework
Democratic Governance	Pearson Correlation	1	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		
Legal Framework	Pearson Correlation	.276**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Fitness of Model

The fitness of model explains the relationship between legal framework and democratic governance. Legal framework was found to be satisfactory variables in determining democratic governance. This was supported by the coefficient of determination also known as the R-square of 0.076. This means that legal framework explains 7.6% of the variations in the dependent variable. These results further mean that the model applied to link the relationship of the variables was satisfactory.

Table 4.6.18: Model Fitness

Model	Coefficient
R	0.276
R Square	0.076
Adjusted R Square	0.071
Std. Error of the Estimate	0.5928

The ANOVA results indicate F statistic of 13.565 which was greater than f critical of 5.8 implying that the model was statistically significant. Further, the results imply that the independent variable, legal framework was a good predictor of democratic governance. This was also supported by the reported p=0.00 which was less than the conventional probability of 0.05 significance level.

Table 4.6.19: Analysis of Variance

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	1.751	1	1.751	13.565	.000
Residual	21.170	164	0.129		
Total	22.921	165			

Table 4.6.19 results revealed a positive relationship between legal framework and democratic governance ($\beta=0.344$). The relationship was also significant at 5% level of significance (P-value=0.000). This finding implied that an improvement in legal framework by one unit led to a 0.240-unit improvement in decentralized units.

Table 4.6.20: Regression Coefficient

	B	Std. Error	beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	2.975	0.397		7.488	0.000
Legal Framework	0.344	0.093	0.276	3.683	0.000

The specific model is;

$$\text{Democratic Governance} = 2.975 + 0.344 X_1$$

Where;

X_1 = Legal Framework

Hypothesis Testing

The hypothesis was tested by using the linear regression (table 4.6.20). The acceptance/rejection criteria were that, if the p value is less than 0.05, the H_{05} is not rejected but if it's greater than 0.05, the H_i fails to be accepted. Based on this objective and literature review, the following alternative hypothesis was formulated for testing.

H_{05} : Legal framework has a positive influence on democratic governance

Results in Table 4.6.20 show that the p-value was $0.000 < 0.05$. This indicated that the alternative hypothesis was not rejected hence legal framework has a positive and significant influence on democratic governance. This study is consistent with that of Ochieng, (2012) that the adoption of the constitution of Kenya 2010 fundamentally alter the governance through far reaching reforms. Of these, devolution of political power, responsibilities and resources have the most profound and transformative impact on governance and management of resources. (2012).

4.7 Test for Multicollinearity

A situation in which there is a high degree of association between independent variables is said to be a problem of multi-collinearity which results into large standard errors of the coefficients associated with the affected variables. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2012), multi-collinearity can occur in multiple regression models in which some of the independent variables are significantly correlated among themselves.

In a regression model that best fits the data, independent variables correlate highly with dependent variables but correlate, at most, minimally with each other. This problem is solved by ensuring that there is a large enough sample as multi-collinearity is not known

to exist in large samples. Multi-collinearity can also be solved by deleting one of the highly correlated variables and re-computing the regression equation (Lind & Van den Bos 2002).

Table 4.7.1: Correlation Analysis

		Democratic Governance	Decentral ized units	Capacity building	Public Participation	Social Equity	Legal Framework
Democratic Governance	Pearson Correlation	1.000					
	Sig. (2-tailed)						
Decentralized units	Pearson Correlation	.333**	1.000				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000					
Capacity building	Pearson Correlation	.295**	.464**	1.000			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000				
Public Participation	Pearson Correlation	.386**	.198*	.212**	1.000		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.011	0.006			
Social Equity	Pearson Correlation	.601**	0.006	-0.083	0.052	1.000	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.938	0.290	0.502		
Legal Framework	Pearson Correlation	.276**	.339**	0.059	-0.054	.325**	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.448	0.492	0.000	

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Collinearity statistics (Table 4.7.1) indicated a Pearson Correlation < 0.8 , an indication that the variables were not highly correlated, hence no existence of Multicollinearity. This is an indication of the suitability of the variables for multiple regression.

4.8 Regression Analysis

4.8.1 Regression model before moderation

A regression model was first run before moderation. Regression of coefficients results is shown in table 4.8.1. The independent variables were found to be satisfactory variables in determining democratic governance. This was supported by the coefficient of determination also known as the R-square of 0.589. This means the independent variables under this study explain 58.9% of the variations in the dependent variable which is the democratic governance. These results further mean that the model applied to link the relationship of the variables was satisfactory.

The results indicate F statistic of 45.922 which was greater than f critical implying that the model was statistically significant. Further, the results imply that the independent variables were good predictors of democratic governance. This was also supported by the reported $p=0.00$ which was less than the conventional probability of 0.05 significance level.

Table 4.8.1: Regression of Coefficients before moderation

	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.
Decentralized Units	0.122	0.045	0.17	2.736	0.007
Capacity Building	0.140	0.04	0.204	3.503	0.001
Public Participation	0.268	0.051	0.28	5.287	0.000
Social Equity	0.505	0.046	0.593	10.905	0.000
Legal Framework	0.106	0.072	0.290	4.950	0.002
R2=0.589					
F- Statistic (p value) = 45.922 (.000)					

Regression of coefficients results in table 4.8.1 shows that decentralized units positively and significantly influence democratic governance ($\beta=0.122$, $p=0.007$). The table indicates that capacity building positively and significantly influence democratic governance ($\beta=0.140$, $p=0.001$). It was also established that public participation positively and significantly influences democratic governance ($\beta=0.268$, $p=0.000$). The table also indicates that social equity positively and significantly influence democratic governance ($\beta=0.505$, $p=0.000$). The table further indicates that legal framework positively and significantly influence democratic governance ($\beta=0.106$, $p=0.002$)

$$\text{Democratic Governance} = 0.048 + 0.505X_1 + 0.268X_2 + 0.140X_3 + 0.122X_4 + 0.106X_5$$

Where;

X_1 = Social Equity

X_2 = Public Participation

X_3 = Capacity Building

X₄= Decentralized Units

X₅= Legal Framework

4.8.2 Moderating Effect of Political Interest

The sixth objective of the study was to assess the moderating effect of political interests in the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance.

H₀₆: there is a moderating effect of political interest in the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance.

A regression analysis was done to determine the effect that political interests has on the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance. The variable devolution framework intersection political interests (X* X₆) was computed and used in the regression model $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 M + \beta_3 X * X_6$

Table 4.8.2 showed R² value of 0.802. The R² value of 0.802 implied that 80.2% of the variation in the dependent variable democratic governance was explained by the variation of the model (independent variables) under the influence of the moderating variable (political interest). The ANOVA results showed an F statistic with significance level of 0.000. This showed that the coefficients in the equation fitted were not equal to zero implying a good fit.

The results of coefficients that were used to generate the line, $Y = -11.68 + -0.91 X_1 * X_5 + 3.351 X_1 + 4.468 X_2$ showed that the coefficient of democratic factors intersection was significant since it had a p-value of 0.000 which was less than 0.05 as shown on Table 4.8.2. Since the coefficient of X₁*X₆ was significant, it implied that the political interest

had a moderating effect on the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance.

Table 4.8.2: Regression of Coefficients after moderation

	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.
(Constant)	-11.68	1.699		-6.873	0.000
X	3.351	0.432	15.226	7.759	0.000
Political Interests	4.468	0.464	4.172	9.623	0.000
Interaction term	-0.91	0.118	-15.956	-7.716	0.000
R ² =0.802					
F- Statistic (p value) = 219.248 (0.000)					
Dependent Variable: Democratic Governance					

4.9 Summary of Results of Hypotheses Test


The results of the regression analysis indicated that all the six alternative hypotheses were confirmed. In order of influence of devolution framework on democratic governance process in Kenya, the study established the following ranking: Social Equity; Public Participation; Capacity Building; Decentralized Units and Legal Framework. Table 4.9.1 summarizes the outcome of the research hypothesis testing.

Table 4.9.1: Summary of the Results

Objective No	Objective	Hypothesis	Rule	p-value	Comment
Objective 1	To establish the influence of decentralized units on enhancing democratic governance	H₀₁: Decentralized units has an influence on the democratic governance in Kenya	Accept H₁ if p value <0.05	p<0.05	The Alternative hypothesis was accepted; therefore, there is a significant relationship between Decentralized units and democratic governance in Kenya
Objective 2	To establish the influence of public participation on enhancing democratic governance	H₀₂: Public participation has an influence on democratic governance in Kenya	Accept H₂ if p value <0.05	p<0.05	The Alternative hypothesis was accepted; therefore, there is a significant relationship between Decentralized units and democratic governance in Kenya
Objective 3	To determine the influence of capacity building on democratic governance	H₀₃: Capacity building has an influence on democratic governance	Accept H₃ if p value <0.05	p<0.05	The Alternative hypothesis was accepted; therefore there is a significant relationship between Decentralized units and democratic governance in Kenya
Objective 4	To establish the influence of social equity on enhancing democratic governance	H₀₄: Social equity has a significant influence on democratic governance in Kenya	Accept H₄ if p value <0.05	p<0.05	The Alternative hypothesis was accepted; therefore, there is a significant relationship between Decentralized units and democratic governance in Kenya
Objective 5	To establish the influence of legal framework in enhancing democratic governance	H₀₅: Legal framework has a significant influence on democratic governance in Kenya.	Accept H₅ if p value <0.05	p<0.05	The Alternative hypothesis was accepted; therefore there is a significant relationship between Decentralized units and democratic governance in Kenya
Objective 6	To assess the moderating effect of political interests in the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance corporations.	H₀₆: There is a moderating effect of political interest in the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance.	Accept H₆ if p value <0.05	The p value of interacti on term <0.05	The Alternative hypothesis was accepted; therefore, there is significant moderating effect of political interest in the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance.

4.10 The Optimal Model

Based on the outcomes of the requisite and inferential analysis, the following figure is the optimal model for the study. All the variables were found to be valid; none of them was rendered redundant. There was no need for revision as hypotheses were tested and all the variables statistically established to be relevant. The Optimal model is presented in the figure below.



(MV) Figure 4.10.1: Conceptual Framework

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is a summary of major findings of the study, conclusions and recommendations. The structure of the chapter is guided by the research objectives and hypotheses. An attempt is made to relate the results to the objectives of the study and hypotheses. This is followed by the main recommendations for further research as well as policy and practice.

5.2 Summary of the Findings

The main purpose of this study was empirically to examine the influence of devolution framework on democratic governance in Kenya. The data for the study was collected from various county governments using a structured self-administered questionnaire. The study target was critical officers in the implementation framework of devolution in Kenya. The County executive was represented by the governor or his representative, while the county assembly speaker represented the County assembly. The IEBC County coordinator represented the electoral agency, which is tasked with the enormous task of civic education in the country. County attorneys provided the much desired legal framework situation of the devolution framework in the counties.

5.2.1 Relationship between Decentralized Units and Democratic Governance

The first objective of the study was to establish the influence of decentralized units on enhancing democratic governance. From this first objective it was hypothesized that

decentralized units has an influence on the democratic governance in Kenya. Simple linear regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. Decentralized units was separately regressed on democratic governance. The results revealed a positive relationship with 11.1% decentralized units explaining democratic governance ($R^2=0.111$). There was a positive relationship between decentralized units and democratic governance ($\beta =0.240$). The relationship was also significant at 5% level of significance (P-value=0.000). This finding implied that an improvement in decentralized units by one unit led to a 0.240-unit improvement in democratic governance. The study supported the first hypothesis that decentralized units have an influence on the democratic governance process in Kenya.

5.2.2 Public Participation and Democratic Governance

The second objective of the study was to establish the influence of public participation on enhancing democratic governance. From this second objective it was hypothesized that public participation has an influence on democratic governance in Kenya. Simple linear regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. Public participation was separately regressed on democratic governance. The results revealed a positive relationship between public participation and democratic governance ($\beta =0.370$). The relationship was also significant at 5% level of significance (P-value=0.000). This finding implied that an improvement in public participation by one unit led to a 0.370-unit improvement in decentralized units.

5.2.3 Capacity Building and Democratic Governance

The third objective was intended to determine the influence of capacity building on democratic governance. From this third objective it was hypothesized that capacity building has an influence on democratic governance. Simple linear regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. Capacity building was separately regressed on democratic governance. The results revealed a positive relationship between capacity building and democratic governance ($\beta = 0.203$). The relationship was also significant at 5% level of significance (P-value=0.000).

5.2.4 Social Equity and Democratic Governance

The fourth objective was to establish the influence of social equity on enhancing democratic governance. Based on this objective, hypothesis four was formulated which predicted that social equity has a significant influence on democratic governance in Kenya. Simple linear regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. Public participation was separately regressed on democratic governance. The results revealed a positive relationship between social equity and democratic governance ($\beta = 0.512$). The relationship was also significant at 5% level of significance (P-value=0.000). This finding implied that an improvement in social equity by one unit led to a 0.512-unit improvement in social equity.

5.2.5 Legal Framework and Democratic Governance

The fifth objective was to establish the influence of legal framework in enhancing democratic governance. Based on this objective, hypothesis was formulated which predicted that legal framework has a significant influence on democratic governance in

Kenya. Simple linear regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. Public participation was separately regressed on democratic governance. The results established that legal framework explains 7.6% of the variations in the dependent variable. It was further found there is a positive relationship between legal framework and democratic governance ($\beta=0.344$). The relationship was also significant at 5% level of significance (P-value=0.000). This finding implied that an improvement in legal framework by one unit led to a 0.344-unit improvement in decentralized units.

5.2.6 Moderating Effect of Political Interest and the Relationship between Devolution Framework and Democratic Governance

The sixth objective was to assess the moderating effect of political interests in the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance. Based on this objective, hypothesis six was formulated which predicted that there is a moderating effect of political interest in the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance.

A regression analysis was done to determine the effect that political interests has on the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance. The result found a R^2 value of 0.802. The R^2 value of 0.802 implied that 80.2% of the variation in the dependent variable democratic governance was explained by the variation of the model independent variables under the influence of the political interest. The results of showed that the coefficient of democratic factors intersection was significant since it had a p-value of 0.000 which was less than 0.05 as. Since the coefficient of intersection was significant, it implied that the political interest had a moderating effect on the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance.

5.3 Conclusion

The main purpose of this study was to examine the influence of devolution framework on democratic governance in Kenya. The results showed that decentralized units has a positive and statistically significant effect on democratic governance. The study concluded that the improvement in decentralized units leads to a positive improvement in democratic governance. Functional devolved governments bring services closer to the people and. Efficient and effective devolved units have the potential to spur economic growth, political stability and social advancement. The overall mean of the responses was 4.11 which indicates that majority of the respondents agreed with the statements on decentralized units. Decentralized units have improved proximity to public services, enhanced timely access to services.

It was found that the relationship between Public Participation and democratic governance in Kenya was positive and significant. The results provided sufficient statistically significant evidence to signify the relationship. It can be concluded that effective public participation allows the public values to be identified and incorporated into decisions that ultimately affect the citizens. Public participation is an indication of awareness of social capital as critical governance variable that guides towards critical understanding, fostering and guiding development it promotes sustainable decisions by recognizing and communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including decision-making agencies.

The results provided sufficient statistically significant evidence to signify a positive relationship between capacity building and democratic governance. The study concludes that county governments management systems and programs strengthen capacity building is designed to increase the competence and effectiveness of individuals and county government capacity building broadens the participation for the masses and becomes a prerequisite for democracy deepening. Capacity building in governance sets the stage for efficiency and effectiveness, and becomes an essential precondition for building public trust, transparency, integrity and professionalism in democratic governance.

The results revealed a positive relationship between social equity and democratic governance. The relationship was also significant. The study concludes that through social equity democratic governance involves developing leadership and people management that promotes diversity as a guiding principle that enforce inclusive practice. Social equity is addressed in all leadership and management training in a democratic governance. Social equity is about government leadership which exercises political morality which is a critical pillar for democratic governance.

It was found that there is a positive relationship between legal framework and democratic governance. The results provided sufficient statistically significant evidence to signify the relationship. The study concludes that devolution legal framework provides for the establishment of an administrative and institutional framework at the national, county and decentralized units to ensure access to national government services in all parts promoting responsiveness to citizen's needs and aspirations.

5.4 Contribution to Knowledge

This study contributes to understanding the influence of devolution framework on democratic governance process in Kenya. It establishes the influence of decentralized units, public participation, capacity building, social equity, legal framework and the moderating effect of political interests in the relationship between devolution framework and democratic governance. The study confirms the theoretical claims that devolved units under the framework of law of autonomies and Decentralization exists to achieve the goal of “the effective participation of citizens in decision making, the deepening of democracy, the satisfaction of collective necessities, and the integral socioeconomic development of the Country (Government of Bolivia, 2010).

Devolved governance is a way of deepening democracy “and enhancing community partnerships” (Nazeef, 2004). Cele (2015) posits public participation to encompass an open, accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities can exchange views and influence decision making. As such, the process includes engaging people, deciding, planning and playing an active part in the development and operation of services that affect their lives. It is important the public participation is understood in its appropriate context. Capacity building broadens the participation for the masses and becomes a prerequisite for democracy’s survival.

Bratton et al. (2005) observes ‘absent mass participation, the door is open for autocrats to assume responsibility for governance and economic management’. For this to be realized, capacity building of the masses is critical. Chaligha et al. (2002.34) remarked thus ‘democracy can only survive and mature where citizens take active role in the

governance of their country, such as voting, contacting representatives, and taking part in community affairs”.

The current study adds to existing knowledge by confirming quality decisions on Kenya’s performance on Accountability and transparency. The democratic governance indicators of transparency, accountability, responsiveness and legitimacy, have been found in this study to related to the objects of devolution indicators of devolved units, capacity building, public participation, social equity and legal framework.

This study brings out an increased understanding that the joint effect of the study variables is greater than the individual effects. This study has contributed to existing knowledge by empirically establishing that the joint effect of capacity building, public participation, social equity and legal framework in the relationship between devolution framework on democratic governance process in Kenya is greater than the individual effect. No other study known to the researcher has attempted to do this. Most of the previous studies related to the variables in this study have been done in the developed country context, hence the findings of these studies may not be applicable to organizations in developing countries in which this study is done.

5.5 Implications of the Findings and Recommendations

Empirical research on the relationship between devolution framework on democratic governance process in Kenya had not been done prior to the present study. Literature suggests a possible existence of relationships between these variables. This study was therefore set to address this gap by determining whether or not the effect of devolution framework on democratic governance process in Kenya is not direct but rather is through devolved units, capacity building, public participation, social equity and legal

framework, and further whether political interest have moderating effect on the relationship between devolution framework on democratic governance process in Kenya. The findings of this study have a number of implications for theory, practice and policy.

5.5.1 Theoretical Implications

This study makes a contribution by confirming devolved units as positively related to democratic governance process in Kenya and further adds the finding that political interest mediates that relationship. It adds to provisions of the Neo-institutional theory which provides the setting within which organizational structures outlay the inherent technical forces, rational myths, knowledge legitimated through schooling. The theory emphasized on the core symbols of organizations, such as symbolic systems, cultural scripts and mental effects. The theory holds that these symbols shape institutional effects.

The symbols of an institution set the stage for institutional effect to be concerned with social stability, attracting attention to reproductive processes that operate as stabilizing patterns for sequences of activities that were routinely enacted (Jepperson, 1991). By embracing citizen participation, an organization attracts the attention of internal organizational logics and the heterogeneity of participation towards institutionalizing organizational behavior. This resultant process confers institutionalization its political attribute as a political exercise, with its success embedded on the relative power of the actors who strive to drive it (DiMaggio 1988).

The signature of this theory has been the development and diffusion of new modes of governance, which has rules and laws with appropriate regulations and processes to

sustain and reproduce those (Drori et al. 2006). In addition, the governance model ought to have appropriate mechanisms to resolve conflicts emerging therein as the stakeholders relate to each other (Djelic & Andersson 2006). The Kenyan model of devolved government and the role of public participation is well defined and explained in this theory and findings of this study. No public participation that can take place outside a regulated environment and at the same time, no state can make the most useful decisions of a people devoid of their participation.

The findings agree with Regulation theory that explains the axis between economic and social relations, and why institutions are established to order their interactions. The theory observes that every entity created ought to have a match between its functions, mandate, authority and accountability. This is reflected at best by the balance between agency expertise and delegated tasks therein (Baldwin & McCrudden, 1987). For the institutions to thrive, independence should be granted to them and their decision making process must be cushioned from external interference. Its officials must be recruited on merit and on a bi-partisan basis and guarantee the leaders of the agencies some security of tenure to discourage their dismissal except on grounds of misconduct (Horn 1995; Majone 1994).

Public participation thus must embrace deliberations of individuals to resolve conflicts and achieve compromises among competing interests as observed by Chapman and Shapiro (1993). The adversary theory assesses individual's development and growth as the goals of democratic theory and recognizes the need for a healthy degree of concern about the potentially harmful impact that the behavior of others may have on an individual's ability to advance his own interests. Public participation therefore is

expected to cure the possibilities that there will be occasions where private individuals, organizations, or public officials act out of what they deem to be the public interest. This applies even where political actors act on their own believe that what they do is in the interest of public good and that it would serve the public interest (Redish & Wasserman, 1998).

Political participation is one of the primary avenues by which the public participate in public policy and governance (Griffin & Newman 2005; Hill & Leighley, 1992; Schlozman & Brady 1995). Public participation therefore is at the core business of deepening democratic governance as it is the foundation of citizen's choice of the governance of their society.

5.5.2 Implications on Practice

The study revealed that decentralized units have a significant influence on democratic governance process in Kenya as the dependent variable. Leaders in the county government can apply the findings of this study to develop internal capacity to work towards promoting democratic space. Both county and national government must embrace devolution as a key democratic governance promotion tool and this study can be used to demonstrate the reason therein. The study further demonstrates that devolved units are the smallest units on representations where citizens can directly engage themselves in electing their choice of representatives in a democratic process.

The study identified that public participation has positive and significant relationship with democratic governance process in Kenya. The findings indicated that inclusion of public input highly contributed to democratic governance and the feel of belonging of the people. Public participation is very critical for perception of fairness and justice. It

also captured that process fairness positively impact on overall evaluation of governmental performance and legitimacy. According to this study public participation involves an open, accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities can exchange views and influence decision making. Public participation make citizens engage within themselves, decide, plan and play an active part in the development and operation of services that improve their democratic space.

The study identified that capacity building have a positive and significant relationship on democratic governance process. The study showed that capacity building is associated with activities designed to increase the competence and effectiveness of individuals and democratic governance process as it allows engagements of the citizens to fully involve themselves in leadership process and hence increased democratic space. Capacity building promotes integrity in governance to effectively respond to winds of change. It assists governments in appreciating service to its citizens by conceptualizing the representation of citizens as 'clients' and related concept that government, in essence, was really no different from private enterprise that could behave as such. This study finding will enable governments invest in building the capacity and credibility of community based institutions that promotes the role of civil society and special groups like gender equality, representation of the minority and people with disabilities, transparency, and accountability are key to the success of any public activity. Capacity building in governance sets the stage for efficiency and effectiveness, and becomes an essential precondition for building public trust, that is, transparency, integrity and professionalism in democratic governance.

Social equity is about government leadership which exercises political morality. It is a process that concerns with preparedness in terms of knowledge, skills, and institutional competence to restore and boost a mood of confidence, which would motivate people to follow the government lead. Social equity directly relates to rules and rule-making processes and to the exchange and distribution of material or immaterial resources in specific settings.

5.5.3 Policy Implications

To ensure devolved process has impact on democratic process, it would be important for both county and national governments to set up policies that ensure devolution and democratic ideals are well protected. Devolved units significantly influence. The governments need to focus on policies that will facilitate devolved unit functions and hence democratic process. Governments should ensure they have policies defining the right and freedom of the citizens in exercising their democratic rights to have their voice heard. Leaders also should make policies to guide setting aside resources, including time, for development of functional devolved units.

Leaders need to adopt policies that ensure the rights of public participation are observed to promote democratic processes and that guide on flexibility required to ensure change from the public contribution is felt. Public participation was identified in the study as having a direct positive relationship with democratic process. To a great extent public participation should be adopted in Kenya.

To ensure the best decisions alternatives are aired out by the citizens, leaders need to make policies on capacity building that guide how decisions are made and who is involved to ensure consistently quality decisions are made that can lead to increased

democratic space. This study indicates that quality decisions and ideas promote the democratic process through capacity building.

The study reveals to policy makers the synergistic effect on democratic process applying legal framework. This enables citizens engage freely in their mind and thoughts in healthy contribution towards promoting increased democratic process and space. They can focus their guidance towards building the legal framework. They can also make regulations that are informed by the findings of this study.

5.4 Suggestions for Future Research

In this section, suggestions for further research in areas related to this study are given. In future, it is recommended that research be done to address the limitations of this study. Future researchers could introduce different variables other than devolved units, capacity building, public participation, social equity, legal framework, and further whether political interest have moderating effect on the relationship between devolution framework on democratic governance process in Kenya. Studies using other additional variables, such as county size and leadership styles, as moderators or mediators can be carried out to gain further insights into the relationship between devolution frameworks on democratic governance process in Kenya.

Further research could also carry out in-depth studies on specific counties or groups of counties to analyze further the reasons for certain results specific to them. Besides future research could also study how devolution framework influences other performance measures other than democratic governance process.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Letter of Introduction

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: QUESTIONNAIRE

I am a PhD student in Leadership and Governance at the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology. One of the requirements to the award of the degree would be to write a dissertation in my area of study.

I have chosen democratic governance issues for my study. The gap from the reviewed literature led me to research on ‘the influence of Kenya’s devolution framework on democratic governance’.

I would highly appreciate your assistance in giving me your sincere feedback on the questionnaire attached to this letter which will be used confidentially for this research only and will not be diverged for any other use. Please note that it would be optional to identify yourself and thus can remain anonymous.

Thank you.

PATRICK KASYULA

0722 492887

Appendix II: Questionnaire

This questionnaire is to collect data for purely academic purpose. The study seeks to examine the influence of devolution framework on democratic governance in Kenya. All information will be treated with strict confidence. Do not put any name or identification on this questionnaire. *Answer all questions as indicated by either filling in the blank or ticking the option that applies.*

SECTION ONE: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1) GENDER

Male

Female

2) Age Bracket

18-25

26-36

36-45

46-55

Over 56

3) Marital Status

Married

Single

Divorced

Widower

4). What is Name of your county.....

5). What is your Academic Qualifications?

i. PhD Level

ii. Masters Level

iii. First Degree

iv. Diploma

v. KCSE

vi. None

SECTION TWO: DECENTRALIZED UNITS

1) What is your level of agreement with the following statements relating to decentralized units in your county? (5- Strongly agree, 4- Agree, 3-Neutral, 2- Disagree, 1- Strongly Disagree)

Statement	5	4	3	2	1
Decentralized units have improved proximity to public services					
Decentralized units have enhanced timely access to services					

2) Please tick as appropriate on how you rate the following in your county;

Statement	1-2 km	3-5 km	6-8 km	9-10 km	Above 10 km
The distance of the nearest hospital from your home is					
The distance to the nearest public registration office					
The distance to the nearest police station					
The distance to the nearest water point					
The distance to the nearest school					

3) What is your level of agreement with the following statements relating to decentralized units in your county? (5- Strongly agree, 4- Agree, 3-Neutral, 2- Disagree, 1- Strongly Disagree)

Statements	5	4	3	2	1
In order for devolution to function as expected, there are several structures that need to be set up including the office of the Governor, County Assembly, County Public Service Board, and the Senate					
Devolution may create or strengthen of independent units or tiers of Government					
Devolution may transfer of authority for decision making, finance and management to counties with cooperate status					
Devolution describes an inter-organizational pattern of power relationship.					
Devolved unit need to be given autonomy and independence without direct control of centre government					
The local level units must have clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries to exercise authority and perform public functions					
The devolved units should act on its own, not under hierarchical supervision of the Central Government					
Devolved entities permit to establish and manage their own budgetary, evaluation system and monitoring					

4). In your view, how else do decentralized units impact service provision in your county?

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SECTION THREE: CAPACITY BUILDING

1). What is your level of agreement with the following statements relating to Capacity building in your county? (5- Strongly Agree, 4- Agree, 3-Neutral, 2- Disagree, 1- Strongly Disagree)

	5	4	3	2	1
Capacity building is a recognition that organizations need to build management systems as well as programs.					
Seminars, workshops, are mode of capacity building used by almost all democratic institutions in Kenya					
Training, Access to on-line data, documentation, and information on specific Capacity building facilitate democratic governance					
Capacity building is associated with activities designed to increase the competence and effectiveness of individuals and organizations					
Capacity building broadens the participation for the masses and becomes a prerequisite for democracy deepening.					
Developing a capacity building plan is to set objectives and indicators to show expected progress over a particular timeframe.					

2). In your view, how else does Capacity building impact processes in your county?

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SECTION FOUR: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

1). What is your level of agreement with the following statements relating to Public Participation in your county? (5- Strongly agree, 4- Agree, 3-Neutral, 2-Disagree, 1-Strongly Disagree)

STATEMENT	5	4	3	2	1
Effective public participation allows the public’s values to be identified and incorporated into decisions that ultimately affect them					
Public participation ought to be appropriately legislated to operationalize its key objectives					
Public participation encompass an open, accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities exchange views on the development and operation of services that affect their lives					
Public participation is an indication of awareness of social capital as critical governance variable that guides towards critical understanding, fostering and guiding development					
Public participation includes the promise that the public’s contribution will influence the decision					
Public participation promotes sustainable decisions by recognizing and communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including decision-making agencies					

2). In your view, how else does Public participation influence decisions in your county?

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SECTION FIVE: SOCIAL EQUITY

1) What is your level of agreement with the following statements relating to Equity and Inclusivity in your County? (5- Strongly agree, 4- Agree, 3-Neutral, 2-Disagree, 1- Strongly Disagree)

STATEMENT	5	4	3	2	1
Democratic governance involves developing leadership and people management that promotes diversity as a guiding principle that enforce inclusive practice					
Democratic governance collaborate with others in order to strengthen its capacity and focus on issues of social equity					
In democratic governance there should be communications that ensure the voices of people who are marginalized are heard					
Social equity is addressed in all leadership and management training in a democratic governance					
Each country has a plan to address unjustifiable and under-representation					
The employment of people with disabilities is promoted across all the counties					

2). In your view, how else does social equity manifest in your County?.....

SECTION SIX: LEGAL FRAMEWORK

1). What is your level of agreement with the following statements relating to Legal Framework in your County? (5- Strongly agree, 4- Agree, 3-Neutral, 2-Disagree, 1- Strongly Disagree)

STATEMENT	5	4	3	2	1
The primary source of legislation on devolution is the Constitution of Kenya					
Devolution Legal Framework Provides for public participation in the conduct of the activities of the county assembly					
Devolution Legal Framework Provides for the mechanism for capacity building requirements of the national government and the county governments					
Devolution Legal Framework Provides for the establishment of an administrative and institutional framework at the national, county and decentralized units to ensure access to national government services in all parts of the Republic					
Devolution legal framework promotes responsiveness to citizens needs and aspirations					
Devolution legal framework engenders legitimacy of governance structures and systems					
Devolution legal framework enhances national and county governance transparency					
Devolution legal framework enhances accountability at the national and county levels of government					
Devolution Legal Framework Provides for promotion of respect for the diversity of the people and communities of Kenya					
Devolution Legal Framework guarantees the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law					

2). In your view, how else has Legal Framework impacted in your County?

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SECTION SEVEN: POLITICAL INTERESTS

1). What is your level of agreement with the following statements relating to political interests? (5- Strongly agree, 4- Agree, 3-Neutral, 2-Disagree, 1- Strongly Disagree)

STATEMENT	5	4	3	2	1
Budget allocation in my county is done in good time					
Budget allocation to my county is usually sufficient					
Budgeting process in my county is does not take long to complete					
My county has the preliquisite skills and expertise					
My county has a policy on staff recruitment, promotions, development and discipline					
My county has a code of conduct to regulate staff behavior					

SECTION EIGHT: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN KENYA

1) What is your level of agreement with the following statements relating to decentralized units in your county? (5- Strongly agree, 4- Agree, 3-Neutral, 2- Disagree, 1- Strongly Disagree)

STATEMENT	5	4	3	2	1
Transparency has improved under the devolved system					
Accountability has improved under the devolved system					
Legitimacy of governments has been enhanced by the devolved system					

Political Leaders are accountable in my county					
Processes and institutions are more transparent in my county					
Responsiveness to citizen's needs has improved under devolved system					

2). In your view, how else has democratic governance been enhanced in your county?

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.....

Thank you very much for participating in this study. Once again you are reassured of confidentiality of this information and it will not be diverged for any other purpose other than this study. Should you be interested in receiving findings of this study, please indicate of your contacts as requested below: -

Contact Person.....

Email Address.....

Signature.....

Date of returning the questionnaire.....

Appendix III: Output Results

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.740
	Approx. Chi-Square	615.470
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	df	45
	Sig.	.000

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.749
	Approx. Chi-Square	202.554
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	df	15
	Sig.	.000

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.769
	Approx. Chi-Square	145.889
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	df	15
	Sig.	.000

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.852
	Approx. Chi-Square	138.468
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	df	15
	Sig.	.000

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.831
	Approx. Chi-Square	408.123
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	df	45
	Sig.	.000

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.885
	Approx. Chi-Square	213.015
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	df	15
	Sig.	.000

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.740
	Approx. Chi-Square	171.871
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	df	15
	Sig.	.000